India, China ink pact to establish hotline
PTI
AP External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna delivers a speech at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing on Tuesday. India and China have on Wednesday signed a pact to establish a hotline. Related
In a significant step in taking their bilateral relations to a new level, India and China on Wednesday signed an agreement to establish a hotline between Prime Ministers of the two countries.
The agreement was signed by External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi after their first round of talks here.
This is the first time in recent years that India has established a dedicated hotline facility with any country.
The hotline would enable Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao to hold direct conversations.
The decision to establish the hotline was reached during a meeting between Mr. Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg in June 2009.
After the meeting, Mr. Krishna said the establishment of hotline facility showed how close India and China were with each other.
“This has been one of the highlights of my visit and it is fitting that the two countries were able to do it during the celebrations of 60th year of establishment of diplomatic relations,” he told reporters.
Asked whether the issue of stapled visas were taken up during the meeting with Mr. Yang, Mr. Krishna said: “All issues concerning bilateral ties were discussed.”
The Minister said the discussions between him and Mr. Yang were “purposeful and indeed satisfying.”
“We want to have continued, sustained and cordial relations with China. That has been one of the priorities of India’s foreign policy. That purpose has been served by my visit to Beijing,” he said.
“We want to have cordial and friendly ties and lift the bilateral relations to a new level of strategic cooperation and partnership.”
He said the trade between India and China will touch $60 billion this year and the issue of trade deficit with China is being discussed.
Wednesday, 7 April 2010
Monday, 5 April 2010
Behind China's India policy, a growing debate
BY Ananth Krishnan
Beyond the expected statements Chinese officials will exchange with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna in Beijing this week, there is little consensus among different policymakers in Beijing on how to engage with a rising India.
Earlier this year, the United States' decision to approve a $ 6.4-billion arms sale to Taiwan sparked a series of agitated commentaries in China's military journals. The tone will sound somewhat familiar to an Indian audience: it reflected a growing anxiety among strategists that the U.S. was building a “crescent-shaped ring” to encircle and contain China. Interestingly, much of the debate focussed on what role India would — or would not — play in a supposed U.S.-led “encirclement.” Some strategists expressed concern that an eventual “integration of India” into an American alliance “would profoundly affect China's security,” as the official China Daily reported. Dai Xu, an Air Force Colonel of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), warned that China needed to be vigilant against this growing network running “from Japan to India” that would suffocate China.
Others, however, were not so convinced, and instead sought to calm the tensions. Pei Yuanying, former Chinese Ambassador to India, said India, as “an independent international power in the international arena,” was “unlikely to be part of any such U.S. scheme.” Shen Dingli, one of the leading voices in the strategic community in Beijing, also disagreed with Dai's views in an interview with The Hindu, suggesting that the current relationship was sound enough for China to have no reason to worry about India's ties with the U.S.
These differing views point to an ongoing debate in Beijing on a question that many policymakers are grappling with: how should China engage with a rising India? On one side of the debate are voices from the PLA, who are pressing Beijing to take a harder line with India and who see little room for cooperation between two rivals. On the other are voices in the Hu Jintao government and official think tanks, which are pushing for a more moderate and non-confrontational foreign policy line, one which they see as crucial to China's own self-interest and continued development.
The military view
The appearance of a number of articles and commentaries last year in military journals and official Communist Party-run newspapers has led some to suggest that the first group is increasingly beginning to have its voice heard. In recent months, articles in influential publications like the People's Daily, have taken a noticeably harder line on India, accusing New Delhi of “arrogance” and calling on China to take a stronger position on the border dispute. The People's Daily, in particular, has also begun to devote extensive coverage to India's military build-up, frequently speaking of an “India threat.”
The articles more or less reflected the “PLA view” of Sino-Indian ties, according to Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University who studies the Chinese military. According to him and other analysts, this view is predicated on three basic policy positions on India. The first assumes that India is seeking to become a great power. The policy response is to support Pakistan, which China continues to do, and confine India's influence to South Asia. The second, he says, assumes that India has “hegemonic ambitions in South Asia” — a phrase often used by the People's Daily last year. The policy response in China is to “oppose hegemony” by supporting smaller states in South Asia, like Nepal and Bangladesh. The third is on India's presence in the Indian Ocean, and the policy response is to strengthen China's naval capabilities.
The other view
Much as the PLA is influential, its view by no means reflects a consensus opinion among the highest policymakers. Besides the PLA, there are at least three groups which have a role in shaping China's India policy, including commercial lobbies, retired officials and a select group of India scholars in official think tanks. This section tends to view the relationship beyond the narrow military paradigm of the PLA. It argues that despite the persisting mistrust between the countries, it is in China's own interest, both from the point of view of sustaining its economic development and its standing as a responsible world power, to have harmonious relations with India and a peaceful periphery.
“Many people in the Chinese government realise that despite historical differences, there are growing commonalities in relations between the two countries and their positions on international issues,” says Ma Jiali, a leading South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), who advises the government on its India policy. “There is also the common goal that both countries do not want to see a unipolar world.” He considers “four roles” India plays in shaping his policy view — “a close neighbour, a developing country with common goals, a rising power and an increasingly important international player.” “The basic fact is,” he continues, “we must have good relations with India, or our national interest will be damaged.”
His view is echoed by Sun Shihai, another influential ‘India hand' at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He says he “completely disagrees” with the policy views voiced by the nationalistic commentaries in much of the official media last year. “Many of those reports misperceived India very deeply,” says Professor Sun. “Among most scholars at least, there is a growing awareness that India's power is rising, its international status is rising, and these facts are a reality that cannot be altered.” He believes that it is in China's self-interest to work with India on issues in which the countries have a common stake such as climate change and combating terrorism. “China has more respect [now] for India's rise, and it is in our interest to co-operate where we can, as we did so effectively last year at Copenhagen [on climate change],” he says. “But as two rising powers with growing international roles and strategic weight, cooperation and competition will be natural. What the governments need to do is manage the competition and avoid conflict. Most serious scholars are of this view.”
