China, India and Nepal Agree on A Common Way Forward for Conservation and Sustainable Development
China, India and Nepal agreed on a common framework for developing a conservation strategy and environmental monitoring plan for the Kailash Sacred Landscap. This is a first step towards developing a regional cooperation framework for this transboundary region linked to the sacred mountain. This is also known as Kang Rinpoche, Gangrenboqi Feng, and Kailasa Parvata. The representatives of this three countries met at the First Regional Workshop on the Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation Initiative held last week in Almora, Uttarakhand. The three day workshop was organised by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and hosted by the GB Pant Institute of Himalayan Environment and Development (GBPIHED), supported by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation Initiative (KSLCI) focuses on developing a transboundary regional cooperation framework for conservation and sustainable development. The preparatory phase of 18 months started in August 2009 following consultations with governments and partners in China, India and Nepal. This Initiative is the first pilot for implementation of ICIMOD’s ‘Trans-Himalayan Transects Programme’ which encompasses seven landscapes and four transects in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas, and aims to focus and increase the effectiveness of research and development activities.
Development of the Regional Cooperation Framework for the Kailash Landscape is being facilitated by ICIMOD with support from UNEP. The Landscape, which includes the southwestern portions of the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, and adjacent Himalayan regions in India and Nepal, is among the most culturally and ecologically diverse and fragile areas in the world, and has sacred significance for hundreds of millions of people in Asia, and around the globe The framework is expected to focus on transboundary biodiversity, and environmental and cultural conservation; scientific and technical cooperation; information exchange and sharing; and regional guidelines and policy mechanisms. The framework is being prepared based on the principles of participatory management, equity, sustainability, partnerships, ecosystem approach, lessons-learned approach, and transboundary cooperation.
This first regional workshop had 35 participants representing 18 institutions and including senior government officials led by Joint Secretaries from the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, and the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation, Government of Nepal, and senior officials from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, PR China. Representatives of the lead partners – the Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, GB Pant Institute of Himalayan Environment and Development, India, and the Central Department of Botany, Tribhuvan University, Nepal – reported the progress of the feasibility assessment studies and the review of the policy and enabling environment. The feasibility assessment included delineation of the target landscape by each of the countries following common agreed criteria, and the workshop finalised the landscape area. Other topics in the feasibility included country-wise descriptions of the landscape, status of resources, culture and heritage sites, tourism/pilgrimage status and potentials, environmental degradation and cultural integrity, identification of priority areas, community perception on biodiversity, cultural values and best-suited livelihood options, enabling environment assessment through policy review and finally the identification of gap areas. All three countries will finalise their reports after these discussions. ICIMOD will prepare a regional landscape map, and synthesise the feasibility report, policy and enabling environment report, conservation strategy, and environmental monitoring plan, all of which will feed into the regional cooperation framework.
The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, ICIMOD, is a regional knowledge development and learning centre serving the eight regional member countries of the Hindu Kush-Himalayas – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan – and based in Kathmandu, Nepal. Globalisation and climate change have an increasing influence on the stability of fragile mountain ecosystems and the livelihoods of mountain people. ICIMOD aims to assist mountain people to understand these changes, adapt to them, and make the most of new opportunities, while addressing upstream-downstream issues. We support regional transboundary programmes through partnership with regional partner institutions, facilitate the exchange of experience, and serve as a regional knowledge hub. We strengthen networking among regional and global centres of excellence. Overall, we are working to develop an economically and environmentally sound mountain ecosystem to improve the living standards of mountain populations and to sustain vital ecosystem services for the billions of people living downstream – now, and for the future.
source;pib-Govt of India
Monday, 19 April 2010
Wednesday, 7 April 2010
India, China ink pact to establish hotline
PTI
AP External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna delivers a speech at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing on Tuesday. India and China have on Wednesday signed a pact to establish a hotline. Related
In a significant step in taking their bilateral relations to a new level, India and China on Wednesday signed an agreement to establish a hotline between Prime Ministers of the two countries.
The agreement was signed by External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi after their first round of talks here.
This is the first time in recent years that India has established a dedicated hotline facility with any country.
The hotline would enable Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao to hold direct conversations.
