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Sunday, 15 July 2012


China acknowledges Dalai Lama's hold in Tibet


China acknowledges Dalai Lama's hold in Tibet
Ajai Shukla / New Delhi Jul 16, 2012, 00:49 IST



As resentment against the Communist Party’s iron yoke boils over in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of China, Beijing has begun admitting that the Dalai Lama’s hold runs deep in these areas.
This is a major policy shift. Since 1959, when the Dalai Lama escaped to political asylum in India, the Communist Party has insisted that the Tibetans are a happy lot. The communist apparatchiks have passed off growing public protests, like the 40 self-immolations by Tibetans in the last four years, as the work of a few malcontents, instigated from “foreign countries” by the “Dalai Clique”.

Source:Business Standard
But, with the Communist Party’s 18th Party Congress looming, denial is no longer an option. Acknowledging the Dalai Lama’s widespread popularity, party bosses in Tibet have slapped harsh restrictions on news, media and communications, ordering that the views of the exiled leaders views must be blocked from reaching Tibetans, particularly those living in rural Tibet.
A fortnight ago, the Communist Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Chen Quanguo, urged officials to “make sure that the Central Party’s voices and images can be heard across 120 thousand square kilometres (of Tibet),” and that “no voices and images of enemy forces and Dalai clique can be heard and seen.” This call was published in an interview in the Communist Party’s official newspaper, Renming Wang on June 27.
Tibetans face tightened controls on internet use, text messages, phone ownership, music publishing, and photocopying. Instead of independent news, Tibetans now get intensified political propaganda in villages, schools, and monasteries, and sharp restrictions on travel into the TAR.
Since March 12, controls have been tightened on travel from other provinces into the TAR. Additional restrictions on travel by foreigners to the TAR were introduced in May 2012 and again in early June.
An authoritative new report from Human Rights Watch traces the Communist Party’s shifting stance that acknowledges the Dalai Lama’s growing influence, especially in rural Tibet, where 85 per cent of the population lives.
Until 2008, Chinese officials in Lhasa declared that Tibetans hardly supported the Dalai Lama. In 2001 an official survey purportedly found that 86 per cent of Lhasa’s residents regarded the “Dalai as a separatist or a politician.” Wu Jilie, TAR’s deputy governor told foreign journalists, “the Dalai Lama has aroused the distrust and resolute opposition of the vast majority of people here (Reuters, August 20, 2004).
According to Human Rights Watch, TAR’s chairman said in 2007 that “the majority of Tibetan people do not want the Dalai Lama to return to the region” and that “his influence is very limited” (Xinhua, June 20, 2007).
The first signs of change date back to 2010, when TAR’s governor, Padma Thrinley (Baima Chiling in Chinese) declared, “to say that the Dalai has no influence at all in Tibet is impossible… The Dalai Lama has some influence for sure” (reported in Ifeng News, November 6, 2010). On March 12, Thrinley said, “Let’s face the reality: the Dalai Lama and his followers do try to attract young Tibetans, but what we need to do is not to compete with them … Instead, the key is to improve people’s livelihood … the popularity of the government will depend on its work” (Xinhua, March 7, 2012). He admitted to a Chinese reporter that, “right now, the Dalai is indeed competing with us for the younger generations.”
Tibetan anger is simmering not just in TAR, but in the adjoining Tibetan-inhabited areas as well. TAR is merely the western half of the Tibetan plateau, home to half of China’s Tibetan population, which is 2.9 million out of 5.7 million officially recognised ethnic Tibetans. The other 2.8 million Tibetans live on the eastern part of the Tibetan plateau, in designated Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAP), and Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TAC) within the four provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan.
Chinese government statements that are directed towards non-Tibetan audiences still pretend there is widespread Tibetan support for China’s policies. However, local articles in Tibetan areas increasingly describe the Dalai Lama as having widespread influence.
Since late 2011, official speeches throughout Tibetan areas have referred repeatedly to campaigns directed at “the masses” or “the foundations,” rather than primarily at monks and nuns, indicating an attempt to change the thinking of rural Tibetans on a scale not seen since the beginning of the reform era in the 1980s.