Reading the debate
Do these different views matter to India? Chinese foreign policy is ultimately decided at the highest levels of the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee using these various inputs. But how these inputs get used is “an extremely complicated process,” says Prof. Kondapalli. “Various groups put out their agenda to try and have their opinions heard, but what is eventually decided depends on who has greater influence at a given moment in time.” For now though, the outcome of this debate still seems uncertain. “The academic community appears to follow a soft and co-operative line while the PLA maintains its stridency to keep India on tenterhooks,” says Brigadier (retd.) Arun Sahgal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
Until there is greater clarity on its outcome, the mistrust between the countries will likely persist. For usually, it is only the harder “PLA view” of India that gets covered in the media, serving as fodder for the often over-hyped ‘China threat' perspectives dished out by strategic analysts. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that these views are more “newsworthy” than balanced views from the government and other scholars. But another factor behind misperceptions is the continuing opacity in China's own government, in both policy-making and the state's control of the media.
“The main problem in understanding China's policies is the lack of transparency, which often leads to misperceptions” Prof. Kondapalli says. Consequently, even extreme opinions, from any media outlet, often tend to be regarded as Beijing's official line, and drown out other views even if they are no more than voices in an ongoing debate. And until China becomes more transparent, analysts say, external observers will likely continue to imagine the worst when reading the tea leaves.
SOURCE:THE HINDU
BY Ananth Krishnan
Beyond the expected statements Chinese officials will exchange with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna in Beijing this week, there is little consensus among different policymakers in Beijing on how to engage with a rising India.
Earlier this year, the United States' decision to approve a $ 6.4-billion arms sale to Taiwan sparked a series of agitated commentaries in China's military journals. The tone will sound somewhat familiar to an Indian audience: it reflected a growing anxiety among strategists that the U.S. was building a “crescent-shaped ring” to encircle and contain China. Interestingly, much of the debate focussed on what role India would — or would not — play in a supposed U.S.-led “encirclement.” Some strategists expressed concern that an eventual “integration of India” into an American alliance “would profoundly affect China's security,” as the official China Daily reported. Dai Xu, an Air Force Colonel of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), warned that China needed to be vigilant against this growing network running “from Japan to India” that would suffocate China.
Others, however, were not so convinced, and instead sought to calm the tensions. Pei Yuanying, former Chinese Ambassador to India, said India, as “an independent international power in the international arena,” was “unlikely to be part of any such U.S. scheme.” Shen Dingli, one of the leading voices in the strategic community in Beijing, also disagreed with Dai's views in an interview with The Hindu, suggesting that the current relationship was sound enough for China to have no reason to worry about India's ties with the U.S.
These differing views point to an ongoing debate in Beijing on a question that many policymakers are grappling with: how should China engage with a rising India? On one side of the debate are voices from the PLA, who are pressing Beijing to take a harder line with India and who see little room for cooperation between two rivals. On the other are voices in the Hu Jintao government and official think tanks, which are pushing for a more moderate and non-confrontational foreign policy line, one which they see as crucial to China's own self-interest and continued development.
The military view
The appearance of a number of articles and commentaries last year in military journals and official Communist Party-run newspapers has led some to suggest that the first group is increasingly beginning to have its voice heard. In recent months, articles in influential publications like the People's Daily, have taken a noticeably harder line on India, accusing New Delhi of “arrogance” and calling on China to take a stronger position on the border dispute. The People's Daily, in particular, has also begun to devote extensive coverage to India's military build-up, frequently speaking of an “India threat.”
The articles more or less reflected the “PLA view” of Sino-Indian ties, according to Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University who studies the Chinese military. According to him and other analysts, this view is predicated on three basic policy positions on India. The first assumes that India is seeking to become a great power. The policy response is to support Pakistan, which China continues to do, and confine India's influence to South Asia. The second, he says, assumes that India has “hegemonic ambitions in South Asia” — a phrase often used by the People's Daily last year. The policy response in China is to “oppose hegemony” by supporting smaller states in South Asia, like Nepal and Bangladesh. The third is on India's presence in the Indian Ocean, and the policy response is to strengthen China's naval capabilities.
The other view
Much as the PLA is influential, its view by no means reflects a consensus opinion among the highest policymakers. Besides the PLA, there are at least three groups which have a role in shaping China's India policy, including commercial lobbies, retired officials and a select group of India scholars in official think tanks. This section tends to view the relationship beyond the narrow military paradigm of the PLA. It argues that despite the persisting mistrust between the countries, it is in China's own interest, both from the point of view of sustaining its economic development and its standing as a responsible world power, to have harmonious relations with India and a peaceful periphery.
“Many people in the Chinese government realise that despite historical differences, there are growing commonalities in relations between the two countries and their positions on international issues,” says Ma Jiali, a leading South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), who advises the government on its India policy. “There is also the common goal that both countries do not want to see a unipolar world.” He considers “four roles” India plays in shaping his policy view — “a close neighbour, a developing country with common goals, a rising power and an increasingly important international player.” “The basic fact is,” he continues, “we must have good relations with India, or our national interest will be damaged.”
His view is echoed by Sun Shihai, another influential ‘India hand' at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He says he “completely disagrees” with the policy views voiced by the nationalistic commentaries in much of the official media last year. “Many of those reports misperceived India very deeply,” says Professor Sun. “Among most scholars at least, there is a growing awareness that India's power is rising, its international status is rising, and these facts are a reality that cannot be altered.” He believes that it is in China's self-interest to work with India on issues in which the countries have a common stake such as climate change and combating terrorism. “China has more respect [now] for India's rise, and it is in our interest to co-operate where we can, as we did so effectively last year at Copenhagen [on climate change],” he says. “But as two rising powers with growing international roles and strategic weight, cooperation and competition will be natural. What the governments need to do is manage the competition and avoid conflict. Most serious scholars are of this view.”