The decision to establish the hotline was reached during a meeting between Mr. Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg in June 2009.
After the meeting, Mr. Krishna said the establishment of hotline facility showed how close India and China were with each other.
“This has been one of the highlights of my visit and it is fitting that the two countries were able to do it during the celebrations of 60th year of establishment of diplomatic relations,” he told reporters.
Asked whether the issue of stapled visas were taken up during the meeting with Mr. Yang, Mr. Krishna said: “All issues concerning bilateral ties were discussed.”
The Minister said the discussions between him and Mr. Yang were “purposeful and indeed satisfying.”
“We want to have continued, sustained and cordial relations with China. That has been one of the priorities of India’s foreign policy. That purpose has been served by my visit to Beijing,” he said.
“We want to have cordial and friendly ties and lift the bilateral relations to a new level of strategic cooperation and partnership.”
He said the trade between India and China will touch $60 billion this year and the issue of trade deficit with China is being discussed.
PTI
AP External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna delivers a speech at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing on Tuesday. India and China have on Wednesday signed a pact to establish a hotline. Related
In a significant step in taking their bilateral relations to a new level, India and China on Wednesday signed an agreement to establish a hotline between Prime Ministers of the two countries.
The agreement was signed by External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi after their first round of talks here.
This is the first time in recent years that India has established a dedicated hotline facility with any country.
The hotline would enable Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao to hold direct conversations.
The decision to establish the hotline was reached during a meeting between Mr. Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg in June 2009.
After the meeting, Mr. Krishna said the establishment of hotline facility showed how close India and China were with each other.
“This has been one of the highlights of my visit and it is fitting that the two countries were able to do it during the celebrations of 60th year of establishment of diplomatic relations,” he told reporters.
Asked whether the issue of stapled visas were taken up during the meeting with Mr. Yang, Mr. Krishna said: “All issues concerning bilateral ties were discussed.”
The Minister said the discussions between him and Mr. Yang were “purposeful and indeed satisfying.”
“We want to have continued, sustained and cordial relations with China. That has been one of the priorities of India’s foreign policy. That purpose has been served by my visit to Beijing,” he said.
“We want to have cordial and friendly ties and lift the bilateral relations to a new level of strategic cooperation and partnership.”
He said the trade between India and China will touch $60 billion this year and the issue of trade deficit with China is being discussed.
Monday, 5 April 2010
Behind China's India policy, a growing debate
BY Ananth Krishnan
Beyond the expected statements Chinese officials will exchange with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna in Beijing this week, there is little consensus among different policymakers in Beijing on how to engage with a rising India.
Earlier this year, the United States' decision to approve a $ 6.4-billion arms sale to Taiwan sparked a series of agitated commentaries in China's military journals. The tone will sound somewhat familiar to an Indian audience: it reflected a growing anxiety among strategists that the U.S. was building a “crescent-shaped ring” to encircle and contain China. Interestingly, much of the debate focussed on what role India would — or would not — play in a supposed U.S.-led “encirclement.” Some strategists expressed concern that an eventual “integration of India” into an American alliance “would profoundly affect China's security,” as the official China Daily reported. Dai Xu, an Air Force Colonel of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), warned that China needed to be vigilant against this growing network running “from Japan to India” that would suffocate China.
Others, however, were not so convinced, and instead sought to calm the tensions. Pei Yuanying, former Chinese Ambassador to India, said India, as “an independent international power in the international arena,” was “unlikely to be part of any such U.S. scheme.” Shen Dingli, one of the leading voices in the strategic community in Beijing, also disagreed with Dai's views in an interview with The Hindu, suggesting that the current relationship was sound enough for China to have no reason to worry about India's ties with the U.S.
These differing views point to an ongoing debate in Beijing on a question that many policymakers are grappling with: how should China engage with a rising India? On one side of the debate are voices from the PLA, who are pressing Beijing to take a harder line with India and who see little room for cooperation between two rivals. On the other are voices in the Hu Jintao government and official think tanks, which are pushing for a more moderate and non-confrontational foreign policy line, one which they see as crucial to China's own self-interest and continued development.
