The great game pantomime
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
Instead of crying over the amazing pace of development of Chinese territories across our borders, ask Chinese companies to come forward and invest in our border roads.
The latest contribution to the discourse on China comes from Jaswant Singh, former External Affairs and Finance Minister. His opinion piece in the American media enjoins our strategic community's current discourse on the power dynamics in Asia. He is convinced that India has a “great game” on its hands and seems to imply that the outcome of this game will critically depend on its military prowess and its strategic alliance with the United States, whereas expanding Sino-Indian economic cooperation ultimately becomes inconsequential. Mr. Singh has articulated these views at an interesting point in the U.S.-India strategic partnership. To be sure, President Barack Obama's forthcoming visit to India gives them a sense of immediacy.
However, is there a great game in our region, and if so, is it as one-dimensional as Mr. Singh suggests? He says: “Rudyard Kipling's old ‘Great Game' now has new contestants. Instead of an expansionist Russian empire confronting Imperial Britain, it is now China hungry for land, water, and raw materials that is flexing its muscles, encroaching on Himalayan redoubts and directly challenging India.”
It may seem an esoteric historical detail in current polemics, but thanks to able historiography in the West, we now know that Imperial Britain exaggerated the “perception of threat” from Czarist Russia with the purpose of expanding its own influence in India and in the regions to the southwest in a wide arc that stretches from Cairo to China's Xinjiang — Greater Middle East. There is a spellbinding book by David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, which Jawaharlal Nehru would have acquired for our Parliament library had been alive today. Unlike Kipling's fiction, Fromkin provides calm, meticulously researched conclusions on Imperial Britain's strategy leading to the great Middle East settlement of 1921 — and the immense vistas of decades of history that provided its backdrop.
What makes Fromkin's world of yesterday absolutely fascinating is that the world of today bears striking similarities. Then too, as the decline of the Ottoman Empire began accelerating, there was a furious struggle for geopolitical space (and resources) among the established and emerging powers in Europe. There were great anxieties as a revolution was erupting with an obscure ideology amid convulsions of social unrest that were threatening to breach the dam in the established powers and which had no easy solutions.
The great game today, too, is a pantomime. The U.S. moves into Middle Asia to get embedded in a region which it historically never accessed — and couldn't access so long as the Soviet Union existed. These U.S. moves are, like Kipling's fiction, easy to dissimulate but the geo-strategic thrust is barely disguised: get embedded in a region that holds multitrillion dollars worth of mineral resources, and which overlooks 4 nuclear powers (potentially 5), three of which are emerging powers that may at some point, inevitably, see the raison d'etre of getting together in a post-Bretton Woods world order. Mr. Singh loses the plot.
He asserts: “The Chinese urge is to break from the confines of their country's history, and thus China's own geography. An assertive and relatively stable China, it seems, must expand, lest pent-up internal pressures tear it apart.” This is taking a walk fearlessly into terrains where Sinologists fear to tread. The point is China is a neighbour and even if a neighbour is not tailor-made for us, we have to live with it. And that can commence only by knowing our neighbour without pride and prejudice. The well-known American historian and author, Jeffrey Wasserstrom (who edits The Journal of Asian Studies), also happened to amble across these tricky terrains last week. Whereas Mr. Singh is self-confident, Prof. Wasserstrom is unsure about the great ambivalences in the Chinese story. I need to quote him at some length:
“One way to interpret China' elevated rhetoric … is as another indication that Chinese leaders have grown supremely self-confident and are eager to throw their weight around. The reality, though, is more complex … words and deeds are often shaped by a mixture of insecurity and cockiness … Of course, there are moments when China's leaders do seem like people who know that they are succeeding and want others to acknowledge it.
“And yet, when news broke last month that China had officially replaced Japan as the world's second-largest economy, instead of crowing about surpassing a long-time rival and having the top spot, held by the U.S. in its sights, the government issued statements emphasising that theirs remains a “poor, developing” country… Why, then, do China's rulers continue to backslide into doubt and fear, why do they seek to avoid having China labelled a superpower?
“China really is still a “poor” country in terms of per capita income. And parts of the country are more similar to sections of troubled “developing” countries than to China's showplace cities … Outsiders are increasingly convinced that China is a superpower, and that it needs to show that it can be a responsible one. But China's rulers only sometimes embrace the designation — and the [Chinese Communist] Party still sometimes behaves as if it had only a tenuous hold on power.”
Of course, it is an extraordinary intellectual challenge facing Indians to comprehend China. To compound it, we base opinions on dogmas and beliefs. Don't trade and investment constitute “constructive engagement” and become “CBMs”? There is a Chinese proposal today that they desire to build nuclear power plants in India — yes, maybe even bigger than the ones in Pakistan — having been India's “strategic partner” historically in the nuclear field. Somehow, our gurus are missing out on the quintessence of history and diplomacy, something our Chief Ministers in Karnataka and Gujarat who frequent China seem to grasp better — that good politics is about creating wealth.
If we are savvy, instead of sitting on the ground and crying about the amazing pace of development of Chinese territories across our borders, ask Chinese companies to come forward and invest in our border roads, too. According to Kamal Nath, China is prepared to increase threefold its present investments in our infrastructure sector. Why can't China build a world-class container terminal near Thiruvananthapuram so that we won't end up depending on the Colombo port, which China is expanding? The Sri Lankans seem to anticipate better the acute infrastructural problems of the Indian economy as it moves into a dazzling trajectory of growth.
The recent U.S. Senate testimony by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on China following his consultations with the Chinese leadership, including President Hu Jintao, provides a fascinating essay in realpolitik. Mr. Geithner said: “We [U.S.] have very significant economic interests in our relationship with China… [China's] efforts to encourage growth led by domestic demand ultimately mean more demand for American goods and services… [U.S. investment] in China provides a major channel through which U.S. exports flow, and as a result contributes to creating jobs here at home at our exporting firms … China has a very substantial economic stake in access to the U.S. market … And we have a very strong interest … in the Chinese market, so that U.S. businesses and U.S. workers do not face unfair trading practices. I want to be clear: a strong and growing China benefits the United States.”
Mr. Geithner, a personal friend of Mr. Obama, is pondering how China makes butter and how they can make butter together. There can be differences of opinion over what should be our appropriate and principled response to the Chinese way of making butter. Yet, today, there is so much for Indians to know: how, for a start, China is beginning to climb from low-end assembly lines and sweatshops to green technology and wind turbines and solar panels and electric cars. As Orville Schell, director of Asia Society's Centre on U.S.-China Relations, put it recently: “The first priority is to get our own house in order, so we're not filled with so much anxiety that is easily transferred on to the rise of another country.”
The pity is, just the wrong people could exploit Mr. Singh's plain thesis: middlemen for American arms manufacturers. India has a need to modernise its armed forces for meeting the new security challenges and “asymmetrical” wars that we may (or may not) fight. But we don't want to be hustled into things. Look at the contemporary politics of power. Saudi Arabia is embarking on a $60-billion dollar arms deal with the U.S. The Obama administration admits that the deal will generate thousands of new jobs in America.
In the run-up to the arms deal, the arms manufacturers and their middlemen whipped up nerve-wracking xenophobia regarding a growing “Iranian threat.” Meanwhile, the U.S. is inching towards normalisation with Iran. China is a serious challenge to the U.S. and the challenge is increasingly how to tap into China's growth. Mr. Obama's ultimate focus is on butter, how to make more butter in America — with the Chinese brought into that enterprise.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
source; hindu
Thursday, 30 September 2010
Monday, 27 September 2010
China starts extension of Tibet railway
BEIJING (Sept 27, 2010): China has begun to extend its controversial railway though Tibet with a new link from the provincial capital to the region's second-largest city, state media said Monday.
Work on the 253km line from Lhasa southward to Xigaze began Sunday and was projected to cost 13.3 billion yuan (RM6.14 billion) by completion in 2014, the China Daily newspaper quoted officials as saying.
"It will play a vital role in boosting tourism in the south-western part of Tibet and promoting the rational use of resources along the line," the newspaper quoted Liu Zhijun, China's minister of railways, as saying at a ground-breaking ceremony in Lhasa.
The new single-track line has a designed speed of 120km per hour. About 115km of the route is to pass through tunnels or over bridges, the report said.
The extension is the first since President Hu Jintao opened the 1,142km, high-altitude Qinghai-Tibet railway, which links Lhasa to China's national rail network, in July 2006.
Many overseas Tibetan activists called for a boycott of the railway, saying it was built for political purposes and would speed up the migration of ethnic Han Chinese people into the region to dilute its Tibetan population.
Earlier reports said China eventually hopes to build a link from Lhasa to the border with Nepal and construct at least two more branch lines as part of its plans for long-term economic development of Tibet.
Officials also said they planned to build another line from Lhasa to the border town of Yadong within the next 10 years, allowing the possibility of rail links between major Indian and Chinese cities via the Nathu La pass. — dpa
BEIJING (Sept 27, 2010): China has begun to extend its controversial railway though Tibet with a new link from the provincial capital to the region's second-largest city, state media said Monday.
Work on the 253km line from Lhasa southward to Xigaze began Sunday and was projected to cost 13.3 billion yuan (RM6.14 billion) by completion in 2014, the China Daily newspaper quoted officials as saying.
"It will play a vital role in boosting tourism in the south-western part of Tibet and promoting the rational use of resources along the line," the newspaper quoted Liu Zhijun, China's minister of railways, as saying at a ground-breaking ceremony in Lhasa.
The new single-track line has a designed speed of 120km per hour. About 115km of the route is to pass through tunnels or over bridges, the report said.
The extension is the first since President Hu Jintao opened the 1,142km, high-altitude Qinghai-Tibet railway, which links Lhasa to China's national rail network, in July 2006.
Many overseas Tibetan activists called for a boycott of the railway, saying it was built for political purposes and would speed up the migration of ethnic Han Chinese people into the region to dilute its Tibetan population.
Earlier reports said China eventually hopes to build a link from Lhasa to the border with Nepal and construct at least two more branch lines as part of its plans for long-term economic development of Tibet.
Officials also said they planned to build another line from Lhasa to the border town of Yadong within the next 10 years, allowing the possibility of rail links between major Indian and Chinese cities via the Nathu La pass. — dpa
Only our fears can encircle us
by Suhasini Haidar
Instead of being alarmed at China's growing inroads in the region, India needs to take a harder look at its own role and find new ways to win neighbours and increase influence in the region's growth story.
No one would accuse Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of being alarmist. So when, addressing the Heads of Missions last month, he spoke of paying close attention to “global powers exercising influence in the Indian Ocean Region,” it was assumed that the Prime Minister was genuinely concerned about China's growing role in the region. When he spoke to editors some days later about his concerns on China again, the assumption was sealed.