Reading the debate
Do these different views matter to India? Chinese foreign policy is ultimately decided at the highest levels of the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee using these various inputs. But how these inputs get used is “an extremely complicated process,” says Prof. Kondapalli. “Various groups put out their agenda to try and have their opinions heard, but what is eventually decided depends on who has greater influence at a given moment in time.” For now though, the outcome of this debate still seems uncertain. “The academic community appears to follow a soft and co-operative line while the PLA maintains its stridency to keep India on tenterhooks,” says Brigadier (retd.) Arun Sahgal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
Until there is greater clarity on its outcome, the mistrust between the countries will likely persist. For usually, it is only the harder “PLA view” of India that gets covered in the media, serving as fodder for the often over-hyped ‘China threat' perspectives dished out by strategic analysts. Part of the reason, no doubt, is that these views are more “newsworthy” than balanced views from the government and other scholars. But another factor behind misperceptions is the continuing opacity in China's own government, in both policy-making and the state's control of the media.
“The main problem in understanding China's policies is the lack of transparency, which often leads to misperceptions” Prof. Kondapalli says. Consequently, even extreme opinions, from any media outlet, often tend to be regarded as Beijing's official line, and drown out other views even if they are no more than voices in an ongoing debate. And until China becomes more transparent, analysts say, external observers will likely continue to imagine the worst when reading the tea leaves.
SOURCE:THE HINDU
Thursday, 1 April 2010
When will the mistrust end?
by Sreemati Chakrabarti
Sixty years after the two countries established diplomatic relations, Indians and Chinese need to break the mental barrier and begin to trust one another. Here's how the trust deficit can be overcome.
On April 1, 2010 India and China observed 60 years of their diplomatic relations. On this day in 1950 India took the world by surprise when it decided to recognise the government of the People's Republic of China headed by Mao Zedong and led by the Communist Party of China, which had brought the Chinese mainland under its control after defeating Chiang Kai-shek's army. This was a bold decision by the Indian government – the government of a newly independent country. It obviously displeased the western powers who went along with Chiang Kai-shek's view that mainland China had been occupied only temporarily by ‘communist bandits' who would soon be overthrown. Indian foreign-policy makers, led by the brilliant and far-sighted K.P.S. Menon, gave sensible advice to Prime Minister Nehru. This led to the recognition of the new government established in Beijing on October 1 1949.
The first decade of the relationship saw some very important developments like the signing of the Panchsheel (the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which later became the official basis of Chinese foreign policy) in 1954, and the Bandung Conference a year later, where both Nehru and Zhou Enlai were elevated to the status of icons for the nations of Asia and Africa struggling for liberation and independence. Cultural and educational exchanges between India and China took place at more than a modest level.
This congenial relationship was upset by the Tibetan Rebellion with the Dalai Lama fleeing to India and eventually setting up a ‘government-in-exile.' The Chinese strongly resented Nehru's trip to Darjeeling to formally welcome the Tibetan leader. The border issue then came to the forefront and disagreement on it further embittered relations, leading to the unfortunate border war between the two young nations. Nehru called it “Chinese aggression” and “betrayal by the Chinese”: these two expressions have been repeated a million times in India mainly through the media despite the fact that all the facts behind the border war have not yet come out in the open. Similarly in China, India was labelled as “expansionist” – desperate to grab the territories of its neighbours. The Indian government was accused of being a “stooge of western imperialism.”
Nearly half a century has lapsed since the 1962 war but some kind of an inbuilt mistrust between the two persists. It often comes out in the open as has been seen recently in the media of the two countries indulging in meaningless mutual accusations. Those in India who feel the border dispute must be resolved before China can be trusted fail to understand the complexities of the issue. Two civilisations have co-existed without any evidence of confrontation for several centuries, when they had no border – a line separating two countries was then an alien idea. It was only after colonialism arrived that the civilisations developed the nation-state mentality and mindset where a single line was to divide the two civilisations. If such a line never existed, it has not been easy to invent one.
Yet another fact of history not known to many Indians who love to demonise China is that the Chinese people and state have been subjected to humiliation and exploitation for more than a century by the western imperialist powers. The Chinese people have always held the government's weakness as the primary cause of its subjugation. Revolutionaries from Sun Yat-sen to Mao Zedong succeeded in mobilising people on the grounds that a government that is completely weak vis-à-vis the foreign powers must go. Up to this day, therefore, the Chinese government is determined not to be seen as weak by its own people. It is this image of a strong government that gives the Communist Party of China legitimacy to rule.
Misperceptions among the Chinese about India are equally unrealistic. They need to understand that India does not covet the land of others nor is it waiting to ‘play the Tibet Card' at an opportune moment. Accepting Tibet as part of China is convenient for India or else an independent ‘Greater Tibet' brings to dispute the status of Sikkim, which has in the past, for centuries, been a vassal-state of Tibet. During my trips to China, both during formal and informal discussions, I have found that the Chinese are far more concerned about India's unpredictability in its Tibet policy than anything else. The Chinese must understand, notwithstanding what some pro-Tibetan independence groups do in India, that this country has nothing to gain by splitting Tibet from China.
Since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's deadlock-breaking visit in 1988-89, there have been many positive developments in bilateral relations. Trade has gone up at an exceedingly fast rate to the extent that today China has become India's largest trading partner. Tourism is on the rise, and with the opening of more consulates and the beginning of direct flights between different cities of India and China, this is likely to increase further.