Focus China: Strike corps plan back on drawing board



Shishir Gupta, Hindustan Times
New Delhi, July 15, 2012
First Published: 00:39 IST(15/7/2012)
Last Up
The UPA government has sent back the army's 2011 proposal for raising a new mountain strike corps at Pannagarh in West Bengal to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) this month in order to bring the navy and air force on board and broad base its military capability against China.
The 
 three armed forces chiefs will deliberate on the plan in their next meeting after adding hardware requirements of the air force and navy too in a bid to synergise future operations.
Top official sources said once the three chiefs decide on their specific individual requirements to strengthen the northern borders and deployment in the Indian Ocean, the new proposal will be sent to the Cabinet Committee on Security after due whetting of the defence ministry.
As first reported by HT last August, the army had moved an ambitious proposal to raise a strike corps with two divisions (total of 60,000 men) against China at Pannagarh, position two armoured regiments at Nathu La in Sikkim and Fukche in Ladakh respectively, and deploy an additional infantry brigade to Barahoti plains in Uttarakhand. After being cleared by the defence ministry last year, the proposal was sent to the finance ministry, followed by the CCS, for approval.
The decision to send back the COSC plan came after the country's security managers felt all three services needed to muscle up against the rising military capability of the northern neighbour, and not just the army. The move also came after the navy and air force raised concerns over preferential treatment to army modernisation by the government.
"We have asked the three chiefs to discuss among themselves their hardware requirements within the designated modernisation budget, and come up with a wholesome proposal," said a senior official.
Apart from the army, the air force and navy will also be sending proposals to the COSC before the final view is taken on what new air and naval assets, including helicopters for advance landing grounds and warships for longer reach into Indian Ocean, will be required.
However, given the speed at which China is building its military capacities, defence minister AK Antony has said if the tri-service proposal is not brought to the table soon, the ministry will intervene to allocate military resources within the budget.

A Chinese encounter
Inside story of how India?s political establishment and army fumbled and fought even as China made incursions

Kuldip Nayar / Jul 14, 2012, 00:56 IST
Source:Business Standard



Kuldip Nayar gives an inside account of how India’s political establishment and army fumbled and fought even as China made incursions into its territory

It was in the home ministry that I first heard about the Chinese incursion into our territory. I was sitting with Fateh Singh, deputy secretary in charge of foreigners, when his aide came with a sheaf of papers relating to China and wanted to know what he should do with them. They related to the illegal construction of a road in Ladakh. Without even looking at him, Fateh Singh said: “Put them in the ‘border file’.”


It was an odd description for reports. Fateh Singh explained that telegrams, messages, and reports dealing with China’s incursions were stacked in files, without any action being taken. Prime Minister (Jawaharlal) Nehru saw them and marked them to the home minister after initialing them. They eventually landed up in the section dealing with foreigners. In fact, there was a joke in the home ministry that if some official did not wish to take any action on a particular complaint he would say “Put it in the border file”. I heard this euphemistic description of inactivity very frequently even at the joint secretary level.

 

Fateh Singh told me how China was nibbling away our territory in Ladakh and the guilt he felt that the nation had not been informed. China had built a road in the Indian territory of Aksai Chin. Police official Lakshman Singh was the first person in 1954 to inform New Delhi about the road. As our trade representative, he used to visit Tibet every year. His contacts were wide and he had learnt about the road from some labourers who had built it. (An Indian air force plane accidentally flying over the area at that time confirmed the road on the basis of a photograph.)

New Delhi doubted Lakshman Singh’s version. There was a division of opinion between (Home Minister Govind Ballabh) Pant and Nehru. Pant wanted air reconnaissance to be undertaken to verify the report. Nehru claimed that this would serve no purpose. He did not want to even lodge a protest about the alignment of the road without being certain about its existence. After many discussions, Nehru agreed to send Indian maps to China which depicted Aksai Chin as part of the Indian territory, and even this he asked the foreign secretary to do informally. He was reluctant to annoy China.