India's growing concern rose from two factors — the first, Beijing's sudden decision to provide Northern GOC General Jaswal with a stapled visa, saying his command includes a ‘disputed' region; and the other, newspaper reports that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had approximately 11,000 soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan, digging tunnels and posing a direct threat to India across the LoC.
Diplomats on both sides now say they are ‘sorting out' the visa issue, with Beijing on the back foot, particularly given that General Jaswal has travelled to China in the past. Meanwhile, the reported build-up in PoK was aggressively denied by Beijing and Islamabad, both insisting that the troops are there to help contain flood damage, and the impending threat of the Hunza dam overflowing, and also to work on the Karakoram Highway project. India's suspicions that China's army is now securing its land route to the Arabian sea via PoK have nonetheless grown, given that China has also wrested control of the Gwadar port back from the Singaporean Port Authority. The development ties in with the fear of India being choked by a strategic “String of Pearls” — a U.S. Defence Department term for China's ambitions for bases in the Indian Ocean Region. With Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and the Sittwe port in Myanmar, it would seem the string is slowly turning into a choke-chain for India.
At one level, the fears of China overrunning Pakistan to open a front with India may seem far-fetched, even hysterical. At another, it may be a much needed wake-up call for India to reassess its preparedness to counter an increasingly assertive Chinese military. At an entirely different level, New Delhi's alarm in the past few weeks could be most constructive if it ensures that India takes a closer look at its own role in the region, and why China is making headway with so many of our neighbours.
Take Sri Lanka that has many reasons to welcome Indian investment. Whether it has been the tsunami, the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or the post-war demining and rehabilitation effort, Indian agencies have been at the forefront to help. And yet, as Sri Lanka recasts itself as the Singapore of the region, it is China that is its biggest infrastructural investor, bagging many coveted projects given China's deeper pockets. Much of it is a result of Indian apathy – the Hambantota port, for example, was offered to India first. New Delhi's lack of interest in developing this strategically located harbour was easily the gain of China, which worked double time to complete the project with $60 billion funded from China's Exim bank, building the port, the city centre, the airport, a stadium, and a massive convention centre. Many in India worry that Hambantota's future could include a Chinese naval base too.
While Indian concerns about Hambantota are well known, practically no one speaks of the port project that India does have, in the northern town of Kankesenthurai (KKS). Originally, after the tsunami, the project was handed to the Dutch, but after India showed interest, the Sri Lankan President tore up that contract and invited India to build the port. Yet 18 months later, this harbour near Jaffna has seen little by way of construction; even a feasibility survey taken in June 2010 has not yet been finalised. Meanwhile Hambantota will receive its first ship in November, some six months ahead of schedule. The contract for the Colombo port has just gone to a Chinese consortium — no Indian company having even tried to bid for it. Given that the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC)-Sampur coal 500-MW plant is already delayed years beyond its 2011 deadline, it is hoped that other projects India has committed itself to including the northern rail line, the Palaly airport and the Jaffna stadium will be dealt with more expeditiously.
While many in India would see these projects essentially as aid to a needy neighbour, it is time to invert the prism and see them, just as we accuse China, as ways of increasing our footprint and extending our ambitions to a sphere of influence well beyond our land mass.
In January this year, a historic agreement with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina seemed to redefine how India would deal with its neighbours. Amongst a slew of agreements came India's $1-billion credit line — for 14 infrastructural projects. Even while the agreements were being finalised — Dhaka delivered some of the most wanted United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) militants. Despite opposition cries of a sell-out, Sheikh Hasina's India deal won her accolades in Bangladesh. Yet it took eight months before Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee flew to Bangladesh to operationalise the credit line, and by the time he reached, India had decided to change its earlier offer of $1bn at one per cent interest to 1.75 per cent — terms that took many in Dhaka by unpleasant surprise. Also, unless India relaxes its trade barriers to Bangladeshi goods, it will be accused of exploiting the transit rights only for its own benefit. It is hoped that Dr. Singh, whose trip to Dhaka is imminent, will address some of those concerns. Meanwhile China has moved into the delay gap on projects like the Chittagong port with ease, funding much of its refurbishment, as also the construction of the second Padma bridge, as it vigorously pushes MoUs on road links via Myanmar and a rail line connecting Beijing to Dhaka — as part of a $2.2-billion Chinese package on infrastructure.
A bolder move, but one that would win many hearts is to consider lifting tariff and non-tarrif barriers and duties unilaterally in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region altogether. Suspend the reality of our relations with Pakistan for a moment to think about the impact of ending such protectionism in a year that has so devastated Pakistan's economy. According to estimates, the destruction of standing crops on two million hectares has virtually wiped out Pakistan's staple revenue from export of cotton, rice, and sugar. The country will be dependent on importing these for the next few years. With 77 million people likely to go hungry, and Pakistan's projected growth likely to fall by half to about two per cent, it is only natural that China's interventions in flood relief, rebuilding destroyed roads, schools and bridges, aid and trade will grow. The question is: will India watch with its customary alarm but do nothing?
On our other frontiers, it must be said, the government has made some moves — increasing development aid to Afghanistan to $1.2 billion and discussing a $1-billion dollar credit line to Myanmar as well. Describing some of these initiatives at Harvard University this month, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said: “Today, with sustained high economic growth rates … India is in a better position to offer a significant stake to our neighbours in our own prosperity and growth.” It is equally important to stand that assumption on its head, and consider India's stake in the prosperity and growth of its neighbours. Whether it's Mauritius or Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan or yes, Pakistan — these are countries with close cultural, linguistic, historic ties to India no other country can match. As a result, it shouldn't be possible for China or any other superpower to encircle a country like India. The only thing that encircles us is our fear that they will.
(Suhasini Haidar is the Deputy Foreign Editor, CNN-IBN.)
by Suhasini Haidar
Instead of being alarmed at China's growing inroads in the region, India needs to take a harder look at its own role and find new ways to win neighbours and increase influence in the region's growth story.
No one would accuse Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of being alarmist. So when, addressing the Heads of Missions last month, he spoke of paying close attention to “global powers exercising influence in the Indian Ocean Region,” it was assumed that the Prime Minister was genuinely concerned about China's growing role in the region. When he spoke to editors some days later about his concerns on China again, the assumption was sealed.
India's growing concern rose from two factors — the first, Beijing's sudden decision to provide Northern GOC General Jaswal with a stapled visa, saying his command includes a ‘disputed' region; and the other, newspaper reports that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had approximately 11,000 soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan, digging tunnels and posing a direct threat to India across the LoC.
Diplomats on both sides now say they are ‘sorting out' the visa issue, with Beijing on the back foot, particularly given that General Jaswal has travelled to China in the past. Meanwhile, the reported build-up in PoK was aggressively denied by Beijing and Islamabad, both insisting that the troops are there to help contain flood damage, and the impending threat of the Hunza dam overflowing, and also to work on the Karakoram Highway project. India's suspicions that China's army is now securing its land route to the Arabian sea via PoK have nonetheless grown, given that China has also wrested control of the Gwadar port back from the Singaporean Port Authority. The development ties in with the fear of India being choked by a strategic “String of Pearls” — a U.S. Defence Department term for China's ambitions for bases in the Indian Ocean Region. With Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and the Sittwe port in Myanmar, it would seem the string is slowly turning into a choke-chain for India.
At one level, the fears of China overrunning Pakistan to open a front with India may seem far-fetched, even hysterical. At another, it may be a much needed wake-up call for India to reassess its preparedness to counter an increasingly assertive Chinese military. At an entirely different level, New Delhi's alarm in the past few weeks could be most constructive if it ensures that India takes a closer look at its own role in the region, and why China is making headway with so many of our neighbours.
Take Sri Lanka that has many reasons to welcome Indian investment. Whether it has been the tsunami, the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or the post-war demining and rehabilitation effort, Indian agencies have been at the forefront to help. And yet, as Sri Lanka recasts itself as the Singapore of the region, it is China that is its biggest infrastructural investor, bagging many coveted projects given China's deeper pockets. Much of it is a result of Indian apathy – the Hambantota port, for example, was offered to India first. New Delhi's lack of interest in developing this strategically located harbour was easily the gain of China, which worked double time to complete the project with $60 billion funded from China's Exim bank, building the port, the city centre, the airport, a stadium, and a massive convention centre. Many in India worry that Hambantota's future could include a Chinese naval base too.
While Indian concerns about Hambantota are well known, practically no one speaks of the port project that India does have, in the northern town of Kankesenthurai (KKS). Originally, after the tsunami, the project was handed to the Dutch, but after India showed interest, the Sri Lankan President tore up that contract and invited India to build the port. Yet 18 months later, this harbour near Jaffna has seen little by way of construction; even a feasibility survey taken in June 2010 has not yet been finalised. Meanwhile Hambantota will receive its first ship in November, some six months ahead of schedule. The contract for the Colombo port has just gone to a Chinese consortium — no Indian company having even tried to bid for it. Given that the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC)-Sampur coal 500-MW plant is already delayed years beyond its 2011 deadline, it is hoped that other projects India has committed itself to including the northern rail line, the Palaly airport and the Jaffna stadium will be dealt with more expeditiously.
While many in India would see these projects essentially as aid to a needy neighbour, it is time to invert the prism and see them, just as we accuse China, as ways of increasing our footprint and extending our ambitions to a sphere of influence well beyond our land mass.
In January this year, a historic agreement with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina seemed to redefine how India would deal with its neighbours. Amongst a slew of agreements came India's $1-billion credit line — for 14 infrastructural projects. Even while the agreements were being finalised — Dhaka delivered some of the most wanted United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) militants. Despite opposition cries of a sell-out, Sheikh Hasina's India deal won her accolades in Bangladesh. Yet it took eight months before Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee flew to Bangladesh to operationalise the credit line, and by the time he reached, India had decided to change its earlier offer of $1bn at one per cent interest to 1.75 per cent — terms that took many in Dhaka by unpleasant surprise. Also, unless India relaxes its trade barriers to Bangladeshi goods, it will be accused of exploiting the transit rights only for its own benefit. It is hoped that Dr. Singh, whose trip to Dhaka is imminent, will address some of those concerns. Meanwhile China has moved into the delay gap on projects like the Chittagong port with ease, funding much of its refurbishment, as also the construction of the second Padma bridge, as it vigorously pushes MoUs on road links via Myanmar and a rail line connecting Beijing to Dhaka — as part of a $2.2-billion Chinese package on infrastructure.
A bolder move, but one that would win many hearts is to consider lifting tariff and non-tarrif barriers and duties unilaterally in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region altogether. Suspend the reality of our relations with Pakistan for a moment to think about the impact of ending such protectionism in a year that has so devastated Pakistan's economy. According to estimates, the destruction of standing crops on two million hectares has virtually wiped out Pakistan's staple revenue from export of cotton, rice, and sugar. The country will be dependent on importing these for the next few years. With 77 million people likely to go hungry, and Pakistan's projected growth likely to fall by half to about two per cent, it is only natural that China's interventions in flood relief, rebuilding destroyed roads, schools and bridges, aid and trade will grow. The question is: will India watch with its customary alarm but do nothing?