Educational and cultural exchanges are taking place at an impressive level. According to unconfirmed but reliable reports, 4000 Indian students are studying in China today. The numbers coming from China are far less, thanks to our Home Ministry's visa policy. Even Chinese academics who are invited by our universities to teach the Chinese language to Indian students (due to a huge demand for it) find it very difficult to obtain visas. Both Delhi University's East Asian Studies Department and Santiniketan's Cheena Bhawan have suffered on account of this rigidity, which is the result of mistrust.
I do not subscribe to the view that two rising powers cannot peacefully co-exist. Indeed, some major path-breaking steps have to be taken by both sides to make sure that Cold War II or as some call it, an Asian Cold War does not happen. A resurgent Asia surely does not deserve it. However, Indians and Chinese need to break the mental barrier and begin to trust one another.
How can this trust deficit be overcome?
First, forget the border issue. Not solving it is not hurting either India or China in any way – economically, socially, culturally, or politically. It is too complicated.
Secondly, China is quite sensitive to the ‘Tibet Issue.' With the Dalai Lama and over 100,000 followers living in India, New Delhi needs constantly to renew its commitment on curbing Tibetan separatist actions on its soil so as to mitigate suspicion that it might intend to ‘play the Tibet Card.'
Thirdly, both sides must open up border trade at many points – the border people have been the worst victims of Sino-Indian hostilities, and develop province-to-province economic relations. The recent K2K (Kolkata to Kunming) Initiative is an encouraging development.
Finally, only large-scale people-to-people contacts can wipe out this trust deficit. Exchanges in the fields of education, sports, culture, science, and technology need to be greatly enhanced. Despite being neighbours, we know and understand very little of each other. On the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, cannot India and China make a new beginning?
(The author is Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi and Professor of Chinese Studies at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.)
by Sreemati Chakrabarti
Sixty years after the two countries established diplomatic relations, Indians and Chinese need to break the mental barrier and begin to trust one another. Here's how the trust deficit can be overcome.
On April 1, 2010 India and China observed 60 years of their diplomatic relations. On this day in 1950 India took the world by surprise when it decided to recognise the government of the People's Republic of China headed by Mao Zedong and led by the Communist Party of China, which had brought the Chinese mainland under its control after defeating Chiang Kai-shek's army. This was a bold decision by the Indian government – the government of a newly independent country. It obviously displeased the western powers who went along with Chiang Kai-shek's view that mainland China had been occupied only temporarily by ‘communist bandits' who would soon be overthrown. Indian foreign-policy makers, led by the brilliant and far-sighted K.P.S. Menon, gave sensible advice to Prime Minister Nehru. This led to the recognition of the new government established in Beijing on October 1 1949.
The first decade of the relationship saw some very important developments like the signing of the Panchsheel (the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which later became the official basis of Chinese foreign policy) in 1954, and the Bandung Conference a year later, where both Nehru and Zhou Enlai were elevated to the status of icons for the nations of Asia and Africa struggling for liberation and independence. Cultural and educational exchanges between India and China took place at more than a modest level.
This congenial relationship was upset by the Tibetan Rebellion with the Dalai Lama fleeing to India and eventually setting up a ‘government-in-exile.' The Chinese strongly resented Nehru's trip to Darjeeling to formally welcome the Tibetan leader. The border issue then came to the forefront and disagreement on it further embittered relations, leading to the unfortunate border war between the two young nations. Nehru called it “Chinese aggression” and “betrayal by the Chinese”: these two expressions have been repeated a million times in India mainly through the media despite the fact that all the facts behind the border war have not yet come out in the open. Similarly in China, India was labelled as “expansionist” – desperate to grab the territories of its neighbours. The Indian government was accused of being a “stooge of western imperialism.”
Nearly half a century has lapsed since the 1962 war but some kind of an inbuilt mistrust between the two persists. It often comes out in the open as has been seen recently in the media of the two countries indulging in meaningless mutual accusations. Those in India who feel the border dispute must be resolved before China can be trusted fail to understand the complexities of the issue. Two civilisations have co-existed without any evidence of confrontation for several centuries, when they had no border – a line separating two countries was then an alien idea. It was only after colonialism arrived that the civilisations developed the nation-state mentality and mindset where a single line was to divide the two civilisations. If such a line never existed, it has not been easy to invent one.
Yet another fact of history not known to many Indians who love to demonise China is that the Chinese people and state have been subjected to humiliation and exploitation for more than a century by the western imperialist powers. The Chinese people have always held the government's weakness as the primary cause of its subjugation. Revolutionaries from Sun Yat-sen to Mao Zedong succeeded in mobilising people on the grounds that a government that is completely weak vis-à-vis the foreign powers must go. Up to this day, therefore, the Chinese government is determined not to be seen as weak by its own people. It is this image of a strong government that gives the Communist Party of China legitimacy to rule.
Misperceptions among the Chinese about India are equally unrealistic. They need to understand that India does not covet the land of others nor is it waiting to ‘play the Tibet Card' at an opportune moment. Accepting Tibet as part of China is convenient for India or else an independent ‘Greater Tibet' brings to dispute the status of Sikkim, which has in the past, for centuries, been a vassal-state of Tibet. During my trips to China, both during formal and informal discussions, I have found that the Chinese are far more concerned about India's unpredictability in its Tibet policy than anything else. The Chinese must understand, notwithstanding what some pro-Tibetan independence groups do in India, that this country has nothing to gain by splitting Tibet from China.
Since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's deadlock-breaking visit in 1988-89, there have been many positive developments in bilateral relations. Trade has gone up at an exceedingly fast rate to the extent that today China has become India's largest trading partner. Tourism is on the rise, and with the opening of more consulates and the beginning of direct flights between different cities of India and China, this is likely to increase further.