The military view
The appearance of a number of articles and commentaries last year in military journals and official Communist Party-run newspapers has led some to suggest that the first group is increasingly beginning to have its voice heard. In recent months, articles in influential publications like the People's Daily, have taken a noticeably harder line on India, accusing New Delhi of “arrogance” and calling on China to take a stronger position on the border dispute. The People's Daily, in particular, has also begun to devote extensive coverage to India's military build-up, frequently speaking of an “India threat.”
The articles more or less reflected the “PLA view” of Sino-Indian ties, according to Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University who studies the Chinese military. According to him and other analysts, this view is predicated on three basic policy positions on India. The first assumes that India is seeking to become a great power. The policy response is to support Pakistan, which China continues to do, and confine India's influence to South Asia. The second, he says, assumes that India has “hegemonic ambitions in South Asia” — a phrase often used by the People's Daily last year. The policy response in China is to “oppose hegemony” by supporting smaller states in South Asia, like Nepal and Bangladesh. The third is on India's presence in the Indian Ocean, and the policy response is to strengthen China's naval capabilities.
The other view
Much as the PLA is influential, its view by no means reflects a consensus opinion among the highest policymakers. Besides the PLA, there are at least three groups which have a role in shaping China's India policy, including commercial lobbies, retired officials and a select group of India scholars in official think tanks. This section tends to view the relationship beyond the narrow military paradigm of the PLA. It argues that despite the persisting mistrust between the countries, it is in China's own interest, both from the point of view of sustaining its economic development and its standing as a responsible world power, to have harmonious relations with India and a peaceful periphery.
“Many people in the Chinese government realise that despite historical differences, there are growing commonalities in relations between the two countries and their positions on international issues,” says Ma Jiali, a leading South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), who advises the government on its India policy. “There is also the common goal that both countries do not want to see a unipolar world.” He considers “four roles” India plays in shaping his policy view — “a close neighbour, a developing country with common goals, a rising power and an increasingly important international player.” “The basic fact is,” he continues, “we must have good relations with India, or our national interest will be damaged.”
His view is echoed by Sun Shihai, another influential ‘India hand' at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He says he “completely disagrees” with the policy views voiced by the nationalistic commentaries in much of the official media last year. “Many of those reports misperceived India very deeply,” says Professor Sun. “Among most scholars at least, there is a growing awareness that India's power is rising, its international status is rising, and these facts are a reality that cannot be altered.” He believes that it is in China's self-interest to work with India on issues in which the countries have a common stake such as climate change and combating terrorism. “China has more respect [now] for India's rise, and it is in our interest to co-operate where we can, as we did so effectively last year at Copenhagen [on climate change],” he says. “But as two rising powers with growing international roles and strategic weight, cooperation and competition will be natural. What the governments need to do is manage the competition and avoid conflict. Most serious scholars are of this view.”
Reading the debate
Do these different views matter to India? Chinese foreign policy is ultimately decided at the highest levels of the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee using these various inputs. But how these inputs get used is “an extremely complicated process,” says Prof. Kondapalli. “Various groups put out their agenda to try and have their opinions heard, but what is eventually decided depends on who has greater influence at a given moment in time.” For now though, the outcome of this debate still seems uncertain. “The academic community appears to follow a soft and co-operative line while the PLA maintains its stridency to keep India on tenterhooks,” says Brigadier (retd.) Arun Sahgal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
Until there is greater clarity on its outcome, the mistrust between the countries will likely persist. For usually, it is only the harder “PLA view” of India that gets covered in the media, serving as fodder for the often over-hyped ‘China threat' perspectives dished out by strategic analysts. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that these views are more “newsworthy” than balanced views from the government and other scholars. But another factor behind misperceptions is the continuing opacity in China's own government, in both policy-making and the state's control of the media.
“The main problem in understanding China's policies is the lack of transparency, which often leads to misperceptions” Prof. Kondapalli says. Consequently, even extreme opinions, from any media outlet, often tend to be regarded as Beijing's official line, and drown out other views even if they are no more than voices in an ongoing debate. And until China becomes more transparent, analysts say, external observers will likely continue to imagine the worst when reading the tea leaves.
SOURCE:THE HINDU
BY Ananth Krishnan
Beyond the expected statements Chinese officials will exchange with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna in Beijing this week, there is little consensus among different policymakers in Beijing on how to engage with a rising India.