On our other frontiers, it must be said, the government has made some moves — increasing development aid to Afghanistan to $1.2 billion and discussing a $1-billion dollar credit line to Myanmar as well. Describing some of these initiatives at Harvard University this month, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said: “Today, with sustained high economic growth rates … India is in a better position to offer a significant stake to our neighbours in our own prosperity and growth.” It is equally important to stand that assumption on its head, and consider India's stake in the prosperity and growth of its neighbours. Whether it's Mauritius or Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan or yes, Pakistan — these are countries with close cultural, linguistic, historic ties to India no other country can match. As a result, it shouldn't be possible for China or any other superpower to encircle a country like India. The only thing that encircles us is our fear that they will.
(Suhasini Haidar is the Deputy Foreign Editor, CNN-IBN.)
Thursday, 23 September 2010
Can India Say No?
by Abanti Bhattacharya
June 23, 2008
Where are India-China relations heading, given repeated Chinese claims in recent years to Indian territory and a noticeable hardening of its position beginning with Sun Yuxi’s statements on Arunachal Pradesh in 2006? The latest Chinese claim is on Sikkim’s finger tip region, which came up a few weeks before Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s four-day visit to China between 4 and 7 June 2008. It may be recalled that Prime Minister Vajpayee’s 2003 visit resulted in China’s recognition of Sikkim as an integral part of India in return for India’s recognition of Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China. It is not clear from media reports what really transpired during Mr. Mukherjee’s discussions with his Chinese interlocutors. One report said that the Minister preferred to remain silent on the Chinese claim, while another noted that Mr. Mukherjee categorically told his interlocutors that Sikkim would not be discussed since it is a settled issue.
Neither did Mr. Mukherjee’s speech at Peking University on June 6 spell out any new thinking in India’s China policy, where he spoke on the need to resolve differences and urged patience and realism. It is not clear what the Minister meant by realism when the Chinese are making one fresh territorial claim after another and when there have been forty border incursions by Chinese troops in the first few months of 2008 alone. Further, the current emphasis on placing the contentious border issue aside and instead focusing on building deeper economic ties is also questionable. India’s booming trade with China stood at $ 37 billion in 2007, and the target has been set at $60 billion by 2010. But 52 per cent of India’s exports to China comprise raw materials, while the Indian market is being flooded with cheap Chinese goods. In the long run such a skewed trade relationship could well introduce another contentious issue in the bilateral relationship.
While India advocates a shared vision with the Chinese for the 21st century, it prefers to keep the core irritants unaddressed. It does not spell out categorically that Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim are non-negotiable. By keeping silent on these vexing issues, it is in reality postponing the moment of reckoning. Moreover, though China has been repeatedly raking up its claims on Arunachal, India seems to have forgotten its own land under Chinese occupation – the Aksai Chin area and a part of Kashmir that Pakistan bartered away to China in 1963.
There seems to be no meaningful advance in the India-China bilateral relationship. India talks of a strategic partnership with China, without fleshing out the nuances of what such a strategic partnership actually means to it. Further, India seldom figures in China’s strategic thinking. What little attention it has received from China was only after conducting its 1998 nuclear test and in the wake of America’s growing interest in engaging India.
India’s approach towards China is, in fact, intriguing. Being a democracy, its dealings with China should have been transparent. But there is total opaqueness on the progress made in the several rounds of boundary talks, resulting in a great deal of speculation about India’s China policy.
Another problem that afflicts India’s China policy is its reactive nature, and examples in this regard are aplenty. India started to strengthen its infrastructure all along its border only after China’s massive build up of road and rail infrastructure on its side of the border. India hosted the India-Africa Forum Summit in 2008, apparently taking inspiration from a similar summit hosted by China in 2006. India realised the power of its Diaspora in boosting national development only after seeing China use its diaspora for this purpose. It would not be surprising if India were to host a World Buddhist Conference in the near future, as China had done in 2006. Cumulatively, all this throws poor light on India’s foreign policy and lays bare its curious lack of innovativeness, adroitness and perception.
It is time India rethought its China policy. It cannot anymore content itself thinking that the border dispute can be resolved under more favourable circumstances in future. China has solved most of its border disputes from a position of strength and it is likely to adopt a similar approach towards India as well. Further, the problem of Tibet, which is central to the India-China border dispute, looms large in Chinese strategic thinking. India ought to remember that China will never accept the McMahon line, not so much because it is an imperialistic relic but because it accords Tibet a sovereign independent status with treaty-making treaties. Given this, should India continue to consider Tibet an internal Chinese issue and sit back and watch China’s growing adventurism along the border?
The border issue is the core irritant in Sino-Indian relations. Unless it is resolved, there cannot be peaceful India-China relations. India should therefore not base its China policy on hopes and assurances but on a clear understanding of Chinese strategy and foreign policy motivations. While building up its economic and military capabilities, India needs to have a pragmatic and robust China policy that is based on saying ‘no’.
source:IDSA
by Abanti Bhattacharya
June 23, 2008
Where are India-China relations heading, given repeated Chinese claims in recent years to Indian territory and a noticeable hardening of its position beginning with Sun Yuxi’s statements on Arunachal Pradesh in 2006? The latest Chinese claim is on Sikkim’s finger tip region, which came up a few weeks before Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s four-day visit to China between 4 and 7 June 2008. It may be recalled that Prime Minister Vajpayee’s 2003 visit resulted in China’s recognition of Sikkim as an integral part of India in return for India’s recognition of Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China. It is not clear from media reports what really transpired during Mr. Mukherjee’s discussions with his Chinese interlocutors. One report said that the Minister preferred to remain silent on the Chinese claim, while another noted that Mr. Mukherjee categorically told his interlocutors that Sikkim would not be discussed since it is a settled issue.
Neither did Mr. Mukherjee’s speech at Peking University on June 6 spell out any new thinking in India’s China policy, where he spoke on the need to resolve differences and urged patience and realism. It is not clear what the Minister meant by realism when the Chinese are making one fresh territorial claim after another and when there have been forty border incursions by Chinese troops in the first few months of 2008 alone. Further, the current emphasis on placing the contentious border issue aside and instead focusing on building deeper economic ties is also questionable. India’s booming trade with China stood at $ 37 billion in 2007, and the target has been set at $60 billion by 2010. But 52 per cent of India’s exports to China comprise raw materials, while the Indian market is being flooded with cheap Chinese goods. In the long run such a skewed trade relationship could well introduce another contentious issue in the bilateral relationship.
While India advocates a shared vision with the Chinese for the 21st century, it prefers to keep the core irritants unaddressed. It does not spell out categorically that Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim are non-negotiable. By keeping silent on these vexing issues, it is in reality postponing the moment of reckoning. Moreover, though China has been repeatedly raking up its claims on Arunachal, India seems to have forgotten its own land under Chinese occupation – the Aksai Chin area and a part of Kashmir that Pakistan bartered away to China in 1963.
There seems to be no meaningful advance in the India-China bilateral relationship. India talks of a strategic partnership with China, without fleshing out the nuances of what such a strategic partnership actually means to it. Further, India seldom figures in China’s strategic thinking. What little attention it has received from China was only after conducting its 1998 nuclear test and in the wake of America’s growing interest in engaging India.
India’s approach towards China is, in fact, intriguing. Being a democracy, its dealings with China should have been transparent. But there is total opaqueness on the progress made in the several rounds of boundary talks, resulting in a great deal of speculation about India’s China policy.
Another problem that afflicts India’s China policy is its reactive nature, and examples in this regard are aplenty. India started to strengthen its infrastructure all along its border only after China’s massive build up of road and rail infrastructure on its side of the border. India hosted the India-Africa Forum Summit in 2008, apparently taking inspiration from a similar summit hosted by China in 2006. India realised the power of its Diaspora in boosting national development only after seeing China use its diaspora for this purpose. It would not be surprising if India were to host a World Buddhist Conference in the near future, as China had done in 2006. Cumulatively, all this throws poor light on India’s foreign policy and lays bare its curious lack of innovativeness, adroitness and perception.
It is time India rethought its China policy. It cannot anymore content itself thinking that the border dispute can be resolved under more favourable circumstances in future. China has solved most of its border disputes from a position of strength and it is likely to adopt a similar approach towards India as well. Further, the problem of Tibet, which is central to the India-China border dispute, looms large in Chinese strategic thinking. India ought to remember that China will never accept the McMahon line, not so much because it is an imperialistic relic but because it accords Tibet a sovereign independent status with treaty-making treaties. Given this, should India continue to consider Tibet an internal Chinese issue and sit back and watch China’s growing adventurism along the border?
The border issue is the core irritant in Sino-Indian relations. Unless it is resolved, there cannot be peaceful India-China relations. India should therefore not base its China policy on hopes and assurances but on a clear understanding of Chinese strategy and foreign policy motivations. While building up its economic and military capabilities, India needs to have a pragmatic and robust China policy that is based on saying ‘no’.
source:IDSA
IDSA COMMENT
Chumbi Valley: Economic Rationale but Strategic Resonance
Medha Bisht
September 23, 2010
What are the concerns in India regarding the Chumbi Valley? This question is often being asked as China increases its presence in Southern Asia. On January 13, 2010, China and Bhutan completed the nineteenth round of boundary talks and both sides decided on a joint field survey, in order to harmonize the reference points and names of the disputed areas. The focus of the joint-field survey was supposed to be on the disputed areas in the western sector which constitute the pastoral lands of Doklam, Charithang, Sinchulumpa and Dramana. This exclusive focus on the North-Western sector is important due to its close proximity with the Chumbi Valley. Chumbi Valley, a vital tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China, is significant as it is 5 km* from the Siliguri corridor—the chicken neck which connects India to North East India and Nepal to Bhutan. At the same time, Chumbi Valley is of geostrategic importance to China because of its shared borders with Tibet and Sikkim.
Chumbi: The Key to Tibet was the title of a story published in the New York Times in 1904. The correspondent (name not revealed) claims to have travelled extensively to Tibet and Bhutan and underlines the economic significance of the Valley to British India, which wanted to establish a trade relationship with Tibet via Bhutan. He claimed that “not only difficulties of the journey into Tibet cease at the Northern end of the Chumbi Valley…but also it would be difficult to overestimate its enormous importance to Bengal.” Given that Bhutan did have a flourishing trade relationship with Rangpur (now in Bangladesh), at that time, the statement seems significant in enticing Bhutan into a mutually beneficial relationship with British India.