However, when there was no response from the other side, Pant persuaded Nehru to send a patrol which found that the road had indeed been constructed in Aksai Chin and was being patrolled by Chinese soldiers. Sighting the Indian patrol, they captured it and tied its members to the tails of horses and dragged them along the road. New Delhi lodged a protest which was rejected with contempt.
* * *
China’s aggressive posture became clear when it denounced the old border maps and refused to accept the traditional alignments depicted on them. To India’s dismay our maps showed some of our territory as part of China. The home ministry wrote to the states asking them to burn the maps or at least smudge the border with China on the Assam side because they did not accurately delineate the Indian border.
The Chinese exploited our confusion and used our maps to question our claim. Nehru was still in favour of accommodating China on the question of the Aksai Chin road. Pant proposed a long-term lease, but China responded by occupying Khurnak Fort in Ladakh. China Pictorial, Beijing’s official publication, once again published a small-scale map showing a large part of north-eastern Ladakh within the borders of China. Nehru wrote to Chou Enlai to express his surprise at the Chinese attitude “which was contrary to what he had been led to believe since 1949”.
It was a bitter personal blow to Nehru. Despite the warnings from Congress leaders that China was deceitful, he relied on his judgement that China would not betray his confidence and would agree to the traditional border with a few minor adjustments. He had recommended a Security Council seat for China even when the West wanted India to occupy it. A communist country, he imagined, would never be hostile to a third world one, and particularly one wedded to socialist ideals.
* * *
I recall that before hostilities broke out, a ‘solution’ of the border issue was suggested by (Defence Minister V K) Krishna Menon, but he was overruled by Pant. Menon had met Chen Yi, China’s foreign minister, at Geneva, and told him that India might accept Peking’s suzerainty over the area in Aksai Chin as well as a buffer of 10 miles to the road. In exchange, China must officially accept the McMahon Line in the East and India’s rights to the rest of Ladakh.
China had reportedly accepted the idea but Pant stood in the way. He got the government to formally withdraw the offer through a resolution in the cabinet. Even leasing out the Aksai Chin area was not acceptable. The fact was that Pant, like Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, did not trust Menon and considered him an inveterate communist.
* * *
At that very meeting, it was agreed that some scrutiny of the different claims would be necessary. Eventually, an official team was appointed with S. Gopal and Jagat Mehta as members from the Indian side. Gopal travelled to London to obtain material to support India’s case. He was happy to have found relevant documents but there was additional material the British government would not part with but made photostat copies available. The Chinese tried their best to sabotage this project but the Mountbattens were a great help. The story that the Chinese attempted to snatch some material from Gopal on his return flight was incorrect, and he contradicted this when I subsequently asked him for confirmation.
Gopal and Mehta carried a load of material to Peking. A set of copies of the entire data was prepared and left in Delhi lest ‘theft’ or some other ‘untoward occurrence’ might destroy the valuable evidence. They had prepared a convincing report but the Chinese rejected it.
I got a hint of how little was expected from the meeting from the Polish ambassador, whom I had met at diplomatic parties, even before the official team left India. I was only the home ministry’s information officer and had no official locus standi, but it was obvious that the Polish ambassador was on a mission. He invited me for a chat at his chancery and expected me to convey what he had said to Pant. At the beginning of the conversation he said that the proposal he would make had the support of all Communist countries, and specifically mentioning the Soviet Union.
His proposal was that India should accept a package political deal, getting recognition for the McMahon Line in exchange for handing over control of some areas in Ladakh to China. He said that the areas demanded had never been charted, and nobody could say to whom they belonged. What was being claimed to be India’s was what had been forcibly occupied by the UK. No power could honour ‘the imperialist line’, nor should India insist upon it. Whatever the odds, China would never part with control of the road it had built. That was the lifeline between Sinkiang and other parts of China, he argued. I conveyed the proposal to Pant who gave me no reaction, his or that of the government.
* * *
The war was, however, preceded by a string of events. I am reconstructing the story after having spoken to General P N Thapar, the then chief of army staff, and Defence Minister Krishna Menon. Somewhat peeved by the criticism, Nehru ordered Thapar to evict the Chinese from the posts they had built within Indian territory. The army chief was reluctant to do so because he thought it would be like ‘disturbing a hornet’s nest’.
A meeting was held under the chairmanship of Krishna Menon, who was all for action. Thapar argued that the Indian army did not have the necessary strength, the ratio being six Chinese to one Indian. Menon responded confidently that he had met Chen Yi, the Chinese deputy premier, at Geneva and had been assured that China would never fight India over the border issue. When I asked Menon specifically whether this information given to me by General Thapar was true, his reply was: “That toothless old woman; he did not know how to fight a war.”
Thapar had submitted a note to the government when he took over as chief in 1960. In it, he had pointed out that the equipment with the army was in such poor condition and in such short supply that China or Pakistan could easily defeat India. This was in sharp contrast to Nehru’s statement, which I heard from the press gallery: “I can tell the House that at no time since Independence has our defence been in better condition and finer fettle.”
It appeared as if the government was determined to fight the Chinese without reorganising or re-equipping the army. At Menon’s meeting, Thapar was supported by only one person,
V Vishwanathan, then the additional secretary in the home ministry. He said that if Gen. Thapar felt that India was unprepared there was no point in being foolhardy, but Menon was obdurate about attacking China.
Faced with no option other than an immediate military operation, Thapar sought an interview with the prime minister to seek his intervention. A few minutes before his departure for Nehru’s house, S S Khera, then cabinet secretary, met him and said: “General, if I were you, I would not express my fears before Panditji for he might think that you are afraid to fight.” Thapar’s curt reply was that he must tell the prime minister the truth; the rest was for him to decide.
Before Thapar got into his car, Khera once again said that he must realise that if India did not fight, the government would fall. Thapar did not argue further but was more convinced than ever that the decision to resist China was motivated by political considerations.
Thapar repeated to Nehru how the Indian army was unprepared, untrained, and ill-equipped for the operation it was being asked to undertake. (Menon told me before he became defence minister that there was no army worth the name and no equipment worth the mention.)
Nehru said Menon had informed him that India was itself producing a substantial part of the army equipment it required. Thapar emphasised that India was nowhere near the stage of even assembling the weapons required for war. He then mentioned the note he had submitted, complaining about the poor shape of the army and its equipment. Nehru said he had never seen it.
To reassure Thapar, Nehru told him that he had received reliable information that the Chinese would not offer resistance if there was a show of force to make them vacate the check-posts. Thapar knew from where the information had come. Obviously, the government had not taken any note of the Chinese warnings that “the Indian aggressor must bear full responsibility for the consequences of their crimes”.
The General was still not prepared to take the risk. He asked Nehru to speak to some of the army commanders. Lt Gen Prodip Sen, commanding-in-chief Eastern Army Command, who was in Thapar’s room in the defence ministry at that time, was summoned. He supported Thapar and said that the army was far from prepared. Nehru repeated that his information was that the Chinese would not retaliate.
Thapar took heart from this. If that was true then even his unprepared forces might wear the crown of glory. No general can resist the temptation of marching at the head of a winning army, and Thapar was no exception. He began preparing for action. Thapar told me on 29 July 1970: “Looking back, I think I should have submitted my resignation at that time. I might have saved my country from the humiliation of defeat.”
* * *
By the time Thapar went to meet Menon towards the end of October 1962, the Indian post at Dhola (3 kilometres north of the McMahon Line) had fallen and the Chinese forces were rushing downhill further into North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Menon had already known about it because one copy of every signal to the chief of the army staff was going directly to the defence minister.
Thapar did not indulge in ‘I-told-you-so’. He simply reported what had happened and said, “Now we must plan what to do next.” Menon, brooding over a cup of black tea, only remarked: “How could I have known that they would come like an avalanche?”
Thapar told the defence minister that Indian forces should now fall back and hold out at Se-la Pass, about 40 miles from Dhola. Menon sarcastically remarked: “General, why not Bangalore?” They talked very little after that and awaited the defence committee meeting over which Nehru was to preside.
Before the meeting, B N Mullick, the intelligence chief, came to Thapar to apologise for being so wrong in his intelligence reports in which he had said that the Chinese were too tied up with the Khampas in Tibet to spare men for the border. The General’s reply was that it was the future which was more important.
* * *
When Bomdi-la fell (19 November 1962), Thapar was at Tezpur. He flew to Delhi and went straight to Nehru to say that in the best traditions of the Indian army he, as a defeated general, would like to submit his resignation. For the first time in many days Thapar saw a smile on Nehru’s face. Holding his hand tightly, he said: “Thank you, but this is not your fault.”