Educational and cultural exchanges are taking place at an impressive level. According to unconfirmed but reliable reports, 4000 Indian students are studying in China today. The numbers coming from China are far less, thanks to our Home Ministry's visa policy. Even Chinese academics who are invited by our universities to teach the Chinese language to Indian students (due to a huge demand for it) find it very difficult to obtain visas. Both Delhi University's East Asian Studies Department and Santiniketan's Cheena Bhawan have suffered on account of this rigidity, which is the result of mistrust.
I do not subscribe to the view that two rising powers cannot peacefully co-exist. Indeed, some major path-breaking steps have to be taken by both sides to make sure that Cold War II or as some call it, an Asian Cold War does not happen. A resurgent Asia surely does not deserve it. However, Indians and Chinese need to break the mental barrier and begin to trust one another.
How can this trust deficit be overcome?
First, forget the border issue. Not solving it is not hurting either India or China in any way – economically, socially, culturally, or politically. It is too complicated.
Secondly, China is quite sensitive to the ‘Tibet Issue.' With the Dalai Lama and over 100,000 followers living in India, New Delhi needs constantly to renew its commitment on curbing Tibetan separatist actions on its soil so as to mitigate suspicion that it might intend to ‘play the Tibet Card.'
Thirdly, both sides must open up border trade at many points – the border people have been the worst victims of Sino-Indian hostilities, and develop province-to-province economic relations. The recent K2K (Kolkata to Kunming) Initiative is an encouraging development.
Finally, only large-scale people-to-people contacts can wipe out this trust deficit. Exchanges in the fields of education, sports, culture, science, and technology need to be greatly enhanced. Despite being neighbours, we know and understand very little of each other. On the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, cannot India and China make a new beginning?
(The author is Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi and Professor of Chinese Studies at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.)
China positive on relations with India
by Ananth Krishnan
Following a year that saw both countries trade bitter exchanges over the long-running border dispute, China-India ties appear set to turn the corner when External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna arrives in the Chinese capital on Monday.
Speaking ahead of the visit, Chinese officials struck an optimistic note on how they viewed the general direction of bilateral ties, saying the countries had made “remarkable” progress on expanding engagement beyond the boundary question that once held the relationship hostage, and even sparked renewed strains last year.
“We are hoping and willing to join hands with India to further enhance strategic mutual trust, to boost mutually beneficial co-operation and have closer communication and coordination in bilateral affairs to press ahead with our relationship,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang told journalists, speaking on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries, which fell on Thursday.
Festival of India
Mr. Krishna arrives in Beijing on Monday evening, and will launch a six month-long “Festival of India in China” near Beijing's Forbidden City to mark the anniversary. During his four-day visit, he will also hold talks with his counterpart Yang Jiechi and meet with Premier Wen Jiabao.
Indian and Chinese officials hope to use the occasion to draw a line over the tensions between the two countries that surfaced last year.
Media reports in India pointed to increased incursions by Chinese troops along disputed border areas, while China's State-run media responded by accusing India of “arrogance” and harbouring “hegemonic” ambitions in South Asia.
The Chinese government also strongly criticised Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh during Assembly elections in the State, accusing India of “stirring up trouble.” China claims parts of the State, and talks over the border issue have made little progress.
Indian and Chinese officials say relations have warmed following the Copenhagen climate summit, when the two countries closely worked together and even coordinated their negotiating positions.
Mr. Krishna's visit would provide a further opportunity for India and China to “strengthen communication and dialogue,” Mr. Qin said.
by Ananth Krishnan
Following a year that saw both countries trade bitter exchanges over the long-running border dispute, China-India ties appear set to turn the corner when External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna arrives in the Chinese capital on Monday.
Speaking ahead of the visit, Chinese officials struck an optimistic note on how they viewed the general direction of bilateral ties, saying the countries had made “remarkable” progress on expanding engagement beyond the boundary question that once held the relationship hostage, and even sparked renewed strains last year.
“We are hoping and willing to join hands with India to further enhance strategic mutual trust, to boost mutually beneficial co-operation and have closer communication and coordination in bilateral affairs to press ahead with our relationship,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang told journalists, speaking on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries, which fell on Thursday.
Festival of India
Mr. Krishna arrives in Beijing on Monday evening, and will launch a six month-long “Festival of India in China” near Beijing's Forbidden City to mark the anniversary. During his four-day visit, he will also hold talks with his counterpart Yang Jiechi and meet with Premier Wen Jiabao.
Indian and Chinese officials hope to use the occasion to draw a line over the tensions between the two countries that surfaced last year.
Media reports in India pointed to increased incursions by Chinese troops along disputed border areas, while China's State-run media responded by accusing India of “arrogance” and harbouring “hegemonic” ambitions in South Asia.
The Chinese government also strongly criticised Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh during Assembly elections in the State, accusing India of “stirring up trouble.” China claims parts of the State, and talks over the border issue have made little progress.
Indian and Chinese officials say relations have warmed following the Copenhagen climate summit, when the two countries closely worked together and even coordinated their negotiating positions.
Mr. Krishna's visit would provide a further opportunity for India and China to “strengthen communication and dialogue,” Mr. Qin said.
Saturday, 27 March 2010
ONEONONE - India and China should work together
BY UTPAL B HASKAR
A s e t the energy policy advisr to 28 member counries,Nobuo Tanaka is a man short on time. International Energy Agency, or IEA, apart from being the world's premier energy monitor, also plays an important role in climate change policies, market reform and en- ergy technology collaboration.
Tanaka was recently in New Del- hi to participate in the 6th Asia Gas Partnership Summit where he spoke to Mint on issues as varied as Indian government's attempts to address the issue of subsidy burden, crude oil prices, US interventions in energy-rich countries and the growing com- petition between India and Chi- na for energy resources. Edited excerpts: India has been talking about re forms in the energy sector for some time now. The intent is to bring down the subsidy burden as they are unsustainable over a long term. What are your views?