While economic rationality played a role in shaping the British preference in engaging the Chumbi Valley, Chinese preferences seem to be inspired by strategic motivations. It is pertinent to mention that Mao Ze Dong had defined Tibet as the palm which had five fingers -- Ladakh, Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. The significance of Chumbi Valley, which has geo-strategic importance, therefore cannot be underestimated. In the present context Chinese interest in Chumbi valley primarily stems from three reasons.
First, China gains proximity to India’s North-East and Siliguri Corridor, which connects North-Eastern states to India and Nepal to Bhutan. It need not be underlined that Sikkim has a substantial Tibetan population. The Chinese focus on the Tibetan issue is also illustrative of the priority Tibet has in their agenda. Indeed, facts on the ground reveal that Nepal has intensified patrolling along its border areas with China since June 2010 and is not only detaining Tibetan refugees but is also handing them back to Chinese authorities. Recently, a visiting delegation of Chinese leaders called upon President Dr. Ram Baran Yadav seeking assurance on Nepal’s one-China policy.
Second, with access to Chumbi valley, China gets closer to Bangladesh’s periphery in the North since only a narrow stretch of land divides Bangladesh from Bhutan. Analysts have already pointed out to two important north-south strategic corridors on either side of India — first, the trans-Karakoram corridor extending to Gwadar and second, the Irrawaddy Corridor linking Yunnan to Myanmar. While connectivity with Nepal is well on the cards, some suggest that extending Indian rail networks at Siliguri via the Chumbi valley has also been proposed. In fact some sources point out that by 2017 China can have a rail link going to Chumbi Valley. India’s consent to provide transit access to Bangladesh via Indian territory can also be a possibility.
Last but not the least, by enhancing connectivity and getting an overarching influence over the Chumbi Valley, China gets a better hold over Tibet, thus weakening any potential cards which India would want to play at a later stage. Further, with well laid out road/railway infrastructure, it also gets an offensive advantage to thwart India’s military posturing. According to sources, six roads so far have been built by China near Bhutan’s North and North-West areas.
Given the importance of the issue, strategic calculations over the Chumbi Valley thus have to be reckoned with. In this regard a three pronged approach can be suggested. First, India needs to look inwards and strengthen its defence preparedness and infrastructure construction plans, in order to counter a plausible Chinese military offensive. Second, at the bilateral level, focused efforts are needed to engage Bhutan as a strategic partner, thus sensitizing it about Indian concerns. The role of the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) positioned in Haa district in Bhutan becomes important and needs to be given some attention. The June 2010 visit of Indian Army chief, Gen. V.K. Singh, to Bhutan to promote defence ties between the two countries is indeed an encouraging development in this context. Third, India should maximize its soft-power approach, providing an enabling environment in Sikkim for Buddhism to flourish. The commonality between Bhutan and Sikkim should therefore be endorsed in order to facilitate cultural exchanges between them. However it needs to be stated that the thrust of all these calculations/responses would require some deliberation on the quintessential question of where does India figure in the Chinese grand strategic design? As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh aptly pointed out in a recent meeting with a group of editors, "China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. We have to be aware of this." Shaping responses towards the issue of Chumbi Valley would perhaps require a penetrating understanding of the “reality” that defines China’s political trajectory in South Asia in coming years.
Note: Amendment: Earlier the distance was wrongly mentioned as 500 kms.
source; IDSA
Chumbi Valley: Economic Rationale but Strategic Resonance
Medha Bisht
September 23, 2010
What are the concerns in India regarding the Chumbi Valley? This question is often being asked as China increases its presence in Southern Asia. On January 13, 2010, China and Bhutan completed the nineteenth round of boundary talks and both sides decided on a joint field survey, in order to harmonize the reference points and names of the disputed areas. The focus of the joint-field survey was supposed to be on the disputed areas in the western sector which constitute the pastoral lands of Doklam, Charithang, Sinchulumpa and Dramana. This exclusive focus on the North-Western sector is important due to its close proximity with the Chumbi Valley. Chumbi Valley, a vital tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China, is significant as it is 5 km* from the Siliguri corridor—the chicken neck which connects India to North East India and Nepal to Bhutan. At the same time, Chumbi Valley is of geostrategic importance to China because of its shared borders with Tibet and Sikkim.
Chumbi: The Key to Tibet was the title of a story published in the New York Times in 1904. The correspondent (name not revealed) claims to have travelled extensively to Tibet and Bhutan and underlines the economic significance of the Valley to British India, which wanted to establish a trade relationship with Tibet via Bhutan. He claimed that “not only difficulties of the journey into Tibet cease at the Northern end of the Chumbi Valley…but also it would be difficult to overestimate its enormous importance to Bengal.” Given that Bhutan did have a flourishing trade relationship with Rangpur (now in Bangladesh), at that time, the statement seems significant in enticing Bhutan into a mutually beneficial relationship with British India.
While economic rationality played a role in shaping the British preference in engaging the Chumbi Valley, Chinese preferences seem to be inspired by strategic motivations. It is pertinent to mention that Mao Ze Dong had defined Tibet as the palm which had five fingers -- Ladakh, Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. The significance of Chumbi Valley, which has geo-strategic importance, therefore cannot be underestimated. In the present context Chinese interest in Chumbi valley primarily stems from three reasons.
First, China gains proximity to India’s North-East and Siliguri Corridor, which connects North-Eastern states to India and Nepal to Bhutan. It need not be underlined that Sikkim has a substantial Tibetan population. The Chinese focus on the Tibetan issue is also illustrative of the priority Tibet has in their agenda. Indeed, facts on the ground reveal that Nepal has intensified patrolling along its border areas with China since June 2010 and is not only detaining Tibetan refugees but is also handing them back to Chinese authorities. Recently, a visiting delegation of Chinese leaders called upon President Dr. Ram Baran Yadav seeking assurance on Nepal’s one-China policy.
Second, with access to Chumbi valley, China gets closer to Bangladesh’s periphery in the North since only a narrow stretch of land divides Bangladesh from Bhutan. Analysts have already pointed out to two important north-south strategic corridors on either side of India — first, the trans-Karakoram corridor extending to Gwadar and second, the Irrawaddy Corridor linking Yunnan to Myanmar. While connectivity with Nepal is well on the cards, some suggest that extending Indian rail networks at Siliguri via the Chumbi valley has also been proposed. In fact some sources point out that by 2017 China can have a rail link going to Chumbi Valley. India’s consent to provide transit access to Bangladesh via Indian territory can also be a possibility.
Last but not the least, by enhancing connectivity and getting an overarching influence over the Chumbi Valley, China gets a better hold over Tibet, thus weakening any potential cards which India would want to play at a later stage. Further, with well laid out road/railway infrastructure, it also gets an offensive advantage to thwart India’s military posturing. According to sources, six roads so far have been built by China near Bhutan’s North and North-West areas.
Given the importance of the issue, strategic calculations over the Chumbi Valley thus have to be reckoned with. In this regard a three pronged approach can be suggested. First, India needs to look inwards and strengthen its defence preparedness and infrastructure construction plans, in order to counter a plausible Chinese military offensive. Second, at the bilateral level, focused efforts are needed to engage Bhutan as a strategic partner, thus sensitizing it about Indian concerns. The role of the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) positioned in Haa district in Bhutan becomes important and needs to be given some attention. The June 2010 visit of Indian Army chief, Gen. V.K. Singh, to Bhutan to promote defence ties between the two countries is indeed an encouraging development in this context. Third, India should maximize its soft-power approach, providing an enabling environment in Sikkim for Buddhism to flourish. The commonality between Bhutan and Sikkim should therefore be endorsed in order to facilitate cultural exchanges between them. However it needs to be stated that the thrust of all these calculations/responses would require some deliberation on the quintessential question of where does India figure in the Chinese grand strategic design? As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh aptly pointed out in a recent meeting with a group of editors, "China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. We have to be aware of this." Shaping responses towards the issue of Chumbi Valley would perhaps require a penetrating understanding of the “reality” that defines China’s political trajectory in South Asia in coming years.
Note: Amendment: Earlier the distance was wrongly mentioned as 500 kms.
source; IDSA
Chinese Checkers in the Himalayas
by P. Stobdan
June 13, 2008
In a disturbing sign, the Chinese seem to have brought up Sikkim and not Arunachal Pradesh back to the table during the recent visit of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to China. The belief was that China had implicitly recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim in 2003, and as such there was no dispute on the matter with China. China’s recognition of Sikkim was interpreted as a quid pro quo for India’s recognition of total Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in 2003.
In an article in the Indian Express on October 6, 2004, this author had argued that Beijing – even after the 2003 commitment – maintains the position that Sikkim is a historical issue between India and China and ‘‘hopes’’ it will be resolved as bilateral relations improve. That though the Chinese have not yet raised the border issue in the Sikkim portion, they might bring it up in future. And that, the recognition of Sikkim as a part of India will depend on the demarcation of the boundary to the satisfaction of the Chinese. Similarly, the trade agreement between Sikkim and Tibet is also without prejudice to the status of Sikkim.
The Sino-Indian relationship, with a strategic dimension since 2005, has progressed by leaps and bounds, pushing the trajectory of trade growth currently at $40 billion and now set to hit $60 billion by 2010. But will it withstand the strains of repeated Chinese frowns at the border? New Chinese provocations have come since July 2007, ranging from the demolition of Indian forward posts in North Sikkim, objection to Indian troops’ deployment in the Siliguri Corridor, objection to the Prime Minister’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, cyber intrusion on Indian computer networks, laying a fresh claim in “Finger Area” and now expressing “unhappiness” over India reopening its airbase at Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh.
Why does China play checkers, when India has been going out of its way to save Beijing from facing embarrassing prospects over the Olympics torch relay? China surprised India by laying claim to the 2.1 square kilometre “Finger Area” in Sikkim and threatened to demolish the stone cairns, usually fiddled only by rustling Yaks.
On Tibet, India was fulfilling its commitment, but China almost expressed contempt for India and its democratic form of government; peremptorily summoned the Indian Ambassador in the middle of the night and threatened to withdraw the Olympic torch if India cannot ensure its security. It wanted India to crack down on the Tibetans and even specified the type of security that should be adopted for the relay. These events ominously gave an impression that the government had waffled on its Tibet policy and was bending over backwards to please the Chinese. The debate over the Indian response contrasted from being totally meek to a sharp display of realpolitik maturity. Op-ed contributors thought Mukherjee’s warning to the Dalai Lama had diminished India as a democracy and made everyone “feel small”. Nearly everyone empathised with the Tibetans, but at the same time realised the inability to offend China. Chinese could correctly assess the Indian public mood. For they know for sure that New Delhi has a soft government with its foreign office not willing to take a confrontationist line, its military not in a mood to fight, a large section of its political class, across party lines, amenable for concessions to China, and most importantly Indian intellectuals, including think-tanks, have become ardent aficionados or acolytes of China.