However, when Thapar met him the following morning Nehru said: “General, you remember what you said to me last night. I would like to get it in writing.” Thapar came home and got the letter of resignation typed by his daughter and sent it within two hours. I saw Nehru in the Lok Sabha waving the letter of resignation. This did lessen the anger of members who were targeting Nehru. He thought that Thapar’s exit would assuage parliament’s anger against Krishna Menon. It did to a degree when Nehru changed Menon’s portfolio from defence to defence production.


(Excerpted with permission from Roli Books)
BEYOND THE LINES
An Autobiography
Author: Kuldip Nayar
Publisher: Roli
Pages: 420
Price: Rs 595

Thursday, 12 July 2012

Batting for the Mcmahon Line





(Photo: courtesy Ajai Shukla): Sunrise over Tawang, the important border town in Arunachal Pradesh, on which China has cunningly focused the border discussions


by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 10th July 12

As this newspaper reported last week (7th July 12, “British question mark lingers over Arunachal”) a scholarly article in a Beijing newspaper has focused China’s spotlight on a troubling British policy retreat that undermines the Indian claim that the McMahon Line forms the Sino-India border in Arunachal Pradesh. This took the form of an inexplicable statement from former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in 2008, that back-tracked from Britain’s long-held position that Tibet was autonomous before 1950, with China having a “special position” but not sovereignty over that country. Miliband abandoned that position as an “anachronism” based on “the outdated concept of suzerainty.” Instead, he announced that, “Like every other EU member state, and the United States, we regard Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China.”

Why is this vital for New Delhi? The McMahon Line was formalized between India and Tibet at the Simla Convention in 1914, and its legitimacy rests on Tibet’s independence. Beijing argues that Lhasa was subordinate to Beijing and, therefore, not empowered to negotiate its borders. Miliband’s statement could add weight to Beijing’s argument. Chinese negotiators will say: the colonial power that negotiated the Simla Convention has wisely repudiated it.

What makes Miliband’s retreat especially baffling is that London got absolutely nothing out of it, except for a mouthful from Beijing for interfering in its internal matters. Having already given away Hong Kong and forsaken Taiwan with a one-China policy, Tibet was the lone card in the British hand that mattered desperately to Beijing. But London gifted it away without any apparent strategic intent.

London was not alone in kowtowing to China in 2008, when the economic recession made the East wind appear to indeed be prevailing over the West wind. Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s blustering former president, responded to China’s brutal crackdown on Tibetan protestors in Mar 08 by threatening to boycott the opening of the Beijing Olympics that August. This led to a coordinated picketing of Carrefour supermarkets across China and an internet campaign that charged the French chain with funding the Dalai Lama. It was the first anti-European deployment of people’s power, a weapon that had been perfected earlier against Japan. Beijing intervened only after a few days of carefully calibrated silence, and Sarkozy got the message. After meeting Chinese president Hu Jintao in July, Sarkozy announced his attendance at the Olympics in the spirit of “peace, friendship and brotherhood.”

Miliband’s wobble and Beijing’s skilful hardball raise two big issues for India. Firstly, is China’s economic muscle reformatting foreign policy hard drives in Western Europe? This is especially relevant regarding the UK, where India’s border claim has been impacted by the inconsistency of British policymaking in the face of a resurgent China. Given the haste and secrecy that attended this policy shift, it appears that London’s eagerness to please Beijing overrode the traditional policy review process, including consultations with historical and legal experts.