Earlier this year, the United States' decision to approve a $ 6.4-billion arms sale to Taiwan sparked a series of agitated commentaries in China's military journals. The tone will sound somewhat familiar to an Indian audience: it reflected a growing anxiety among strategists that the U.S. was building a “crescent-shaped ring” to encircle and contain China. Interestingly, much of the debate focussed on what role India would — or would not — play in a supposed U.S.-led “encirclement.” Some strategists expressed concern that an eventual “integration of India” into an American alliance “would profoundly affect China's security,” as the official China Daily reported. Dai Xu, an Air Force Colonel of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), warned that China needed to be vigilant against this growing network running “from Japan to India” that would suffocate China.
Others, however, were not so convinced, and instead sought to calm the tensions. Pei Yuanying, former Chinese Ambassador to India, said India, as “an independent international power in the international arena,” was “unlikely to be part of any such U.S. scheme.” Shen Dingli, one of the leading voices in the strategic community in Beijing, also disagreed with Dai's views in an interview with The Hindu, suggesting that the current relationship was sound enough for China to have no reason to worry about India's ties with the U.S.
These differing views point to an ongoing debate in Beijing on a question that many policymakers are grappling with: how should China engage with a rising India? On one side of the debate are voices from the PLA, who are pressing Beijing to take a harder line with India and who see little room for cooperation between two rivals. On the other are voices in the Hu Jintao government and official think tanks, which are pushing for a more moderate and non-confrontational foreign policy line, one which they see as crucial to China's own self-interest and continued development.
The military view
The appearance of a number of articles and commentaries last year in military journals and official Communist Party-run newspapers has led some to suggest that the first group is increasingly beginning to have its voice heard. In recent months, articles in influential publications like the People's Daily, have taken a noticeably harder line on India, accusing New Delhi of “arrogance” and calling on China to take a stronger position on the border dispute. The People's Daily, in particular, has also begun to devote extensive coverage to India's military build-up, frequently speaking of an “India threat.”
The articles more or less reflected the “PLA view” of Sino-Indian ties, according to Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University who studies the Chinese military. According to him and other analysts, this view is predicated on three basic policy positions on India. The first assumes that India is seeking to become a great power. The policy response is to support Pakistan, which China continues to do, and confine India's influence to South Asia. The second, he says, assumes that India has “hegemonic ambitions in South Asia” — a phrase often used by the People's Daily last year. The policy response in China is to “oppose hegemony” by supporting smaller states in South Asia, like Nepal and Bangladesh. The third is on India's presence in the Indian Ocean, and the policy response is to strengthen China's naval capabilities.
The other view
Much as the PLA is influential, its view by no means reflects a consensus opinion among the highest policymakers. Besides the PLA, there are at least three groups which have a role in shaping China's India policy, including commercial lobbies, retired officials and a select group of India scholars in official think tanks. This section tends to view the relationship beyond the narrow military paradigm of the PLA. It argues that despite the persisting mistrust between the countries, it is in China's own interest, both from the point of view of sustaining its economic development and its standing as a responsible world power, to have harmonious relations with India and a peaceful periphery.
“Many people in the Chinese government realise that despite historical differences, there are growing commonalities in relations between the two countries and their positions on international issues,” says Ma Jiali, a leading South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), who advises the government on its India policy. “There is also the common goal that both countries do not want to see a unipolar world.” He considers “four roles” India plays in shaping his policy view — “a close neighbour, a developing country with common goals, a rising power and an increasingly important international player.” “The basic fact is,” he continues, “we must have good relations with India, or our national interest will be damaged.”
His view is echoed by Sun Shihai, another influential ‘India hand' at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He says he “completely disagrees” with the policy views voiced by the nationalistic commentaries in much of the official media last year. “Many of those reports misperceived India very deeply,” says Professor Sun. “Among most scholars at least, there is a growing awareness that India's power is rising, its international status is rising, and these facts are a reality that cannot be altered.” He believes that it is in China's self-interest to work with India on issues in which the countries have a common stake such as climate change and combating terrorism. “China has more respect [now] for India's rise, and it is in our interest to co-operate where we can, as we did so effectively last year at Copenhagen [on climate change],” he says. “But as two rising powers with growing international roles and strategic weight, cooperation and competition will be natural. What the governments need to do is manage the competition and avoid conflict. Most serious scholars are of this view.”
