By Robert D. KaplanChief Geopolitical Analyst
Everyone loves equality: equality of races, of ethnic groups, of sexual
orientations, and so on. The problem is, however, that in geopolitics equality
usually does not work very well. For centuries Europe had a rough equality
between major states that is often referred to as the
balance-of-power system. And
that led to frequent wars. East Asia, by contrast, from the 14th to the early
19th centuries, had its relations ordered by a tribute system in which China was
roughly dominant. The result, according to political scientist David C. Kang of
the University of Southern California, was a generally more peaceful climate in
Asia than in Europe.
The fact is that domination of one sort or another, tyrannical or not, has a
better chance of preventing the outbreak of war than a system in which no one is
really in charge; where no one is the top dog, so to speak. That is why Columbia
University's Kenneth Waltz, arguably America's pre-eminent realist, says that
the opposite of "anarchy" is not stability, but "hierarchy."
Hierarchy eviscerates equality; hierarchy implies that some are frankly "more
equal" than others, and it is this formal inequality -- where someone, or some
state or group, has more authority and power than others -- that prevents chaos.
For it is inequality itself that often creates the conditions for peace.
Government is the most common form of hierarchy. It is a government that
monopolizes the use of violence in a given geographical space, thereby
preventing anarchy. To quote Thomas Hobbes, the 17th century English
philosopher, only where it is possible to punish the wicked can right and wrong
have any practical meaning, and that requires "some coercive power."
The best sort of inequality is hegemony. Whereas primacy, as Kang explains,
is about preponderance purely through military or economic power, hegemony
"involves legitimation and consensus." That is to say, hegemony is some form of
agreed-upon inequality, where the dominant power is expected by others to lead.
When a hegemon does not lead, it is acting irresponsibly.
Of course, hegemony has a bad reputation in media discourse. But that is only
because journalists are confused about the terminology, even as they
sanctimoniously judge previous historical eras by the strict standards of their
own. In fact, for most of human history, periods of relative peace have been the
product of hegemony of one sort or another. And for many periods, the reigning
hegemonic or imperial power was the most liberal, according to the standards of
the age. Rome, Venice and Britain were usually more liberal than the forces
arranged against them. The empire of the Austrian Hapsburgs in Central and
Eastern Europe often protected the rights of minorities and prevented ethnic
wars to a much greater degree than did the modern states that succeeded it. The
Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the Middle East frequently did likewise. There
are exceptions, of course, like Hapsburg Spain, with its combination of
inquisition and conquest. But the point is that hegemony does not require
tyrannical or absolutist rule.
Stability is not the natural order of things. In fact, history shows that
stability such as it exists is usually a function of imperial rule, which, in
turn, is a common form of hierarchy. To wit, there are few things messier in
geopolitics than the demise of an empire. The collapse of the Hapsburgs, of the
Ottoman Turks, of the
Soviet Empire and
the British Empire in Asia and Africa led to chronic wars and upheavals. Some
uncomprehending commentators remind us that all empires end badly. Of course
they do, but that is only after they have provided decades and centuries of
relative peace.
Obviously, not all empires are morally equivalent. For example, the Austrian
Hapsburgs were for their time infinitely more tolerant than the Soviet
Communists. Indeed, had the Romanov Dynasty in St. Petersburg not been replaced
in 1917 by Lenin's Bolsheviks, Russia would likely have evolved far more
humanely than it did through the course of the 20th century. Therefore, I am
saying only in a general sense is order preferable to disorder. (Though
captivating subtleties abound: For example, Napoleon betrayed the ideals of the
French Revolution by creating an empire, but he also granted rights to Jews and
Protestants and created a system of merit over one of just birth and
privilege.)
In any case, such order must come from hierarchal domination.