New Delhi must immediately seek a public clarification from London, which would allow the British government to clarify that the pre-1950 position on Tibet remains unchanged. The big question is: “What is the UK’s current view of its pre-1950 relations with Tibet, and in particular of the Annexures to the Simla Convention of 1914.” Meanwhile, New Delhi must urge London to recalibrate how it deals with a rising China, basing policy decisions on long-term considerations and not just immediate needs.

Secondly, India must re-evaluate its own Tibet policy. Having provided asylum to the Dalai Lama, the Central Tibetan Administration, a vibrant Tibetan clergy and a hundred thousand Tibetans, India is probably the world’s only country with serious leverage in Tibet. Sadly, New Delhi bends over backwards to convince Beijing that India has no designs on Tibet. This submissiveness has yielded only disadvantages: the Tibetan presence in India cannot but make China deeply suspicious of India; while New Delhi’s periodic clamp-down on Tibetan refugee activity --- portrayed as a neighbourly concern for Chinese sensitivities --- leads Beijing to conclude that sustained pressure on India will make the Tibet card unplayable.

India must abandon this practice of dealing with China through concessions. Over thousands of years of history, successive Chinese rulers have seen concessions as a sign of weakness. The Chinese Communist Party wholeheartedly embraces this belief.

Another Chinese diplomatic tradition involves centring the public debate on relatively minor issues, while consigning the crucial central issues --- such as Tibet --- to the shadows. Robert Barnett of Columbia University, a noted Tibet and China expert says, “My hypothesis is that we can understand Chinese diplomatic strategy better by regarding the things they make a big noise about as less important because they want to protect from public debate the really important things.”

China will cheerfully discuss human rights, labour protection legislation, environmental degradation and a raft of issues that could well be fobbed off as “internal affairs”. But say the word “Tibet” and the shutters come down. China’s expansive claim over Arunachal Pradesh is hardly backed by history. But it is designed to keep the discussion off Tibet, an increasingly sensitive issue for Beijing as its thuggish militias fail in stamping out a deep-rooted identity struggle.

Rather than continuing to play by Chinese rules, where Arunachal is discussed but not Tibet, and while concessions like Miliband’s reshape the ballgame to India’s disadvantage, New Delhi must begin raising the issue of Tibet in the Special Representatives’ dialogue. As long as talks are about only the border, no settlement is likely. But by strategically repositioning the Sino-Indian dialogue, and shifting at least some of the spotlight onto Tibet, New Delhi can create incentives for Beijing to loosen its untenable positions. India has legitimate and non-provocative interests in Tibet: including the reopening of India’s consulate in Lhasa that was shut down in the 1950s; border trade; religious linkages and tourism and people-to-people contacts.

Friday, 6 July 2012


India frets as Bhutan falls in China Teacup

Jabin T Jacob | Agency: DNA | Friday, July 6, 2012


News of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meeting his Bhutanese counterpart Jigme Yoser Thinley, on the sidelines of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development at Rio de Janeiro last month, grabbed considerable attention in India. The Chinese state-owned Global Times announced that the Bhutanese leader had expressed willingness to establish diplomatic ties with China.

While the news was later denied by the Bhutanese, there are a number of issues that the incident raises about India’s relations with its smaller neighbours and specifically with Bhutan and China. It would appear that neither New Delhi nor ordinary Indians pay much attention to their smaller neighbours unless the Chinese get involved.

Why are Bhutan’s relations with China of such importance to India? The tiny Himalayan constitutional monarchy happens to be the only other country besides India that has a land boundary dispute with China. While Bhutan and China began direct negotiations on the boundary dispute in 1984, they are yet to establish full diplomatic relations, thwarted so far by Indian pressure on the Himalayan nation.


Despite Thimphu’s recent denial that it was seeking diplomatic relations with Beijing, it has been evident for some time now that Bhutanese authorities including both the monarchy and elected representatives are interested in precisely this — Bhutan for example, has had a one-China policy and Chinese representatives were invited to the coronations of both the former and current kings.

While the economic reasons are self-evident, the desire to maintain a little more distance from New Delhi is also attractive politically for Bhutan. Despite being a small nation, Bhutan is not short of ambitions for a more active role internationally. And such a role demands greater freedom of action in the foreign policy domain including the assertion of its sovereignty vis-à-vis India and the mending of fences with the Chinese.

India and Bhutan have long shared a ‘special’ relationship signified by their treaty of friendship first signed in 1949 and later revised in 2007. The revised treaty, it might be noted, was occasioned by the impending turn to parliamentary democracy in Bhutan and places the two countries on a substantially more equal footing with both sides agreeing to “cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests” instead of Bhutan being “guided” by India “in regard to its external relations.”
Indeed, as parliamentary democracy takes roots in Bhutan, questions will be increasingly asked about Thimphu maintaining such ‘special’ ties with India, and about Indian military presence in the country.