Reading the debate
Do these different views matter to India? Chinese foreign policy is ultimately decided at the highest levels of the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee using these various inputs. But how these inputs get used is “an extremely complicated process,” says Prof. Kondapalli. “Various groups put out their agenda to try and have their opinions heard, but what is eventually decided depends on who has greater influence at a given moment in time.” For now though, the outcome of this debate still seems uncertain. “The academic community appears to follow a soft and co-operative line while the PLA maintains its stridency to keep India on tenterhooks,” says Brigadier (retd.) Arun Sahgal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
Until there is greater clarity on its outcome, the mistrust between the countries will likely persist. For usually, it is only the harder “PLA view” of India that gets covered in the media, serving as fodder for the often over-hyped ‘China threat' perspectives dished out by strategic analysts. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that these views are more “newsworthy” than balanced views from the government and other scholars. But another factor behind misperceptions is the continuing opacity in China's own government, in both policy-making and the state's control of the media.
“The main problem in understanding China's policies is the lack of transparency, which often leads to misperceptions” Prof. Kondapalli says. Consequently, even extreme opinions, from any media outlet, often tend to be regarded as Beijing's official line, and drown out other views even if they are no more than voices in an ongoing debate. And until China becomes more transparent, analysts say, external observers will likely continue to imagine the worst when reading the tea leaves.
SOURCE:THE HINDU
Thursday, 1 April 2010
When will the mistrust end?
by Sreemati Chakrabarti
Sixty years after the two countries established diplomatic relations, Indians and Chinese need to break the mental barrier and begin to trust one another. Here's how the trust deficit can be overcome.
On April 1, 2010 India and China observed 60 years of their diplomatic relations. On this day in 1950 India took the world by surprise when it decided to recognise the government of the People's Republic of China headed by Mao Zedong and led by the Communist Party of China, which had brought the Chinese mainland under its control after defeating Chiang Kai-shek's army. This was a bold decision by the Indian government – the government of a newly independent country. It obviously displeased the western powers who went along with Chiang Kai-shek's view that mainland China had been occupied only temporarily by ‘communist bandits' who would soon be overthrown. Indian foreign-policy makers, led by the brilliant and far-sighted K.P.S. Menon, gave sensible advice to Prime Minister Nehru. This led to the recognition of the new government established in Beijing on October 1 1949.
The first decade of the relationship saw some very important developments like the signing of the Panchsheel (the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which later became the official basis of Chinese foreign policy) in 1954, and the Bandung Conference a year later, where both Nehru and Zhou Enlai were elevated to the status of icons for the nations of Asia and Africa struggling for liberation and independence. Cultural and educational exchanges between India and China took place at more than a modest level.
This congenial relationship was upset by the Tibetan Rebellion with the Dalai Lama fleeing to India and eventually setting up a ‘government-in-exile.' The Chinese strongly resented Nehru's trip to Darjeeling to formally welcome the Tibetan leader. The border issue then came to the forefront and disagreement on it further embittered relations, leading to the unfortunate border war between the two young nations. Nehru called it “Chinese aggression” and “betrayal by the Chinese”: these two expressions have been repeated a million times in India mainly through the media despite the fact that all the facts behind the border war have not yet come out in the open. Similarly in China, India was labelled as “expansionist” – desperate to grab the territories of its neighbours. The Indian government was accused of being a “stooge of western imperialism.”
Nearly half a century has lapsed since the 1962 war but some kind of an inbuilt mistrust between the two persists. It often comes out in the open as has been seen recently in the media of the two countries indulging in meaningless mutual accusations. Those in India who feel the border dispute must be resolved before China can be trusted fail to understand the complexities of the issue. Two civilisations have co-existed without any evidence of confrontation for several centuries, when they had no border – a line separating two countries was then an alien idea. It was only after colonialism arrived that the civilisations developed the nation-state mentality and mindset where a single line was to divide the two civilisations. If such a line never existed, it has not been easy to invent one.