On this score, even the Dalai Lama should now gracefully accept defeat, collect his passport from Chanakya Puri and return to Lhasa for he should know that the answers for his problems lie in Beijing and not in New Delhi or in Western capitals. After all, he also knows that the religion he practices, though it came from India, the same lineage and tradition also prevails in China. The ultimate salvation for the Tibetans naturally lies not in the West but in the East. The Dalai, so far, has successfully played the democracy and human rights game, and in the process inflicted enough damage on China. It is now time for him to reconcile with China and take up a larger responsibility for the revival and restoration of Buddhism in China. India could potentially moderate his future plan but now lacks a sense of imagination. After all, Buddhism is no longer on India’s agenda after Nehru’s death. In fact, it is China which is fast assuming the leadership role of the Buddhist world. Therefore, it is not too late for the Dalai Lama to quickly resume his traditional “Priest” role for China, at least for the Dhamma’s sake. And, in the process, if he can revive the spiritual bonds among Indian, Chinese, Tibetans, and rest of the Asians, then possibly he would have achieved the task of laying the foundation for a new architecture of peace and destiny in Asia.
Mukherjee’s visit also clearly indicates that we have not gained any leverage in Beijing for our handling of Tibetan protests. Instead, the Chinese look more belligerent and claim fresh areas. Clearly, China seems to be making a dubious shift in its position. China has been aiming to snatch Tawang if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh through negotiation, but now understands the difficulty stemming from the Indian domestic angle. The pleading by Chinese leaders to make Tawang an exception is well known. But now knowing that this is unattainable, Beijing is possibly resorting to another trick by reopening the Sikkim card as a leverage to pressurise India over Tawang. They may be intending to withhold formal recognition of India’s sovereignty and say – give us Tawang or face new consequences in Sikkim. Recall the PLA-owned think tank’s latest article A warning to the Indian Government: Don’t be Evil, which warned India to stay away from the “path of confrontation” and not to “misjudge the situation”.
The PLA has started using the Tibet railway since December 2007 and is steadily ramping up its military infrastructure (road, rail and air) capabilities in Tibet close to the Indian border for dual usage. The Tibet crisis and India’s acquiescence may have emboldened the Chinese to further assert the point that Tibet is incomplete without Tawang and that it is crucial for Tibet’s security. Beijing could bring up fresh obstacles. A case is being built up that internationally branded terrorists are active on Indian soil. Beijing will next ask New Delhi to dismantle the Dalai Lama’s Dharamsala set-up. The PLA may even be contemplating a limited military pursuit to capture Tawang, while India still thinks that China’s position in Tibet is tenuous. They have been cautioning New Delhi on Arunachal Pradesh and very soon they would say – we had warned you before!
The External Affair Minister’s visit to China has not broken any new ground. Beijing seems to have given a snub to Mukherjee by cancelling his planned meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao. But significantly he has not allowed Beijing to set its agenda on Sikkim. The progress on our concern over the trans-Himalayan Rivers is also little. So, was the visit only about aid diplomacy to deliver relief materials worth $5 million to quake victims in Sichuan? We could have done this better through spiritual diplomacy.
On Tibet, Mukherjee seems to have got a pat on his back but the Chinese leadership was probably not happy with Indian media coverage of the Dalai Lama. Mukherjee may have reiterated India’s position on Tibet, though it is not clear whether the phrase Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is being used.
All in all, the visit appeared as a bit of a disappointment with no substantive breakthrough being made on any of the controversial issues. The Chinese, on the other hand, visibly appeared reluctant to move ahead in a positive way and keen to play checkers with India.
India needs to be watchful of China’s moves in South Asia. In Pakistan, Chinese firms are constructing a hydro project on the Neelam River in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Their profile is ever growing in Nepal. In Sri Lanka, China has surpassed India and Japan by providing $1 billion in aid with no strings attached. After Gwadar, it is building a port in Sittwe (Myanmar) and one at Hambantota (Sri Lanka). Reports suggest that Chinese weapons are pouring into the Northeastern states. The news channels splashed fresh satellite images of China building a major underground nuclear submarine base on Hainan to control the Indian Ocean Region.
Given China’s unpredictable behaviour, it would be too early to drop one’s guard. Instead, India should exploit the current window of opportunity and assert its position before it gets closed once the Olympics are over. The reopening of Daulat Beg Oldi is a thoughtful and an unusually sharp decision. We should consolidate our position further and reopen Chushul and Fukche.
India could also reopen the issue of Skasgyam Valley, ceded to China by Pakistan. And, if Chinese continue to make diversionary moves, India should reclaim the ownership of Minser Enclave, composing of several villages, located inside Tibet on the bank of Mount Kailash. Minser was a sovereign part of India until mid-1960s, which New Delhi forgot about due to apathy and it deserves a revisit before the final boundary settlement.
source:IDSA
by P. Stobdan
June 13, 2008
In a disturbing sign, the Chinese seem to have brought up Sikkim and not Arunachal Pradesh back to the table during the recent visit of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to China. The belief was that China had implicitly recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim in 2003, and as such there was no dispute on the matter with China. China’s recognition of Sikkim was interpreted as a quid pro quo for India’s recognition of total Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in 2003.
In an article in the Indian Express on October 6, 2004, this author had argued that Beijing – even after the 2003 commitment – maintains the position that Sikkim is a historical issue between India and China and ‘‘hopes’’ it will be resolved as bilateral relations improve. That though the Chinese have not yet raised the border issue in the Sikkim portion, they might bring it up in future. And that, the recognition of Sikkim as a part of India will depend on the demarcation of the boundary to the satisfaction of the Chinese. Similarly, the trade agreement between Sikkim and Tibet is also without prejudice to the status of Sikkim.
The Sino-Indian relationship, with a strategic dimension since 2005, has progressed by leaps and bounds, pushing the trajectory of trade growth currently at $40 billion and now set to hit $60 billion by 2010. But will it withstand the strains of repeated Chinese frowns at the border? New Chinese provocations have come since July 2007, ranging from the demolition of Indian forward posts in North Sikkim, objection to Indian troops’ deployment in the Siliguri Corridor, objection to the Prime Minister’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, cyber intrusion on Indian computer networks, laying a fresh claim in “Finger Area” and now expressing “unhappiness” over India reopening its airbase at Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh.
Why does China play checkers, when India has been going out of its way to save Beijing from facing embarrassing prospects over the Olympics torch relay? China surprised India by laying claim to the 2.1 square kilometre “Finger Area” in Sikkim and threatened to demolish the stone cairns, usually fiddled only by rustling Yaks.
On Tibet, India was fulfilling its commitment, but China almost expressed contempt for India and its democratic form of government; peremptorily summoned the Indian Ambassador in the middle of the night and threatened to withdraw the Olympic torch if India cannot ensure its security. It wanted India to crack down on the Tibetans and even specified the type of security that should be adopted for the relay. These events ominously gave an impression that the government had waffled on its Tibet policy and was bending over backwards to please the Chinese. The debate over the Indian response contrasted from being totally meek to a sharp display of realpolitik maturity. Op-ed contributors thought Mukherjee’s warning to the Dalai Lama had diminished India as a democracy and made everyone “feel small”. Nearly everyone empathised with the Tibetans, but at the same time realised the inability to offend China. Chinese could correctly assess the Indian public mood. For they know for sure that New Delhi has a soft government with its foreign office not willing to take a confrontationist line, its military not in a mood to fight, a large section of its political class, across party lines, amenable for concessions to China, and most importantly Indian intellectuals, including think-tanks, have become ardent aficionados or acolytes of China.
On this score, even the Dalai Lama should now gracefully accept defeat, collect his passport from Chanakya Puri and return to Lhasa for he should know that the answers for his problems lie in Beijing and not in New Delhi or in Western capitals. After all, he also knows that the religion he practices, though it came from India, the same lineage and tradition also prevails in China. The ultimate salvation for the Tibetans naturally lies not in the West but in the East. The Dalai, so far, has successfully played the democracy and human rights game, and in the process inflicted enough damage on China. It is now time for him to reconcile with China and take up a larger responsibility for the revival and restoration of Buddhism in China. India could potentially moderate his future plan but now lacks a sense of imagination. After all, Buddhism is no longer on India’s agenda after Nehru’s death. In fact, it is China which is fast assuming the leadership role of the Buddhist world. Therefore, it is not too late for the Dalai Lama to quickly resume his traditional “Priest” role for China, at least for the Dhamma’s sake. And, in the process, if he can revive the spiritual bonds among Indian, Chinese, Tibetans, and rest of the Asians, then possibly he would have achieved the task of laying the foundation for a new architecture of peace and destiny in Asia.
Mukherjee’s visit also clearly indicates that we have not gained any leverage in Beijing for our handling of Tibetan protests. Instead, the Chinese look more belligerent and claim fresh areas. Clearly, China seems to be making a dubious shift in its position. China has been aiming to snatch Tawang if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh through negotiation, but now understands the difficulty stemming from the Indian domestic angle. The pleading by Chinese leaders to make Tawang an exception is well known. But now knowing that this is unattainable, Beijing is possibly resorting to another trick by reopening the Sikkim card as a leverage to pressurise India over Tawang. They may be intending to withhold formal recognition of India’s sovereignty and say – give us Tawang or face new consequences in Sikkim. Recall the PLA-owned think tank’s latest article A warning to the Indian Government: Don’t be Evil, which warned India to stay away from the “path of confrontation” and not to “misjudge the situation”.
The PLA has started using the Tibet railway since December 2007 and is steadily ramping up its military infrastructure (road, rail and air) capabilities in Tibet close to the Indian border for dual usage. The Tibet crisis and India’s acquiescence may have emboldened the Chinese to further assert the point that Tibet is incomplete without Tawang and that it is crucial for Tibet’s security. Beijing could bring up fresh obstacles. A case is being built up that internationally branded terrorists are active on Indian soil. Beijing will next ask New Delhi to dismantle the Dalai Lama’s Dharamsala set-up. The PLA may even be contemplating a limited military pursuit to capture Tawang, while India still thinks that China’s position in Tibet is tenuous. They have been cautioning New Delhi on Arunachal Pradesh and very soon they would say – we had warned you before!
The External Affair Minister’s visit to China has not broken any new ground. Beijing seems to have given a snub to Mukherjee by cancelling his planned meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao. But significantly he has not allowed Beijing to set its agenda on Sikkim. The progress on our concern over the trans-Himalayan Rivers is also little. So, was the visit only about aid diplomacy to deliver relief materials worth $5 million to quake victims in Sichuan? We could have done this better through spiritual diplomacy.
On Tibet, Mukherjee seems to have got a pat on his back but the Chinese leadership was probably not happy with Indian media coverage of the Dalai Lama. Mukherjee may have reiterated India’s position on Tibet, though it is not clear whether the phrase Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is being used.