The trend will be towards greater balance and neutrality. Thus, the Bhutanese opening up to China is to be expected, even if Thimphu will probably be careful not to play the card as disastrously as Kathmandu has.

Meanwhile, the boundary dispute with China is a major national concern for Bhutan. It has apparently already lost a substantial chunk of the area under dispute including the Kula Kangri peak, to slow encroachment by the Chinese. However, the Chinese record on boundary settlements so far, shows a substantial willingness to make territorial concessions to smaller neighbours and Bhutan’s association with India in the dispute has probably disadvantaged the smaller nation.

Thimphu for its part seems willing to accept the Chinese offer of conceding Bhutanese claims in its north in return for letting China have disputed areas in the Chumbi Valley in the west.

However, such a concession in the Chumbi has huge security implications for India. Any widening of the Chumbi salient in China’s favour threatens the narrow Siliguri corridor, not very far away, that connects India to its northeast.

There are limits however, to how much pressure India can bring to bear on Bhutan especially in the era of parliamentary democracy in Bhutan. And given its rather poor record of relations with democratic governments in the neighbourhood, India can ill-afford to alienate another neighbour. New Delhi will therefore, need to tread very carefully here.

Meanwhile, owing to Bhutan’s close historical ties to Tibet and its identity as a Buddhist nation, it will continue to be concerned and wary about Chinese actions in general and in Tibet and on the religious front, in particular.

To these must be added, its desire to preserve its unique model of development. It would appear therefore, that even as Bhutan seeks greater freedom of manoeuver in its ties with India, there remain plenty of reasons that should allow the two countries to continue coordinating their foreign policies.

Chinese checkers on border board: Will India make the winning move?



By: T R Ramaswami
source: The Economic Times

Those under 50 were not born when the Indo-China battles took place. Only those now above 80, with access to newspapers and other sources of information and sufficient knowledge of history and geography, would have grasped the significance of the happenings during 1947-65.

Regardless of age, only soldiers, diplomats, bureaucrats, media personnel, historians and oddballs (like this writer) would have sufficient incentive to develop interest and keep track of the happenings on this subject.

A thousand, or even a million, words would not be sufficient to appreciate the anatomy of the events. All papers from 1913, i.e., before World War I, on the border issue are still not public.

As the saying goes, the Official Secrets Act protects officials, not the secrets. The Henderson-Brookes report, now nearly 50, is still unavailable, even to Parliament, on grounds of national security! Probably the biggest secret is the abject incompetence, mule-like obstinacy and desire for self-preservation, with deceit if necessary, of someone very high then.

Interested folks should lay their hands on just three books - India's China War by Neville Maxwell, India-China Boundary Problem by A G Noorani and Himalayan Blunder by Brig. J P Dalvi, the senior-most officer taken prisoner after Independence and the ill-fated commander of 7 Brigade - the formation around which the 1962 tragedy started and ended.

Some history is inevitable to appreciate the background. A good map - you can web-search 'Sino-Indian War' - will aid comprehension. After the Battle of Gujrat (just below the Chenab, south-west of Jammu, now in Pakistan) in the Second Anglo-Sikh War, the Sikh empire came to an end and the British acquired Kashmir as one of the prizes. How it passed on to Maharaja Gulab Singh is another story by itself.

To rein in the ambitious Maharaja, the British drew a line beyond which he was forbidden to venture into Tibetan territory. It may be noted that till the 10th/11th century, Ladakh was part of Tibet. This 1846 line, drawn by the British Boundary Commission (BBC), stretched from the River Spiti (now in Himachal Pradesh) to the Pangong Lake, east of Chusul.

In 1865, the Johnson-Ardagh Line closed the gap between Pangong and the Karakoram Pass and extended from near Shahidullah, along the Kuen-Lun Mountains, joining the BBC line near Lanak La. But the British Foreign Office modified this in 1873, curtailing it to the Karakoram Range.

Still later came the Macartney-Macdonald Line of 1899 that extended the 1873 line slightly into Aksai Chin beyond the Karakoram. This line is significant. It is the only line formally communicated to the Chinese - which evoked no reply. Further, the road the Chinese built in the 1950s across Aksai Chin falls well outside this line.

From the middle of the 19th century till about 1915, the British were more worried about the Russians than the Chinese. Having created a buffer zone in Afghanistan vide the Wakhan Corridor, the British, for nearly half a century, were virtually inviting the Chinese to come right up to the Karakoram line so as to create another buffer. The collapse of China in 1911 and the Russian Revolution in 1917 altered the geopolitical scenario significantly.

Taking advantage of the weakness of China, the British convened the Simla Conference in 1913 with Tibet and China, to now create a buffer between China and British India. There, one of the most underhand deals of deceit was played out.

A concept of Outer and Inner Tibet (similar to the Russian-Chinese treaty regarding Mongolia) was initiated. The inner line was the famous, or infamous, McMahon Line, the outer line running along the foothills of Assam, the pre-1914 boundary.