Yet another fact of history not known to many Indians who love to demonise China is that the Chinese people and state have been subjected to humiliation and exploitation for more than a century by the western imperialist powers. The Chinese people have always held the government's weakness as the primary cause of its subjugation. Revolutionaries from Sun Yat-sen to Mao Zedong succeeded in mobilising people on the grounds that a government that is completely weak vis-à-vis the foreign powers must go. Up to this day, therefore, the Chinese government is determined not to be seen as weak by its own people. It is this image of a strong government that gives the Communist Party of China legitimacy to rule.
Misperceptions among the Chinese about India are equally unrealistic. They need to understand that India does not covet the land of others nor is it waiting to ‘play the Tibet Card' at an opportune moment. Accepting Tibet as part of China is convenient for India or else an independent ‘Greater Tibet' brings to dispute the status of Sikkim, which has in the past, for centuries, been a vassal-state of Tibet. During my trips to China, both during formal and informal discussions, I have found that the Chinese are far more concerned about India's unpredictability in its Tibet policy than anything else. The Chinese must understand, notwithstanding what some pro-Tibetan independence groups do in India, that this country has nothing to gain by splitting Tibet from China.
Since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's deadlock-breaking visit in 1988-89, there have been many positive developments in bilateral relations. Trade has gone up at an exceedingly fast rate to the extent that today China has become India's largest trading partner. Tourism is on the rise, and with the opening of more consulates and the beginning of direct flights between different cities of India and China, this is likely to increase further.
Educational and cultural exchanges are taking place at an impressive level. According to unconfirmed but reliable reports, 4000 Indian students are studying in China today. The numbers coming from China are far less, thanks to our Home Ministry's visa policy. Even Chinese academics who are invited by our universities to teach the Chinese language to Indian students (due to a huge demand for it) find it very difficult to obtain visas. Both Delhi University's East Asian Studies Department and Santiniketan's Cheena Bhawan have suffered on account of this rigidity, which is the result of mistrust.
I do not subscribe to the view that two rising powers cannot peacefully co-exist. Indeed, some major path-breaking steps have to be taken by both sides to make sure that Cold War II or as some call it, an Asian Cold War does not happen. A resurgent Asia surely does not deserve it. However, Indians and Chinese need to break the mental barrier and begin to trust one another.
How can this trust deficit be overcome?
First, forget the border issue. Not solving it is not hurting either India or China in any way – economically, socially, culturally, or politically. It is too complicated.
Secondly, China is quite sensitive to the ‘Tibet Issue.' With the Dalai Lama and over 100,000 followers living in India, New Delhi needs constantly to renew its commitment on curbing Tibetan separatist actions on its soil so as to mitigate suspicion that it might intend to ‘play the Tibet Card.'
Thirdly, both sides must open up border trade at many points – the border people have been the worst victims of Sino-Indian hostilities, and develop province-to-province economic relations. The recent K2K (Kolkata to Kunming) Initiative is an encouraging development.
Finally, only large-scale people-to-people contacts can wipe out this trust deficit. Exchanges in the fields of education, sports, culture, science, and technology need to be greatly enhanced. Despite being neighbours, we know and understand very little of each other. On the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, cannot India and China make a new beginning?
(The author is Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi and Professor of Chinese Studies at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.)
by Sreemati Chakrabarti
Sixty years after the two countries established diplomatic relations, Indians and Chinese need to break the mental barrier and begin to trust one another. Here's how the trust deficit can be overcome.
On April 1, 2010 India and China observed 60 years of their diplomatic relations. On this day in 1950 India took the world by surprise when it decided to recognise the government of the People's Republic of China headed by Mao Zedong and led by the Communist Party of China, which had brought the Chinese mainland under its control after defeating Chiang Kai-shek's army. This was a bold decision by the Indian government – the government of a newly independent country. It obviously displeased the western powers who went along with Chiang Kai-shek's view that mainland China had been occupied only temporarily by ‘communist bandits' who would soon be overthrown. Indian foreign-policy makers, led by the brilliant and far-sighted K.P.S. Menon, gave sensible advice to Prime Minister Nehru. This led to the recognition of the new government established in Beijing on October 1 1949.