All in all, the visit appeared as a bit of a disappointment with no substantive breakthrough being made on any of the controversial issues. The Chinese, on the other hand, visibly appeared reluctant to move ahead in a positive way and keen to play checkers with India.
India needs to be watchful of China’s moves in South Asia. In Pakistan, Chinese firms are constructing a hydro project on the Neelam River in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Their profile is ever growing in Nepal. In Sri Lanka, China has surpassed India and Japan by providing $1 billion in aid with no strings attached. After Gwadar, it is building a port in Sittwe (Myanmar) and one at Hambantota (Sri Lanka). Reports suggest that Chinese weapons are pouring into the Northeastern states. The news channels splashed fresh satellite images of China building a major underground nuclear submarine base on Hainan to control the Indian Ocean Region.
Given China’s unpredictable behaviour, it would be too early to drop one’s guard. Instead, India should exploit the current window of opportunity and assert its position before it gets closed once the Olympics are over. The reopening of Daulat Beg Oldi is a thoughtful and an unusually sharp decision. We should consolidate our position further and reopen Chushul and Fukche.
India could also reopen the issue of Skasgyam Valley, ceded to China by Pakistan. And, if Chinese continue to make diversionary moves, India should reclaim the ownership of Minser Enclave, composing of several villages, located inside Tibet on the bank of Mount Kailash. Minser was a sovereign part of India until mid-1960s, which New Delhi forgot about due to apathy and it deserves a revisit before the final boundary settlement.
source:IDSA
Nathu La: Pass To Prosperity But Also A Challenge
by Pushpita Das
July 4, 2006
Nathu La, identified as the third mountain pass for border trade between India and China, is officially slated to open on July 6, 2006 after a gap of 44 years. Previous attempts to open the border pass had to be postponed due to lack of proper infrastructure. This time around, the infrastructure from the Indian side is complete. A field visit to Nathu La on June 25, 2006 revealed that the approach road has been constructed. And the warehouses, customs and administrative offices, banks etc. at Sherathang, the designated trade mart situated 5 km from Nathu La, have been completed.
Nathu La, situated at 14,420 feet was an offshoot of the ancient Silk Route, which connected India with China, the Middle East and Europe. It was thus once a part of the thriving Indo-Tibetan trade accounting for 80 per cent of the border trade between India and China at the start of the 20th century. The British even envisaged constructing a rail line from Siliguri to Chumbi Valley to facilitate greater border trade between India and Tibet. The border trade was, however, discontinued following the 1962 border war between India and China. With the thawing of relations between the two countries, hopes for the resumption of trade through Nathu La were once again generated. Sikkim, the State adversely affected due to the stopping of the border trade, forcefully advocated for its resumption.
The opening of Nathu La represents the culmination of a process of resumption of border trade between India and China that began in December 1991. On July 1, 1992, both countries signed a Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade. Border trade between India and China resumed in 1992-93, when two mountain passes at Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh and Lipu Lekh in Uttaranchal were opened. In June 2003, a MoU was signed between the two countries to resume border trade between Sikkim and Tibet. According to the MoU, Changgu in Sikkim and Renqinggang in Tibet Autonomous Region were designated as trade markets for India and China respectively. Nathu La was identified as the border pass for the entry and exit of persons, means of transport and commodities engaged in border trade. Both sides agreed to trade in 44 items (29 from export list and 15 from import list), which have been included in the border trade agreements of 1991, 1992 and 2003. Initially the trade will be tightly controlled, with just 60 vehicles and 100 traders allowed to pass through. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force will escort the Chinese traders and goods from Nathu La till Sherathang.
The border trade through Shipki La and Lipu Lekh did not provide any impetus to trade and commerce in the region. The importance of Nathu La, on the contrary, is believed to be immeasurable. The State government even constituted a Study Group headed by Mahendra P Lama of the Jawaharlal Nehru University to study the prospects of border trade. The Report of the Study Group titled, "Nathu La Trade: Prospects, Potentials and Opportunities," which was submitted on September 2005, had an optimistic tenor. According to the report, the opening of the trade route through Nathu La would not only benefit the landlocked state of Sikkim but also its adjoining regions like the North East Region and West Bengal. It suggested that trade though Nathu La should be integrated with movements of tourists and that a bus service between Gangtok and Lhasa should be started. The report also envisioned that border trade would transform Sikkim into a dry port and Siliguri in West Bengal into a major trading centre. If China avails the port facilities of Kolkata and Haldia, which are nearer to the southern and western regions of China, it would not only help cut its transportation costs but at the same benefit Kolkata and Haldia immensely. The report estimated that the trade volume would reach Rs. 353 crores by 2010 and by 2020 it would be approximately Rs. 573 crores.
The reopening of the Nathu La for border trade is seen as part of a greater confidence building measure between India and China. It would underscore China's policy of recognizing Sikkim as a constituent state of India. In his address to the Parliament in 2003, Atal Behari Vajpayee had said that the MoU on border trade through Nathu La in Sikkim was a significant development and "with this a process had started by which Sikkim would cease to be an issue in India-China relations." Economically, the benefits accruing to Sikkim are estimated to be immense. According to Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling, the expected revenue generation from toll tax and license fee would be Rs. 81 lakhs for each of the first five years and is expected to go up to Rs. 3 crores. He also stated that revenue from tourists visiting Sheathing and Nathu La would be Rs. 181 lakhs and is expected to go up to Rs. 347 lakhs by 2010.
In the midst of the euphoria, a few voices of apprehension can also be heard. The general population of Sikkim appears to be sceptical about the benefits of the resumption of border trade. They feel that it would simply legalise the smuggling of goods, which has hitherto been carried out via Nepal. They fear that instead of Bagdogra and Siliguri, now Gangtok would be flooded with Chinese goods. As far as employment generation is concerned, a few hoteliers and transporters seem enthusiastic about the reopening of Nathu La. The local population, on the other hand, sees more opportunities in the tourism sector than in border trade. Moreover, border trade would initially benefit only the residents of the East Sikkim district (especially Bhutias), since only they will be allowed to trade with their Tibetan counterparts.
The people of Sikkim are also apprehensive that opening of the border pass would lead to a massive influx of Tibetan refugees. There is simmering resentment among the people of Sikkim towards the Tibetans. It is believed that during the late 1950s and early 1960s, substantial Tibetans crossed over to India and settled in Sikkim. In due course of time, they added "Bhutia" to their names and started availing the reservations facilities extended to the scheduled tribes of the state. Since the Tibetans were better educated compared to the local Bhutias, they were able to grab top positions in government as well as in other economic and social spheres.
In addition, a substantial influx of Tibetan refugees can also have adverse political implications. Sikkim is a small state with a population of approximately 5 lakhs. It has 32 constituencies with about 18,000 persons in each. Even a small addition of Tibetans to the voter's list can alter the political destiny of the state. Even if the security arrangements and the terrain around the border pass do not facilitate large scale Tibetan infiltration, complacency in guarding the borders can cost us dearly. The case of Bangladeshi refugees and illegal migrants do serve a good example to assess the impact of illegal migrants both in socio-economic and political life of the border states of India. The opening of the border pass can usher in an era of prosperity, but India should be prepared to meet the challenges it might pose in maintaining the peace and tranquillity of the strategically sensitive border regions.
source: IDSA
by Pushpita Das
July 4, 2006
Nathu La, identified as the third mountain pass for border trade between India and China, is officially slated to open on July 6, 2006 after a gap of 44 years. Previous attempts to open the border pass had to be postponed due to lack of proper infrastructure. This time around, the infrastructure from the Indian side is complete. A field visit to Nathu La on June 25, 2006 revealed that the approach road has been constructed. And the warehouses, customs and administrative offices, banks etc. at Sherathang, the designated trade mart situated 5 km from Nathu La, have been completed.
Nathu La, situated at 14,420 feet was an offshoot of the ancient Silk Route, which connected India with China, the Middle East and Europe. It was thus once a part of the thriving Indo-Tibetan trade accounting for 80 per cent of the border trade between India and China at the start of the 20th century. The British even envisaged constructing a rail line from Siliguri to Chumbi Valley to facilitate greater border trade between India and Tibet. The border trade was, however, discontinued following the 1962 border war between India and China. With the thawing of relations between the two countries, hopes for the resumption of trade through Nathu La were once again generated. Sikkim, the State adversely affected due to the stopping of the border trade, forcefully advocated for its resumption.
The opening of Nathu La represents the culmination of a process of resumption of border trade between India and China that began in December 1991. On July 1, 1992, both countries signed a Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade. Border trade between India and China resumed in 1992-93, when two mountain passes at Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh and Lipu Lekh in Uttaranchal were opened. In June 2003, a MoU was signed between the two countries to resume border trade between Sikkim and Tibet. According to the MoU, Changgu in Sikkim and Renqinggang in Tibet Autonomous Region were designated as trade markets for India and China respectively. Nathu La was identified as the border pass for the entry and exit of persons, means of transport and commodities engaged in border trade. Both sides agreed to trade in 44 items (29 from export list and 15 from import list), which have been included in the border trade agreements of 1991, 1992 and 2003. Initially the trade will be tightly controlled, with just 60 vehicles and 100 traders allowed to pass through. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force will escort the Chinese traders and goods from Nathu La till Sherathang.
The border trade through Shipki La and Lipu Lekh did not provide any impetus to trade and commerce in the region. The importance of Nathu La, on the contrary, is believed to be immeasurable. The State government even constituted a Study Group headed by Mahendra P Lama of the Jawaharlal Nehru University to study the prospects of border trade. The Report of the Study Group titled, "Nathu La Trade: Prospects, Potentials and Opportunities," which was submitted on September 2005, had an optimistic tenor. According to the report, the opening of the trade route through Nathu La would not only benefit the landlocked state of Sikkim but also its adjoining regions like the North East Region and West Bengal. It suggested that trade though Nathu La should be integrated with movements of tourists and that a bus service between Gangtok and Lhasa should be started. The report also envisioned that border trade would transform Sikkim into a dry port and Siliguri in West Bengal into a major trading centre. If China avails the port facilities of Kolkata and Haldia, which are nearer to the southern and western regions of China, it would not only help cut its transportation costs but at the same benefit Kolkata and Haldia immensely. The report estimated that the trade volume would reach Rs. 353 crores by 2010 and by 2020 it would be approximately Rs. 573 crores.
The reopening of the Nathu La for border trade is seen as part of a greater confidence building measure between India and China. It would underscore China's policy of recognizing Sikkim as a constituent state of India. In his address to the Parliament in 2003, Atal Behari Vajpayee had said that the MoU on border trade through Nathu La in Sikkim was a significant development and "with this a process had started by which Sikkim would cease to be an issue in India-China relations." Economically, the benefits accruing to Sikkim are estimated to be immense. According to Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling, the expected revenue generation from toll tax and license fee would be Rs. 81 lakhs for each of the first five years and is expected to go up to Rs. 3 crores. He also stated that revenue from tourists visiting Sheathing and Nathu La would be Rs. 181 lakhs and is expected to go up to Rs. 347 lakhs by 2010.
