ACCEPTANCE SPEECH BY SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE ON HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE AS PRESIDENT OF INDIA
Central Hall of Parliament, New Delhi, 25th July 2012Download TextHindi | English
Tuesday, 24 July 2012
Download TextHindi | English
I AM DEEPLY MOVED BY THE HIGH HONOUR YOU HAVE ACCORDED TO ME. SUCH HONOUR EXALTS THE OCCUPANT OF THIS OFFICE, EVEN AS IT DEMANDS THAT HE RISES ABOVE PERSONAL OR PARTISAN INTERESTS IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL GOOD.THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS OFFICE IS TO FUNCTION AS THE GUARDIAN OF OUR CONSTITUTION. I WILL STRIVE, AS I SAID ON OATH, TO PRESERVE, PROTECT AND DEFEND OUR CONSTITUTION NOT JUST IN WORD BUT ALSO IN SPIRIT. WE ARE ALL, ACROSS THE DIVIDE OF PARTY AND REGION, PARTNERS AT THE ALTAR OF OUR MOTHERLAND. OUR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION EMBODIES THE IDEA OF MODERN INDIA: IT DEFINES NOT ONLY INDIA BUT ALSO MODERNITY. A MODERN NATION IS BUILT ON SOME BASIC FUNDAMENTALS: DEMOCRACY, OR EQUAL RIGHTS FOR EVERY CITIZEN; SECULARISM, OR EQUAL FREEDOM TO EVERY FAITH; EQUALITY OF EVERY REGION AND LANGUAGE; GENDER EQUALITY AND, PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, ECONOMIC EQUITY. FOR OUR DEVELOPMENT TO BE REAL THE POOREST OF OUR LAND MUST FEEL THAT THEY ARE PART OF THE NARRATIVE OF RISING INDIA.I HAVE SEEN VAST, PERHAPS UNBELIEVABLE, CHANGES DURING THE JOURNEY THAT HAS BROUGHT ME FROM THE FLICKER OF A LAMP IN A SMALL BENGAL VILLAGE TO THE CHANDELIERS OF DELHI. I WAS A BOY WHEN BENGAL WAS SAVAGED BY A FAMINE THAT KILLED MILLIONS; THE MISERY AND SORROW IS STILL NOT LOST ON ME. WE HAVE ACHIEVED MUCH IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE; BUT THAT IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT INDIA, LED BY THE COMING GENERATIONS, WILL CREATE IN THE DECADES AHEAD.
OUR NATIONAL MISSION MUST CONTINUE TO BE WHAT IT WAS WHEN THE GENERATION OF MAHATMA GANDHI, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, SARDAR PATEL, RAJENDRA PRASAD, AMBEDKAR AND MAULANA AZAD OFFERED US A TRYST WITH DESTINY: TO ELIMINATE THE CURSE OF POVERTY, AND CREATE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE YOUNG THAT THEY CAN TAKE OUR INDIA FORWARD BY QUANTUM LEAPS. THERE IS NO HUMILIATION MORE ABUSIVE THAN HUNGER. TRICKLE-DOWN THEORIES DO NOT ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE POOR. WE MUST LIFT THOSE AT THE BOTTOM SO THAT POVERTY IS ERASED FROM THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN INDIA.
WHAT HAS BROUGHT US THUS FAR, WILL TAKE US FURTHER AHEAD. INDIA'S TRUE STORY IS THE PARTNERSHIP OF THE PEOPLE. OUR WEALTH HAS BEEN CREATED BY FARMERS AND WORKERS, INDUSTRIALISTS AND SERVICE-PROVIDERS, SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS. OUR SOCIAL HARMONY IS THE SUBLIME CO-EXISTENCE OF TEMPLE, MOSQUE, CHURCH, GURUDWARA AND SYNAGOGUE; THEY ARE SYMBOLS OF OUR UNITY IN DIVERSITY.