The first decade of the relationship saw some very important developments like the signing of the Panchsheel (the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which later became the official basis of Chinese foreign policy) in 1954, and the Bandung Conference a year later, where both Nehru and Zhou Enlai were elevated to the status of icons for the nations of Asia and Africa struggling for liberation and independence. Cultural and educational exchanges between India and China took place at more than a modest level.
This congenial relationship was upset by the Tibetan Rebellion with the Dalai Lama fleeing to India and eventually setting up a ‘government-in-exile.' The Chinese strongly resented Nehru's trip to Darjeeling to formally welcome the Tibetan leader. The border issue then came to the forefront and disagreement on it further embittered relations, leading to the unfortunate border war between the two young nations. Nehru called it “Chinese aggression” and “betrayal by the Chinese”: these two expressions have been repeated a million times in India mainly through the media despite the fact that all the facts behind the border war have not yet come out in the open. Similarly in China, India was labelled as “expansionist” – desperate to grab the territories of its neighbours. The Indian government was accused of being a “stooge of western imperialism.”
Nearly half a century has lapsed since the 1962 war but some kind of an inbuilt mistrust between the two persists. It often comes out in the open as has been seen recently in the media of the two countries indulging in meaningless mutual accusations. Those in India who feel the border dispute must be resolved before China can be trusted fail to understand the complexities of the issue. Two civilisations have co-existed without any evidence of confrontation for several centuries, when they had no border – a line separating two countries was then an alien idea. It was only after colonialism arrived that the civilisations developed the nation-state mentality and mindset where a single line was to divide the two civilisations. If such a line never existed, it has not been easy to invent one.
Yet another fact of history not known to many Indians who love to demonise China is that the Chinese people and state have been subjected to humiliation and exploitation for more than a century by the western imperialist powers. The Chinese people have always held the government's weakness as the primary cause of its subjugation. Revolutionaries from Sun Yat-sen to Mao Zedong succeeded in mobilising people on the grounds that a government that is completely weak vis-à-vis the foreign powers must go. Up to this day, therefore, the Chinese government is determined not to be seen as weak by its own people. It is this image of a strong government that gives the Communist Party of China legitimacy to rule.
Misperceptions among the Chinese about India are equally unrealistic. They need to understand that India does not covet the land of others nor is it waiting to ‘play the Tibet Card' at an opportune moment. Accepting Tibet as part of China is convenient for India or else an independent ‘Greater Tibet' brings to dispute the status of Sikkim, which has in the past, for centuries, been a vassal-state of Tibet. During my trips to China, both during formal and informal discussions, I have found that the Chinese are far more concerned about India's unpredictability in its Tibet policy than anything else. The Chinese must understand, notwithstanding what some pro-Tibetan independence groups do in India, that this country has nothing to gain by splitting Tibet from China.
Since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's deadlock-breaking visit in 1988-89, there have been many positive developments in bilateral relations. Trade has gone up at an exceedingly fast rate to the extent that today China has become India's largest trading partner. Tourism is on the rise, and with the opening of more consulates and the beginning of direct flights between different cities of India and China, this is likely to increase further.
Educational and cultural exchanges are taking place at an impressive level. According to unconfirmed but reliable reports, 4000 Indian students are studying in China today. The numbers coming from China are far less, thanks to our Home Ministry's visa policy. Even Chinese academics who are invited by our universities to teach the Chinese language to Indian students (due to a huge demand for it) find it very difficult to obtain visas. Both Delhi University's East Asian Studies Department and Santiniketan's Cheena Bhawan have suffered on account of this rigidity, which is the result of mistrust.
I do not subscribe to the view that two rising powers cannot peacefully co-exist. Indeed, some major path-breaking steps have to be taken by both sides to make sure that Cold War II or as some call it, an Asian Cold War does not happen. A resurgent Asia surely does not deserve it. However, Indians and Chinese need to break the mental barrier and begin to trust one another.
How can this trust deficit be overcome?
First, forget the border issue. Not solving it is not hurting either India or China in any way – economically, socially, culturally, or politically. It is too complicated.