The Simla Conference, as Neville Maxwell puts it, was one where there were two participants in a tripartite conference openly signing a secret declaration, one text of a draft convention initialled by three parties, another initialled by two, and a map initialled by all three!

But the net result was that the conference produced nothing that was accepted by China. The McMahon Line was virtually forgotten till 1935, and here came another sleight of hand. International treaties, pacts, agreements, etc, are published in Atchison's Register much like the Lloyd's register for shipping. Having missed announcing the 1913 Tibetan Convention in the 1929 edition, the British in 1937 published what was passed off as the 1929 edition.

All copies of the original 1929 edition were to be suppressed and were recalled and destroyed. One survived - in the Harvard University library. This falsification of evidence was to enable the British to state that the Simla Convention was always valid from 1914. Only, this claim was first made in 1960 - by Independent India!

This was the position in 1947. All lines drawn by the British but none of them agreed to by China. We became independent but it appears that there are different modes of becoming independent. A G Noorani details the manner in which Independence was granted and the various nuances of the methodologies.

The leaders of Pakistan and India adopted the Canadian/Australian model and accepted "transfer of power from British hands and devolution of treaties concluded by the British. They were stopped from contesting that position."

In contrast, Ireland's Dail Eireann (their Lok Sabha) maintains that Ireland's power comes directly from God to the people of Ireland and, hence, any treaty/pact signed by the British was null and void. Even the Burma Independence Act was different: there, the British relinquished power and there was no transfer.

The nuances of these words may make sense only to someone steeped in international law, but was the Indian National Congress aware of the consequences? If so, has it kept this hidden from its people so far? We had bound ourselves to treaties as far back as 1792, concluded by the East India Company! Noorani adds that while the 1914 Indo-Tibetan treaty on the Mcmahon Line concerned British India, the Aksai Chin province was never a part of British India, although a part of the British Empire. This distinction is significant. Was this fact known and, if so, was this also hidden?

The stage was set for the denouement.

Rustic Indian proverb: jiski lathi, uski bhains. If both have lathis, then the one whose is bigger or uses it more effectively will win. That's 1962 in short, but we have jumped time. After Independence, Tibet demanded return of the territories taken by the British! These included large parts of Ladakh, Assam and the districts of Darjeeling and Sikkim.

In 1949, China announced that its army would match into Tibet for a more centralised administration, accomplishing the exercise despite India's protestations. No other country opened its mouth. South Asian power politics had shifted with the exit of the British and, in retrospect, perhaps we should have accepted Dominion Status while our netas learned statecraft and geopolitical strategy using a military backing.

Strangely, when India moved into the Tawang tract in 1951, there was no protest from China. It appeared that China had tacitly accepted the McMahon Line.

In 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru decided to redraw maps showing firm boundary lines where earlier colour wash reflected an unsettled boundary. Aksai Chin became entirely Indian territory. Nehru further declared that the border was firm and not open to discussion.

Unilaterally drawing a map to your convenience is easy. Occupying and enforcing your administration on the ground is another. While deciding to advance and establish posts in the disputed area, an event that shook India was taking shape.

In 1956, the Chinese started building a road from Yarkand to Gartok, 1,200-km long with about 180 km in Aksai Chin claimed by India! The joke is that the Chinese completed a road right across 'our territory' without us knowing about it till 1957 - from press reports in China congratulating the building of the road!

Nehru kept this hidden from Parliament till 1959, till a patrol sent to establish the configuration of the road just disappeared. With India lodging a protest, the dispute was out in the open.

China responded with the bitter truth: the entire Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Much correspondence flowed, each with new nuances/stances/interpretations being revealed. In the interim came the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet in 1959. Things began to happen very fast.

Long before letters, protests, etc, flowed, Nehru maintained to Parliament and people that there was no dispute - hence, no negotiation. He virtually painted himself into a corner. Political compulsions, media and an enraged Opposition made track-changes difficult.

But the fault for deciding on a collision course was set by Nehru by his inexplicable intransigent approach. He and the country paid a heavy price for this. While claiming Aksai Chin, Nehru defended the government's ignorance of the road by stating that it was remote, no one lived there, nothing grew there, etc. He was told: nothing grows on your head either.


From 1959 to 1962 began a race that could only end in a collision - which it did. Adopting an aggressive forward policy with inadequate resources both in men and material, the Indian army was ordered to move and patrol areas, including Chinese-claimed areas but shown as Indian territory only on our maps

With the gun loaded, safety catch off, only the trigger had to be pulled. It came in the form of an Indian post set up at Khinzamane, in extreme north-west NEFA, north of the McMahon Line. Subsequent claims to the Thagla Ridge and the setting up of another post called Dhola on the banks of the Namka Chu, all north of the McMahon Line, was enough to rile the Chinese.

They launched their attack. 7 Brigade just evaporated, Brig. Dalvi taken prisoner. How the war was conducted is best described by him: the PM wanted the Chinese pushed out and pushed the defence minister, who pushed the army chief, who pushed the Army Commander, who pushed the Corps Commander, who pushed the Division Commander, who pushed the Brigade Commander, who pushed the nearest battalion into the river!