In the midst of the euphoria, a few voices of apprehension can also be heard. The general population of Sikkim appears to be sceptical about the benefits of the resumption of border trade. They feel that it would simply legalise the smuggling of goods, which has hitherto been carried out via Nepal. They fear that instead of Bagdogra and Siliguri, now Gangtok would be flooded with Chinese goods. As far as employment generation is concerned, a few hoteliers and transporters seem enthusiastic about the reopening of Nathu La. The local population, on the other hand, sees more opportunities in the tourism sector than in border trade. Moreover, border trade would initially benefit only the residents of the East Sikkim district (especially Bhutias), since only they will be allowed to trade with their Tibetan counterparts.
The people of Sikkim are also apprehensive that opening of the border pass would lead to a massive influx of Tibetan refugees. There is simmering resentment among the people of Sikkim towards the Tibetans. It is believed that during the late 1950s and early 1960s, substantial Tibetans crossed over to India and settled in Sikkim. In due course of time, they added "Bhutia" to their names and started availing the reservations facilities extended to the scheduled tribes of the state. Since the Tibetans were better educated compared to the local Bhutias, they were able to grab top positions in government as well as in other economic and social spheres.
In addition, a substantial influx of Tibetan refugees can also have adverse political implications. Sikkim is a small state with a population of approximately 5 lakhs. It has 32 constituencies with about 18,000 persons in each. Even a small addition of Tibetans to the voter's list can alter the political destiny of the state. Even if the security arrangements and the terrain around the border pass do not facilitate large scale Tibetan infiltration, complacency in guarding the borders can cost us dearly. The case of Bangladeshi refugees and illegal migrants do serve a good example to assess the impact of illegal migrants both in socio-economic and political life of the border states of India. The opening of the border pass can usher in an era of prosperity, but India should be prepared to meet the challenges it might pose in maintaining the peace and tranquillity of the strategically sensitive border regions.
source: IDSA
Wednesday, 15 September 2010
A peaceful South Asia can be built only if India works with China
South Asia beckons China
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
A peaceful South Asia can be built only if India works with China. The alternative will be war and mayhem and history provides many examples.
An Assistant Secretary dealing with South Asia in the State Department in Washington a decade-and-a-half ago once took justifiable pride that she only needed a clutch of minutes to get the Indians all worked up into a tizzy. What the loquacious U.S. diplomat, who was an old India-Pakistan hand familiar with the human frailties (and vanities) in our part of the world, meant was that Indians never bothered to crosscheck facts when they came across an unpalatable thought.
She had a point. And her adage holds good. When an opinion piece by the U.S. strategic analyst, Selig Harrison, appeared in the New York Times recently alleging large-scale Chinese military presence in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, history seemed to repeat itself. Our tribal instincts resurfaced. It still remains foggy on what basis Mr. Harrison painted the apocalyptic vision of war drums beating distantly in the obscure Himalayan mountains. The regions beyond the northern edges of Kashmir comprise tangled, inaccessible mountains and it is highly improbable that Mr. Harrison wrote on the basis of any first-hand information regarding the 22 secret tunnels in which 11,000 Chinese soldiers belonging to the People's Liberation Army reportedly huddle uneasily alongside stockpiles of deadly missiles that could be launched against India. (Actually, the Pakistani authorities have invited him to go to that picturesque region and take a good look himself.)
Not much ingenuity is needed to discern that Mr. Harrison based his opinion piece on intelligence sources. All he would say later was that his story was based on “western and regional intelligence sources.” Who could be these sources? Politics should, after all, begin with asking a few blunt questions. Were these sources Pakistani, Afghan, Iranian, Russian or Chinese who guided Mr. Harrison? Seems illogical. Were they Indian sources based in Delhi — or Indian “analysts” comfortably located in Singapore? Indeed, by a process of elimination, we arrive at the conclusion that the greatest likelihood seems to be that Mr. Harrison's sources were American. This of course is by no means casting aspersions on Mr. Harrison's integrity. In fact, he has been most candid about his thesis when he concluded his opinion piece with a stirring call to the U.S. administration. He wrote: “The United States is uniquely situated to play a moderating role in Kashmir, given its growing economic and military ties with India and Pakistan's aid dependence on Washington.
“Washington should press New Delhi to resume autonomy negotiations with Kashmiri separatists. Success would put pressure on Islamabad for comparable concessions in Free Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan … Precisely because the Gilgit-Baltistan region is so important to China, the U.S., India and Pakistan should work together to make sure that it is not overwhelmed … by the Chinese behemoth.”
Both Islamabad and Beijing have since repeatedly and unequivocally refuted the contents of Mr. Harrison's article. Top Indian officials who have full access to intelligence have also off-the-record given their estimation that any Chinese presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region could be related to flood-relief work and some development projects and it doesn't involve Chinese regulars of the PLA. They are also inclined to accept the Chinese assurance that there is no change in Beijing's stand on the Kashmir issue, including the part of Kashmir that is under Indian governance.
Equally, in their assessment, Chinese nationals are not taking up habitation in Gilgit-Baltistan, but come to the region from time to time to build infrastructure projects and they go away upon the completion of those projects. Delhi regards the figure of $1.7 billion as Chinese investment in Northern Areas and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as far-too inflated a figure. As a senior Indian official put it “They [the Chinese] are a business-like people and they won't invest in that kind of area like that.”
Evidently, there is a glaring disconnect in New Delhi between those who know and generally prefer not to speak and those who rave but have no flair or patience for checking the facts on the ground. The problem with disregard of facts is that incrementally you withdraw into a smaller and smaller coil of rage and ultimately resign yourself to a sense of powerlessness, frustration and defeat. Should that be the fate of a great country like India that has survived for millennia?
Ultimately, it all boils down to China's presence in the South Asian region and, as the Prime Minister put it the other day, “we have to reflect on this reality, we have to be aware of this.” The issue is: what is the nature of the “reality” so that we can come to terms with it?
The reality is China's growing power and influence that need to be tackled in regional politics. The security of our region and its future will significantly depend on the choices that China makes. Having said that, we too have choices to make. Even if India fails to overtake China economically, it will nonetheless be the second-strongest regional power and will be the most serious constraint on Chinese power. That is to say, the manner and the directions in which India chooses to use its power is going to be no less important than China's actions in their impact on regional stability.
Of course, our choices are going to be harder than China's. The heart of the matter is that a stable, peaceful South Asia can only be built if India works with China. The alternative will be war and mayhem and history provides many examples. The point is, there is a fundamental choice involved here — the choice between “influence” and stability. India and China are on the same side — both want influence and neither seeks instability.
However, we cannot insist that regional stability is synonymous with India's primacy. The international community will only mock at us if we do so in this era of globalisation. As, for that matter, was the region in a blissful state of stability even in the halcyon days when India's influence reigned supreme? In short, the rise in China's influence in the region can lead to peace and regional stability provided we eschew outdated notions of “sphere of influence.” On the contrary, a struggle will inevitably ensue if India chooses to contest China's growing influence since the quintessence of that choice will be that India is prepared to sacrifice peace and stability in the region in its quest for regional primacy. Our South Asian neighbours will only see our choice as a quest for regional hegemony and they cannot be expected to accommodate hubris.
Alas, a segment of our strategic community seems to think that South Asia can be peaceful only under Indian tutelage. It perceives China's desire to expand its influence in the region as inherently threatening. But what is the alternative? China has already grown to be the second biggest economic power in the world. With such economic power, political and strategic power inexorably follows. To quote from a recent thoughtful essay by well-known Australian scholar Hugh White, “China's power, controlled by China's government, must be dealt with as a simple fact of international politics. If Americans deny the right to exercise its power internationally within the same limits and norms that they accept for themselves, they can hardly be surprised if China decides not to accept the legitimacy of American power and starts pushing back. These days it can push back pretty hard.”
Again, all evidence so far points to a distinct pattern that China wishes to expand its influence in South Asia without breaking international law or the rules set out in the Charter of the United Nations. China has not used its power improperly. The fact that China has growing ambitions to develop communication links via South Asia to the world market bypassing the Malacca Strait (which is an American “choke-point”) or that China aspires to explore the vast untapped potential for regional trade and investment in South Asia do not make the Chinese policies illegitimate. Our dilemma is that we are used to exercising a level of regional primacy in the neighbouring countries and we may have come to regard it almost as a mark of our national identity. Clearly, the instinct to “fight” to keep our perceived regional primacy stems from a wrong notion.
The rise of China's influence doesn't have to be a story of India's weakness but can remain a story of Chinese strength. What is it, arguably, that prevents Indian companies even today from spreading wings to the mountains, jungles and beaches of Nepal, Myanmar or Sri Lanka with the gusto with which the Chinese businessmen are doing? Last week, Yunnan commenced direct flight to Colombo. Why is it that a Raipur-Colombo air link remains “uneconomical?”
Nothing like this Chinese “challenge” ever happened before in the South Asian region. Japan or America or Britain could have mounted it in these six decades, but they didn't. But then, they weren't South Asia's neighbours. China is a neighbour.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
source:HINDU
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
A peaceful South Asia can be built only if India works with China. The alternative will be war and mayhem and history provides many examples.
An Assistant Secretary dealing with South Asia in the State Department in Washington a decade-and-a-half ago once took justifiable pride that she only needed a clutch of minutes to get the Indians all worked up into a tizzy. What the loquacious U.S. diplomat, who was an old India-Pakistan hand familiar with the human frailties (and vanities) in our part of the world, meant was that Indians never bothered to crosscheck facts when they came across an unpalatable thought.
She had a point. And her adage holds good. When an opinion piece by the U.S. strategic analyst, Selig Harrison, appeared in the New York Times recently alleging large-scale Chinese military presence in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, history seemed to repeat itself. Our tribal instincts resurfaced. It still remains foggy on what basis Mr. Harrison painted the apocalyptic vision of war drums beating distantly in the obscure Himalayan mountains. The regions beyond the northern edges of Kashmir comprise tangled, inaccessible mountains and it is highly improbable that Mr. Harrison wrote on the basis of any first-hand information regarding the 22 secret tunnels in which 11,000 Chinese soldiers belonging to the People's Liberation Army reportedly huddle uneasily alongside stockpiles of deadly missiles that could be launched against India. (Actually, the Pakistani authorities have invited him to go to that picturesque region and take a good look himself.)