Secondly, China is quite sensitive to the ‘Tibet Issue.' With the Dalai Lama and over 100,000 followers living in India, New Delhi needs constantly to renew its commitment on curbing Tibetan separatist actions on its soil so as to mitigate suspicion that it might intend to ‘play the Tibet Card.'
Thirdly, both sides must open up border trade at many points – the border people have been the worst victims of Sino-Indian hostilities, and develop province-to-province economic relations. The recent K2K (Kolkata to Kunming) Initiative is an encouraging development.
Finally, only large-scale people-to-people contacts can wipe out this trust deficit. Exchanges in the fields of education, sports, culture, science, and technology need to be greatly enhanced. Despite being neighbours, we know and understand very little of each other. On the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, cannot India and China make a new beginning?
(The author is Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi and Professor of Chinese Studies at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.)
China positive on relations with India
by Ananth Krishnan
Following a year that saw both countries trade bitter exchanges over the long-running border dispute, China-India ties appear set to turn the corner when External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna arrives in the Chinese capital on Monday.
Speaking ahead of the visit, Chinese officials struck an optimistic note on how they viewed the general direction of bilateral ties, saying the countries had made “remarkable” progress on expanding engagement beyond the boundary question that once held the relationship hostage, and even sparked renewed strains last year.
“We are hoping and willing to join hands with India to further enhance strategic mutual trust, to boost mutually beneficial co-operation and have closer communication and coordination in bilateral affairs to press ahead with our relationship,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang told journalists, speaking on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries, which fell on Thursday.
Festival of India
Mr. Krishna arrives in Beijing on Monday evening, and will launch a six month-long “Festival of India in China” near Beijing's Forbidden City to mark the anniversary. During his four-day visit, he will also hold talks with his counterpart Yang Jiechi and meet with Premier Wen Jiabao.
Indian and Chinese officials hope to use the occasion to draw a line over the tensions between the two countries that surfaced last year.
Media reports in India pointed to increased incursions by Chinese troops along disputed border areas, while China's State-run media responded by accusing India of “arrogance” and harbouring “hegemonic” ambitions in South Asia.
The Chinese government also strongly criticised Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh during Assembly elections in the State, accusing India of “stirring up trouble.” China claims parts of the State, and talks over the border issue have made little progress.
Indian and Chinese officials say relations have warmed following the Copenhagen climate summit, when the two countries closely worked together and even coordinated their negotiating positions.
Mr. Krishna's visit would provide a further opportunity for India and China to “strengthen communication and dialogue,” Mr. Qin said.
by Ananth Krishnan
Following a year that saw both countries trade bitter exchanges over the long-running border dispute, China-India ties appear set to turn the corner when External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna arrives in the Chinese capital on Monday.
Speaking ahead of the visit, Chinese officials struck an optimistic note on how they viewed the general direction of bilateral ties, saying the countries had made “remarkable” progress on expanding engagement beyond the boundary question that once held the relationship hostage, and even sparked renewed strains last year.
“We are hoping and willing to join hands with India to further enhance strategic mutual trust, to boost mutually beneficial co-operation and have closer communication and coordination in bilateral affairs to press ahead with our relationship,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang told journalists, speaking on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries, which fell on Thursday.
Festival of India
Mr. Krishna arrives in Beijing on Monday evening, and will launch a six month-long “Festival of India in China” near Beijing's Forbidden City to mark the anniversary. During his four-day visit, he will also hold talks with his counterpart Yang Jiechi and meet with Premier Wen Jiabao.
Indian and Chinese officials hope to use the occasion to draw a line over the tensions between the two countries that surfaced last year.
Media reports in India pointed to increased incursions by Chinese troops along disputed border areas, while China's State-run media responded by accusing India of “arrogance” and harbouring “hegemonic” ambitions in South Asia.
The Chinese government also strongly criticised Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh during Assembly elections in the State, accusing India of “stirring up trouble.” China claims parts of the State, and talks over the border issue have made little progress.
Indian and Chinese officials say relations have warmed following the Copenhagen climate summit, when the two countries closely worked together and even coordinated their negotiating positions.
Mr. Krishna's visit would provide a further opportunity for India and China to “strengthen communication and dialogue,” Mr. Qin said.
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