Yes, that's right. When the price of oil is high at certain ref- erence price, it increases the fis- cal burden for the government.
So in the long term, due to cost of exploration and development, the cost of oil will get higher... So subsidies will be very difficult to sustain. We have been asked by the G-20 (Group of Twenty) countries to make some analysis of subsidies. We are going to re- port to the G-20 finance minis- ters meeting which is next month on 23 April in Washing- ton, DC.
We did a similar study in 2007.
The total amount then was $320 billion (around Rs14.5 trillion today) globally.
Since in 2008 the oil prices were very high, the subsidies should have been much higher, that's what we guess.
So for India, we are strongly advising to phase out price con- trol and subsidy as it is very im- portant to make price signal from the market directly to the consumer. That is the way to conserve energy or move to an energy-efficient society or econ- omy. We understand that the In- dian government is serious about phasing out subsidies and trying their best. It is also politi- cally very difficult, we under- stand that. In many countries, it is mandatory for the govern- ments to help and to support the poor population. Our advice is--yes, it is necessary to support the poor but don't undermine the energy sector, because sub- sidy is wasteful use of energy sources and also adds to the problem of low investment in in- frastructure. It (subsidy) prohib- its infrastructure investment. So this is not good. In the longer term, I think this (Indian) gov- ernment is committed to phas- ing out subsidy but in practical terms it will certainly take some time.
So when this report is ready, would G20 as a group ask India to take care of the subsidy burden?
G-20 is asking the Indian gov- ernment to make sure that the phasing out of subsidy happens.
We do not have the power to re- ally enforce this phase out. I think that this government clearly understands the necessi- ty and is moving in the direction towards it. Our study tries to help the governments to move in the right direction. There is still a considerable per centage of population in India which does not have access to en ergy. How do you see India's ener gy demands growing?
That is the point. In China and India, the per capita energy con- sumption is very low compared to the global average and much more growth is necessary to reach there. On the other hand, if India or China go through the same way as the former develop- ed countries, I mean the OECD (Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development) countries, then the fossil fuel consumption will go so high that the price of oil and price of gas will climb rapidly. World CO2 emissions will increase so much that it will not be sustainable. So the only solution for this eco- nomic growth and the CO2 emission is more energy-effi- cient society, more greener sys- tems of living, using electric ve- hicles and more efficient hous- ing. So this kind of revolutionary change in lower carbon technol- ogy is necessary. We are working with the Indian government on what kind of technology does In- dia need to make this revolu- tionary change.
Is $100 per barrel of crude the re alistic price?
We are not commenting on the level of price. It is always moving. About four-five years ago, $30 per barrel price was seen as a very high price. Now $100 may be a high price but we have seen crude oil prices reach- ing $147 per barrel, so what is the high price, we can't tell. In the mid to long term, we know that the cost of investment in ex- ploration, development and production will increase. We will have much more deeper offshore oil fields or oil sands so the cost will increase. Because of the supply-demand situation, the market is tighter, and if the economic recovery is robust as it should be, the prices will get higher.
Given the way that the crude de mand has picked up, is the world out of the recession?
That is a good question. I think India, China and Middle East are out of recession, but not necessarily the OECD countries because OECD countries de- mand is projected to be negative in 2010. The OECD demand will shrink in 2010. On the other hand, macro economists say that OECD countries are on the track of economic recovery. So we call it oil less recovery. In other emerging economies, we see economic recovery happen- ing and the demand for oil is coming back.
When do you see a recovery in OECD demand?
That is a difficult question be- cause the current price levels and current financial troubles in Europe may have a very negative impact.
Is there a way around for energy firms across the globe which want to invest in Iran, Sudan and other countries where the US has im posed sanctions?
This is a very difficult judge- ment an investor should make because they risk their business chance in the United States if they don't abide by the sanc- tions. On the other hand, we want stabilization of the place and as much investment to hap- pen, for decline of the current production level from the exist- ing oil fields is a serious con- cern. We need a huge invest- ment just to offset this decline. Isn't the US policing these re sources now? For example, Indian firms have done well in Sudan. It seems that when the US compa nies can't get through they impose sanctions, which will also make sure that no one goes there and those resources are well covered for the US?
(Laughs). Well, if Indian com- panies take some risk and go there and explore and develop, certainly it helps the global mar- ket in the demand and supply situation.
So as an organization would you be interested in promoting invest ments in countries such as Iran or Sudan?
We are not promoting that.
Certainly in terms of the global markets, difficult places, not only these geopolitically difficult places, but also in places like the Arctic, very deep offshore, no- body dares to take the risk. If that's the case, then we have a serious problem. Taking risk is part of the business. The ways of taking risks are different, de- pending on the way of a country or the way of a corporation.
Given the fact that the demand will come from China and India with the demand slowing down in the West, the two countries are in a quest for securing energy re sources overseas. In the process, it inflates the acquisition cost of an asset. What is the way forward?
Yes, to some extent it depends upon how companies from India and China do business. It is ob- vious that due to high prices you suffer... If you suffer, you change the way of making a deal, con- sulting more closely with other consuming countries, compa- nies and make a consortium.
This is the process.
So the way forward is to collabo rate?
Exactly, for example, we al- ways ask the European countries to speak in one voice to the sup- plier. By doing so you have a huge advantage in negotiations.
source; Livemint
BY UTPAL B HASKAR
A s e t the energy policy advisr to 28 member counries,Nobuo Tanaka is a man short on time. International Energy Agency, or IEA, apart from being the world's premier energy monitor, also plays an important role in climate change policies, market reform and en- ergy technology collaboration.