Not much ingenuity is needed to discern that Mr. Harrison based his opinion piece on intelligence sources. All he would say later was that his story was based on “western and regional intelligence sources.” Who could be these sources? Politics should, after all, begin with asking a few blunt questions. Were these sources Pakistani, Afghan, Iranian, Russian or Chinese who guided Mr. Harrison? Seems illogical. Were they Indian sources based in Delhi — or Indian “analysts” comfortably located in Singapore? Indeed, by a process of elimination, we arrive at the conclusion that the greatest likelihood seems to be that Mr. Harrison's sources were American. This of course is by no means casting aspersions on Mr. Harrison's integrity. In fact, he has been most candid about his thesis when he concluded his opinion piece with a stirring call to the U.S. administration. He wrote: “The United States is uniquely situated to play a moderating role in Kashmir, given its growing economic and military ties with India and Pakistan's aid dependence on Washington.
“Washington should press New Delhi to resume autonomy negotiations with Kashmiri separatists. Success would put pressure on Islamabad for comparable concessions in Free Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan … Precisely because the Gilgit-Baltistan region is so important to China, the U.S., India and Pakistan should work together to make sure that it is not overwhelmed … by the Chinese behemoth.”
Both Islamabad and Beijing have since repeatedly and unequivocally refuted the contents of Mr. Harrison's article. Top Indian officials who have full access to intelligence have also off-the-record given their estimation that any Chinese presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region could be related to flood-relief work and some development projects and it doesn't involve Chinese regulars of the PLA. They are also inclined to accept the Chinese assurance that there is no change in Beijing's stand on the Kashmir issue, including the part of Kashmir that is under Indian governance.
Equally, in their assessment, Chinese nationals are not taking up habitation in Gilgit-Baltistan, but come to the region from time to time to build infrastructure projects and they go away upon the completion of those projects. Delhi regards the figure of $1.7 billion as Chinese investment in Northern Areas and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as far-too inflated a figure. As a senior Indian official put it “They [the Chinese] are a business-like people and they won't invest in that kind of area like that.”
Evidently, there is a glaring disconnect in New Delhi between those who know and generally prefer not to speak and those who rave but have no flair or patience for checking the facts on the ground. The problem with disregard of facts is that incrementally you withdraw into a smaller and smaller coil of rage and ultimately resign yourself to a sense of powerlessness, frustration and defeat. Should that be the fate of a great country like India that has survived for millennia?
Ultimately, it all boils down to China's presence in the South Asian region and, as the Prime Minister put it the other day, “we have to reflect on this reality, we have to be aware of this.” The issue is: what is the nature of the “reality” so that we can come to terms with it?
The reality is China's growing power and influence that need to be tackled in regional politics. The security of our region and its future will significantly depend on the choices that China makes. Having said that, we too have choices to make. Even if India fails to overtake China economically, it will nonetheless be the second-strongest regional power and will be the most serious constraint on Chinese power. That is to say, the manner and the directions in which India chooses to use its power is going to be no less important than China's actions in their impact on regional stability.
Of course, our choices are going to be harder than China's. The heart of the matter is that a stable, peaceful South Asia can only be built if India works with China. The alternative will be war and mayhem and history provides many examples. The point is, there is a fundamental choice involved here — the choice between “influence” and stability. India and China are on the same side — both want influence and neither seeks instability.
However, we cannot insist that regional stability is synonymous with India's primacy. The international community will only mock at us if we do so in this era of globalisation. As, for that matter, was the region in a blissful state of stability even in the halcyon days when India's influence reigned supreme? In short, the rise in China's influence in the region can lead to peace and regional stability provided we eschew outdated notions of “sphere of influence.” On the contrary, a struggle will inevitably ensue if India chooses to contest China's growing influence since the quintessence of that choice will be that India is prepared to sacrifice peace and stability in the region in its quest for regional primacy. Our South Asian neighbours will only see our choice as a quest for regional hegemony and they cannot be expected to accommodate hubris.
Alas, a segment of our strategic community seems to think that South Asia can be peaceful only under Indian tutelage. It perceives China's desire to expand its influence in the region as inherently threatening. But what is the alternative? China has already grown to be the second biggest economic power in the world. With such economic power, political and strategic power inexorably follows. To quote from a recent thoughtful essay by well-known Australian scholar Hugh White, “China's power, controlled by China's government, must be dealt with as a simple fact of international politics. If Americans deny the right to exercise its power internationally within the same limits and norms that they accept for themselves, they can hardly be surprised if China decides not to accept the legitimacy of American power and starts pushing back. These days it can push back pretty hard.”
Again, all evidence so far points to a distinct pattern that China wishes to expand its influence in South Asia without breaking international law or the rules set out in the Charter of the United Nations. China has not used its power improperly. The fact that China has growing ambitions to develop communication links via South Asia to the world market bypassing the Malacca Strait (which is an American “choke-point”) or that China aspires to explore the vast untapped potential for regional trade and investment in South Asia do not make the Chinese policies illegitimate. Our dilemma is that we are used to exercising a level of regional primacy in the neighbouring countries and we may have come to regard it almost as a mark of our national identity. Clearly, the instinct to “fight” to keep our perceived regional primacy stems from a wrong notion.
The rise of China's influence doesn't have to be a story of India's weakness but can remain a story of Chinese strength. What is it, arguably, that prevents Indian companies even today from spreading wings to the mountains, jungles and beaches of Nepal, Myanmar or Sri Lanka with the gusto with which the Chinese businessmen are doing? Last week, Yunnan commenced direct flight to Colombo. Why is it that a Raipur-Colombo air link remains “uneconomical?”
Nothing like this Chinese “challenge” ever happened before in the South Asian region. Japan or America or Britain could have mounted it in these six decades, but they didn't. But then, they weren't South Asia's neighbours. China is a neighbour.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
source:HINDU
Friday, 3 September 2010
TROOPS BUILD-UP - Government conveys concern to China
BY ELIZABETH R OCHE
India on Friday formally conveyed its concerns to China over reports of the presence of thousands of People's Libera- tion Army troopers in Pakistan- occupied Kashmir--a region In- dia claims is part of its territory.
A foreign ministry official confirmed that India's ambassa- dor to China S. Jaishankar had met and discussed the subject of Chinese “activity and presence“ with vice-minister for foreign af- fairs Zhang Zhijun in Beijing on Friday.
The move comes in the wake of a recent report in The New York Times (NYT) that spoke of the influx of 7,000-11,000 Chi- nese soldiers in the Gilgit- Baltistan region--to ensure un- fettered road and rail access to West Asia through Pakistan.
That would shorten the time taken by Chinese oil tankers to 48 hours from 16 to 25 days, it said.
Many of the Chinese troopers entering Gilgit-Baltistan were expected to work on the railroad project, the report said, adding others were constructing dams and expressways. Some were also building 22 tunnels that could be used for laying a gas pipeline from Iran to China across the Himalayas but could alternatively be used as missile storage sites.
The meeting between Jais- hankar and Zhang also comes a day after Chinese foreign minis- try spokeswoman Jiang Yu dis- missed the NYT report as “total- ly groundless“.
The issue of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Balistan is the latest in a series of developments casting a shadow over the uneasy ties the two countries.
Last year, local media was re- plete with reports of Chinese troop intrusions across the yet- to-be demarcated border in eastern India--a legacy of a brief but bitter 1962 border dis- pute. The Chinese government also protested against Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims is part of its territory, during an election campaign. The Indian govern- ment allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Arunachal Pradesh de- spite Chinese protests and Chi- na issuing stapled visas to Kash- miris did not help matters.
Political and diplomatic ties seemed to be back on an even keel this year with President Pratibha Patil visiting China and national security adviser Shiv Shankar Menon holding talks to resolve differences in July. But in August, India put on hold de- fence exchanges with Beijing that were started with the aim of eliminating the deep-seated mistrust between the armies of the two countries as Chinese authorities refused to grant a visa to a senior Indian army offi- cer in charge of Kashmir.
Sujit Dutta, an expert on Chi- na, noted that India-China rela- tions were becoming “more and more complex“ and “not con- ducive to maintaining a happy engagement.“
“No doubt, this has to be seen in the context of an increasingly assertive China,“ said Dutta, a professor at Jamia Millia Isla- mia. “This assertiveness is being felt by most of China's neigh- bours, barring Russia and Pakis- tan,“ he said, referring to wor- ries expressed by several South- East Asian countries about Chi- na flexing its military and diplo- matic muscle.
EMAIL
elizabeth.r@livemint.com
BY ELIZABETH R OCHE
India on Friday formally conveyed its concerns to China over reports of the presence of thousands of People's Libera- tion Army troopers in Pakistan- occupied Kashmir--a region In- dia claims is part of its territory.
A foreign ministry official confirmed that India's ambassa- dor to China S. Jaishankar had met and discussed the subject of Chinese “activity and presence“ with vice-minister for foreign af- fairs Zhang Zhijun in Beijing on Friday.
The move comes in the wake of a recent report in The New York Times (NYT) that spoke of the influx of 7,000-11,000 Chi- nese soldiers in the Gilgit- Baltistan region--to ensure un- fettered road and rail access to West Asia through Pakistan.
That would shorten the time taken by Chinese oil tankers to 48 hours from 16 to 25 days, it said.
Many of the Chinese troopers entering Gilgit-Baltistan were expected to work on the railroad project, the report said, adding others were constructing dams and expressways. Some were also building 22 tunnels that could be used for laying a gas pipeline from Iran to China across the Himalayas but could alternatively be used as missile storage sites.
The meeting between Jais- hankar and Zhang also comes a day after Chinese foreign minis- try spokeswoman Jiang Yu dis- missed the NYT report as “total- ly groundless“.
The issue of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Balistan is the latest in a series of developments casting a shadow over the uneasy ties the two countries.
Last year, local media was re- plete with reports of Chinese troop intrusions across the yet- to-be demarcated border in eastern India--a legacy of a brief but bitter 1962 border dis- pute. The Chinese government also protested against Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims is part of its territory, during an election campaign. The Indian govern- ment allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Arunachal Pradesh de- spite Chinese protests and Chi- na issuing stapled visas to Kash- miris did not help matters.
Political and diplomatic ties seemed to be back on an even keel this year with President Pratibha Patil visiting China and national security adviser Shiv Shankar Menon holding talks to resolve differences in July. But in August, India put on hold de- fence exchanges with Beijing that were started with the aim of eliminating the deep-seated mistrust between the armies of the two countries as Chinese authorities refused to grant a visa to a senior Indian army offi- cer in charge of Kashmir.
Sujit Dutta, an expert on Chi- na, noted that India-China rela- tions were becoming “more and more complex“ and “not con- ducive to maintaining a happy engagement.“
“No doubt, this has to be seen in the context of an increasingly assertive China,“ said Dutta, a professor at Jamia Millia Isla- mia. “This assertiveness is being felt by most of China's neigh- bours, barring Russia and Pakis- tan,“ he said, referring to wor- ries expressed by several South- East Asian countries about Chi- na flexing its military and diplo- matic muscle.
elizabeth.r@livemint.com
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