But let us not be harsh on the soldier. Unacclimatised, dressed in cotton with canvas shoes, with no artillery support, he was gasping at 17,000 ft. His fate was compounded by contradictory stop-go orders, often vague, coming right from Delhi from a political class that had an amateurish boy scout vision in conducting military operations. The Chinese tore through Tawang, Se La and Bomdi La, and were just miles away from Tezpur.

The 'forward policy' enunciated and implemented over three years was in shambles in less than three weeks. On November 21, 1962, the Chinese announced a unilateral ceasefire and a withdrawal to the November 7, 1959, positions. Tacitly, the Chinese were inviting India back to negotiations. It was the first time in history that a military power did not exploit victory and demand anything more. The situation today is almost the same as November 21, 1962.

We unilaterally drew borders that even the British, a more powerful nation, took care not to. Having drawn them, we transgressed them with bravado not matched with military and political capability, paying a heavy price not only in lives but also in morale and national shame for an adventure that could have been avoided and settled on the table.

Even if negotiations failed and we did not unilaterally take aggressive steps, the matter could even today have been as it was in 1959. To effect a border settlement would mean to admit the tacit error of Nehru and exorcising the belief that we were innocent victims in 1962 and that the Chinese cannot be trusted.

We need to educate our people that it was our fault, be transparent, not withhold facts and build up a consensus. Those who swear of "not letting go even an inch of territory" should be given guns and sent to the border.

The country is being held hostage to the ego and the Himalayan blunders of one man, long dead, and probably the worst first CEO of any major country. Only one major gain: Mao-Tse Tung, whose dictum, "never start a war that you cannot win", which Nehru learnt the hard way, was primarily responsible for galvanising the Indian army.

Monday, 2 July 2012


Show patience in resolving border issue, China advises India

China,Defence/Security,Diplomacy, Wed, 27 Jun 2012 IANS

Beijing, June 27 (IANS) India and China should be patient in resolving their long-standing border issue though "difficulties remain high", a senior official here has said, falling back on a Chinese metaphor to buttress his point. He also suggested that too much focus on the border issue might not be helpful.
A solution would work out in the course of time, just like "a watermelon, which when ripe will come down on its own", said Ma Jisheng, deputy director general of the foreign ministry's information department.
"More haste on the issue would lead to less speed," Ma told a group of visiting Indian journalists, adding that the talks should be backed by more cooperation and feelings in relations in the political field.
He noted that the joint working group on the border had "achieved some progress but difficulties remain high".
Ma also said that "too much focus" on the issue was a deterrent. "Change the ways and eyes and that will give a different approach to solving the issue," Ma said.
The two countries held their 15th round of border talks in New Delhi in January between Chinese special representative, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, and Indian special representative, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon. The next round of talks is to be held in China.
In separate interactions with the Indian journalists, Chinese officials, including senior women officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) , and experts on Sino-Indian affairs stressed that while the border issue involved "core national interests", it should not be allowed to dictate bilateral ties in other spheres.
Ma said the two countries should follow a two-track policy - hold talks away from the spotlight on the border issue while continuing to boost their ties in the economic, cultural, educational and other fields.
"Negotiations on the border issue should be on one track, and on other track the economic, cultural ties should go on," he said.
He said bilateral trade has jumped manifold in the last decade - from $2.9 billion in 2000 to $73.9 billion in 2011. "If all the attention had been on the border issue, then trade would not have jumped," Ma said.
To a query on reports of incursions by Chinese troops across the border into Arunachal Pradesh, a senior PLA officer, in another interaction, stressed that the border between their two countries has not been officially demarcated.
Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu, director of the Center on China-America Defence Relations at the PLA Academy of Military Science, said both India and China have a "different concept" of the Line of Actual Control as it is not a "physical concept". Thus, reports in the Indian media of Chinese troops having crossed over cannot be termed transgressions.
"The border has not been officially demarcated; therefore you cannot call it transgression by Chinese troops...We don't see how the calculation was arrived at...Maybe then Indian border troops have transgressed more than China has done, according to the Chinese side," she said, and stressed that China was for maintaining status quo on the border issue for stability and tranquillity.
Col Guo Hongtao, staff officer Asian Affairs Bureau in the defence ministry's foreign affairs office, said there were differences of perception of the Line of Actual Control between the two countries as "in some sections of LAC, China thinks it belongs to it, while India proclaims sovereignty, and vice versa...which leads to disagreement".
The nearly 4,057-km Line of Actual Control divides India and China.
To a question on the status of Sikkim, the official said China has officially proclaimed in 2004 that the previous line between China and Sikkim has been replaced by the Sikkim section.
He also said that the problem of issuing visas on passports to people from Arunachal Pradesh was "under discussion".
The Indian journalists were visiting China on the invite of the All China Journalists' Association.
(Ranjana Narayan can be contacted at ranjana.n@ians.in)