Tanaka was recently in New Del- hi to participate in the 6th Asia Gas Partnership Summit where he spoke to Mint on issues as varied as Indian government's attempts to address the issue of subsidy burden, crude oil prices, US interventions in energy-rich countries and the growing com- petition between India and Chi- na for energy resources. Edited excerpts: India has been talking about re forms in the energy sector for some time now. The intent is to bring down the subsidy burden as they are unsustainable over a long term. What are your views?
Yes, that's right. When the price of oil is high at certain ref- erence price, it increases the fis- cal burden for the government.
So in the long term, due to cost of exploration and development, the cost of oil will get higher... So subsidies will be very difficult to sustain. We have been asked by the G-20 (Group of Twenty) countries to make some analysis of subsidies. We are going to re- port to the G-20 finance minis- ters meeting which is next month on 23 April in Washing- ton, DC.
We did a similar study in 2007.
The total amount then was $320 billion (around Rs14.5 trillion today) globally.
Since in 2008 the oil prices were very high, the subsidies should have been much higher, that's what we guess.
So for India, we are strongly advising to phase out price con- trol and subsidy as it is very im- portant to make price signal from the market directly to the consumer. That is the way to conserve energy or move to an energy-efficient society or econ- omy. We understand that the In- dian government is serious about phasing out subsidies and trying their best. It is also politi- cally very difficult, we under- stand that. In many countries, it is mandatory for the govern- ments to help and to support the poor population. Our advice is--yes, it is necessary to support the poor but don't undermine the energy sector, because sub- sidy is wasteful use of energy sources and also adds to the problem of low investment in in- frastructure. It (subsidy) prohib- its infrastructure investment. So this is not good. In the longer term, I think this (Indian) gov- ernment is committed to phas- ing out subsidy but in practical terms it will certainly take some time.
So when this report is ready, would G20 as a group ask India to take care of the subsidy burden?
G-20 is asking the Indian gov- ernment to make sure that the phasing out of subsidy happens.
We do not have the power to re- ally enforce this phase out. I think that this government clearly understands the necessi- ty and is moving in the direction towards it. Our study tries to help the governments to move in the right direction. There is still a considerable per centage of population in India which does not have access to en ergy. How do you see India's ener gy demands growing?
That is the point. In China and India, the per capita energy con- sumption is very low compared to the global average and much more growth is necessary to reach there. On the other hand, if India or China go through the same way as the former develop- ed countries, I mean the OECD (Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development) countries, then the fossil fuel consumption will go so high that the price of oil and price of gas will climb rapidly. World CO2 emissions will increase so much that it will not be sustainable. So the only solution for this eco- nomic growth and the CO2 emission is more energy-effi- cient society, more greener sys- tems of living, using electric ve- hicles and more efficient hous- ing. So this kind of revolutionary change in lower carbon technol- ogy is necessary. We are working with the Indian government on what kind of technology does In- dia need to make this revolu- tionary change.
Is $100 per barrel of crude the re alistic price?
We are not commenting on the level of price. It is always moving. About four-five years ago, $30 per barrel price was seen as a very high price. Now $100 may be a high price but we have seen crude oil prices reach- ing $147 per barrel, so what is the high price, we can't tell. In the mid to long term, we know that the cost of investment in ex- ploration, development and production will increase. We will have much more deeper offshore oil fields or oil sands so the cost will increase. Because of the supply-demand situation, the market is tighter, and if the economic recovery is robust as it should be, the prices will get higher.
Given the way that the crude de mand has picked up, is the world out of the recession?
That is a good question. I think India, China and Middle East are out of recession, but not necessarily the OECD countries because OECD countries de- mand is projected to be negative in 2010. The OECD demand will shrink in 2010. On the other hand, macro economists say that OECD countries are on the track of economic recovery. So we call it oil less recovery. In other emerging economies, we see economic recovery happen- ing and the demand for oil is coming back.
When do you see a recovery in OECD demand?
That is a difficult question be- cause the current price levels and current financial troubles in Europe may have a very negative impact.
Is there a way around for energy firms across the globe which want to invest in Iran, Sudan and other countries where the US has im posed sanctions?
This is a very difficult judge- ment an investor should make because they risk their business chance in the United States if they don't abide by the sanc- tions. On the other hand, we want stabilization of the place and as much investment to hap- pen, for decline of the current production level from the exist- ing oil fields is a serious con- cern. We need a huge invest- ment just to offset this decline. Isn't the US policing these re sources now? For example, Indian firms have done well in Sudan. It seems that when the US compa nies can't get through they impose sanctions, which will also make sure that no one goes there and those resources are well covered for the US?
(Laughs). Well, if Indian com- panies take some risk and go there and explore and develop, certainly it helps the global mar- ket in the demand and supply situation.
So as an organization would you be interested in promoting invest ments in countries such as Iran or Sudan?
We are not promoting that.
Certainly in terms of the global markets, difficult places, not only these geopolitically difficult places, but also in places like the Arctic, very deep offshore, no- body dares to take the risk. If that's the case, then we have a serious problem. Taking risk is part of the business. The ways of taking risks are different, de- pending on the way of a country or the way of a corporation.
Given the fact that the demand will come from China and India with the demand slowing down in the West, the two countries are in a quest for securing energy re sources overseas. In the process, it inflates the acquisition cost of an asset. What is the way forward?
Yes, to some extent it depends upon how companies from India and China do business. It is ob- vious that due to high prices you suffer... If you suffer, you change the way of making a deal, con- sulting more closely with other consuming countries, compa- nies and make a consortium.
This is the process.
So the way forward is to collabo rate?
Exactly, for example, we al- ways ask the European countries to speak in one voice to the sup- plier. By doing so you have a huge advantage in negotiations.
source; Livemint
Tuesday, 16 March 2010
India, China play down border dispute
BY Ananth Krishnan
Indian and Chinese officials on Tuesday struck a positive note on Sino-Indian ties, saying the long-running border dispute had become increasingly less relevant to bilateral relations, in spite of renewed tensions seen in recent months.