Indeed, from the end of World War II until very recently, the United States
has performed the role of a
hegemon in
world politics. America may be democratic at home, but abroad it has been
hegemonic. That is, by some rough measure of international consent, it is
America that has the responsibility to lead. America formed NATO in Europe, even
as its Navy and Air Force exercise preponderant power in the Pacific Basin. And
whenever there is a humanitarian catastrophe somewhere in the developing world,
it is the United States that has been expected to organize the response.
Periodically, America has failed. But in general, it would be a different, much
more anarchic world without American hegemony.
But that hegemony, in some aspects, seems to be on the wane. That is what
makes this juncture in history unique.
NATO is simply not what it used to be.
U.S. forces in the Pacific are perceived to be less all-powerful than in the
past, as China tests U.S. hegemony in the region. But most importantly, U.S.
President Barack Obama is evolving a
doctrine of surgical strikes
against specific individuals combined with non-interference -- or minimal
interference -- in cases of regional disorder. Libya and Syria are cases in
point. Gone, at least for the moment, are the days when U.S. forces were at the
ready to put a situation to rights in this country or that.
When it comes to the Greater Middle East, Americans seem to want protection
on the cheap, and Obama is giving them that.
We will kill a terrorist with a
drone, but outside of limited numbers of special operations forces there will be
no boots on the ground for Libya, Syria or any other place. As for Iran,
whatever the White House now says, there is a perception that the administration
would rather contain a nuclear Iran than launch a military strike
to prevent
Iran from going nuclear.
That, by itself, is unexceptional. Previous administrations have been quite
averse to the use of force. In recent decades, it was only George W. Bush -- and
only in the
aftermath
of 9/11 -- who relished the concept of large-scale boots on the ground in a
war of choice. Nevertheless, something has shifted. In a world of strong states
-- a world characterized by hierarchy, that is -- the United States often
enforced the rules of the road or competed with another hegemon, the Soviet
Union, to do so. Such enforcement came in the form of robust diplomacy, often
backed by a threat to use military power. Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush were noted for American leadership and an effective, sometimes
ruthless foreign policy. Since the Cold War ended and Bill Clinton became
president, American leadership has often seemed to be either unserious,
inexpertly and crudely applied or relatively absent. And this has transpired
even as states themselves in the Greater Middle East have become feebler.
In other words, both the hegemon and the many states it influences are
weaker. Hierarchy is dissolving on all levels. Equality is now on the march in
geopolitics: The American hegemon is less hegemonic, and within individual
countries -- Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Tunisia and so on -- internal forces are
no longer subservient to the regime. (And states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan are not in the American camp to the degree that they used to be,
further weakening American hegemony.) Moreover, the European Union as a
political organizing principle is also weakening, even as the one-party state in
China is under increasing duress.
Nevertheless, in the case of the Middle East, do not conflate chaos with
democracy. Democracy itself implies an unequal, hierarchal order, albeit one
determined by voters. What we have in the Middle East cannot be democracy
because almost nowhere is there a new and sufficiently formalized hierarchy. No,
what we have in many places in the Middle East is the
weakening of central authority with no
new hierarchy to adequately replace it.
Unless some force can, against considerable odds, reinstitute hierarchy -- be
it an American hegemon acting globally, or an international organization acting
regionally or, say, an Egyptian military acting internally -- we will have more
fluidity, more equality and therefore more anarchy to look forward to. This is
profoundly disturbing, because civilization abjures anarchy. In his
novel
Billy Budd (1924), Herman Melville deeply laments the fact that
even beauty itself must be sacrificed for the maintenance of order. For without
order -- without hierarchy -- there is
nothing.
The high politics of state survival from the standpoint of political realism
This ongoing uncertainty presents India with no alternate choice other than building-up and upgrading an all-inclusive military infrastructure in the Northeast that will offer effective resistance to a possible Chinese military assault. In 1962, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) retreated after it had reached deep into Tezpur, a populous town in north-central state of Assam, for the fact that China was then not in a position to efficiently sustain the PLA’s lines of communication.