Speaking in Washington, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said ties between the two countries had “improved significantly” in the last two decades to a “multi-dimensional relationship,” which was “not just focused on the boundary question.”
Her comments were favourably received in Beijing, where officials said continued engagement between the two countries on various fronts would help create the conditions for resolving the border issue, over which talks have made little progress so far.
The two countries had made “significant progress” in enhancing relations in various other fields and taking ties beyond the border issue, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang said.
“China is ready to work with the Indian side to enhance the friendship and to be good partners,” he said in reply to a question on Ms. Rao's comments. He said differences over the border were “inevitable,” but what was important was that leaders of the two countries had reached consensus to “properly handle” the dispute, pending a final resolution.
“With the development of relations between China and India, China believes the border issue will gradually be resolved,” Mr. Qin said.
Tuesday's statements mark a striking departure from the barbs the two governments routinely traded over the boundary dispute for much of last year.
In a speech in London in February, Ms. Rao described the relationship between the two countries as a “dynamic equilibrium” of both “competition and collaboration,” although only one aspect of that equation was most evident last year. As recently as October, China accused India of “stirring up trouble” along the border areas, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Arunachal Pradesh during Assembly elections in the State, parts of which China claims. Beijing then accused New Delhi of “disregarding its grave concerns,” while China's State-run media launched a coordinated onslaught accusing India of “recklessness and arrogance.”
Officials in Beijing point to the October 24 meeting between Dr. Singh and his counterpart, Wen Jiabao, in Hua Hin, Thailand, as playing a vital role in calming the tensions. The two sides agreed then to refrain from publicly voicing any differences, and instead use official mechanisms to discuss issues.
One senior Chinese official told The Hindu that following the meeting, officials at the Foreign Ministry here held regular meetings with State-run media outlets, including the nationalistic Communist Party-run People's Daily and its English-version Global Times newspaper, instructing them to cool down their anti-India rhetoric. State media here have also struck a noticeably warmer tone towards India following co-operation between the two countries at the climate summit in Copenhagen last year, which was framed as a battle between the developing world and the West.
BY Ananth Krishnan
Indian and Chinese officials on Tuesday struck a positive note on Sino-Indian ties, saying the long-running border dispute had become increasingly less relevant to bilateral relations, in spite of renewed tensions seen in recent months.
Speaking in Washington, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said ties between the two countries had “improved significantly” in the last two decades to a “multi-dimensional relationship,” which was “not just focused on the boundary question.”
Her comments were favourably received in Beijing, where officials said continued engagement between the two countries on various fronts would help create the conditions for resolving the border issue, over which talks have made little progress so far.
The two countries had made “significant progress” in enhancing relations in various other fields and taking ties beyond the border issue, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang said.
“China is ready to work with the Indian side to enhance the friendship and to be good partners,” he said in reply to a question on Ms. Rao's comments. He said differences over the border were “inevitable,” but what was important was that leaders of the two countries had reached consensus to “properly handle” the dispute, pending a final resolution.
“With the development of relations between China and India, China believes the border issue will gradually be resolved,” Mr. Qin said.
Tuesday's statements mark a striking departure from the barbs the two governments routinely traded over the boundary dispute for much of last year.
In a speech in London in February, Ms. Rao described the relationship between the two countries as a “dynamic equilibrium” of both “competition and collaboration,” although only one aspect of that equation was most evident last year. As recently as October, China accused India of “stirring up trouble” along the border areas, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Arunachal Pradesh during Assembly elections in the State, parts of which China claims. Beijing then accused New Delhi of “disregarding its grave concerns,” while China's State-run media launched a coordinated onslaught accusing India of “recklessness and arrogance.”
Officials in Beijing point to the October 24 meeting between Dr. Singh and his counterpart, Wen Jiabao, in Hua Hin, Thailand, as playing a vital role in calming the tensions. The two sides agreed then to refrain from publicly voicing any differences, and instead use official mechanisms to discuss issues.
One senior Chinese official told The Hindu that following the meeting, officials at the Foreign Ministry here held regular meetings with State-run media outlets, including the nationalistic Communist Party-run People's Daily and its English-version Global Times newspaper, instructing them to cool down their anti-India rhetoric. State media here have also struck a noticeably warmer tone towards India following co-operation between the two countries at the climate summit in Copenhagen last year, which was framed as a battle between the developing world and the West.
Monday, 15 March 2010
Significant improvement in Indo-China relationship: Rao
Washington, March 16, 2010 PTI
The relationship between India and China has improved significantly in the last two decades and the two neighbours are discussing to resolve their outstanding border dispute, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said on Tuesday.
“The relationship between India and China has improved significantly in the last two decades particularly. We have a broad spectrum, multidimensional relationship that covers many areas; which is not just focused on the boundary question,” she said.
Resolution of the boundary dispute between the two countries, she said, has not hindered the advancement of dialogue, trade and business relations.
“The rise of China and the rise of India has become an object of world attention. I think, in both the countries, we see a competitive edge but we also see a greater degree of collaboration between the two counties,” Ms. Rao said.
“There is peace on our borders with China,” the Foreign Secretary said.
The relationship between India and China has improved significantly in the last two decades and the two neighbours are discussing to resolve their outstanding border dispute, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said on Tuesday.
“The relationship between India and China has improved significantly in the last two decades particularly. We have a broad spectrum, multidimensional relationship that covers many areas; which is not just focused on the boundary question,” she said.
Resolution of the boundary dispute between the two countries, she said, has not hindered the advancement of dialogue, trade and business relations.
“The rise of China and the rise of India has become an object of world attention. I think, in both the countries, we see a competitive edge but we also see a greater degree of collaboration between the two counties,” Ms. Rao said.
“There is peace on our borders with China,” the Foreign Secretary said.
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