BUT THE VISIBLE REWARDS OF PEACE HAVE ALSO OBSCURED THE FACT THAT THE AGE OF WAR IS NOT OVER. WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF A FOURTH WORLD WAR; THE THIRD WAS THE COLD WAR, BUT IT WAS VERY WARM IN ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA TILL IT ENDED IN THE EARLY 1990S. THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM IS THE FOURTH; AND IT IS A WORLD WAR BECAUSE IT CAN RAISE ITS EVIL HEAD ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. INDIA HAS BEEN ON THE FRONTLINES OF THIS WAR LONG BEFORE MANY OTHER RECOGNIZED ITS VICIOUS DEPTH OR POISONOUS CONSEQUENCES. I AM PROUD OF THE VALOUR AND CONVICTION AND STEELY DETERMINATION OF OUR ARMED FORCES AS THEY HAVE FOUGHT THIS MENACE ON OUR BORDERS; OF OUR BRAVE POLICE FORCES AS THEY HAVE MET THE ENEMY WITHIN; AND OF OUR PEOPLE, WHO HAVE DEFEATED THE TERRORIST TRAP BY REMAINING CALM IN THE FACE OF EXTRAORDINARY PROVOCATION. THE PEOPLE OF INDIA HAVE BEEN A BEACON OF MATURITY THROUGH THE TRAUMA OF WHIPLASH WOUNDS. THOSE WHO INSTIGATE VIOLENCE AND PERPETUATE HATRED NEED TO UNDERSTAND ONE TRUTH. FEW MINUTES OF PEACE WILL ACHIEVE FAR MORE THAN MANY YEARS OF WAR. INDIA IS CONTENT WITH ITSELF, AND DRIVEN BY THE WILL TO SIT ON THE HIGH TABLE OF PROSPERITY. IT WILL NOT BE DEFLECTED IN ITS MISSION BY NOXIOUS PRACTITIONERS OF TERROR.
AS INDIANS, WE MUST OF COURSE LEARN FROM THE PAST; BUT WE MUST REMAIN FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE. IN MY VIEW, EDUCATION IS THE ALCHEMY THAT CAN BRING INDIA ITS NEXT GOLDEN AGE. OUR OLDEST SCRIPTURES LAID THE FRAMEWORK OF SOCIETY AROUND THE PILLARS OF KNOWLEDGE; OUR CHALLENGE IS TO CONVERT KNOWLEDGE INTO A DEMOCRATIC FORCE BY TAKING IT INTO EVERY CORNER OF OUR COUNTRY. OUR MOTTO IS UNAMBIGUOUS: ALL FOR KNOWLEDGE, AND KNOWLEDGE FOR ALL.THE WEIGHT OF OFFICE SOMETIMES BECOMES A BURDEN ON DREAMS. THE NEWS IS NOT ALWAYS CHEERFUL. CORRUPTION IS AN EVIL THAT CAN DEPRESS THE NATION'S MOOD AND SAP ITS PROGRESS. WE CANNOT ALLOW OUR PROGRESS TO BE HIJACKED BY THE GREED OF A FEW.
Tuesday, 17 July 2012
Shyam Saran: The fragmentation of Europe
| Shyam
Saran: The fragmentation of Europe |
| The great project of European integration is in danger, which India should view with concern |
| Shyam Saran /
Jul 18, 2012, 00:36 IST source:Business Standard |
In a recent swing through several European countries, one witnessed the ominous signs of a deepening fragmentation among member states of the European Union, with the historic fault lines in the continent resurfacing with a disturbing intensity. In dealing with the persistent financial and economic crisis, the member states are increasingly taking recourse to narrowly conceived policy measures.
The vulnerability of banks in several southern European countries like Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (the so-called PIIGS, itself a pejorative acronym) has frozen much of the normal inter-bank flow of funds, which is the lifeblood of economic activity, in particular trade finance. Despite having a common currency, there are significant outflows of money taking place from the more vulnerable countries to those regarded, at least for now, as relatively safe havens. A euro in Greece is no longer the same as a euro in Germany. Money being pumped into the banking system through funds provided by the European Central Bank is being retained in bank coffers rather than being used to extend credit to industry and business to kick-start economic recovery. Under the facade of a single market and a single currency, European states are increasingly reverting to the habits characteristic of nation states.
In parallel to the economic fragmentation, there is an even more disturbing political fragmentation under way in Europe. The European Union project was designed not only to generate the economic benefits of regional integration and an expanded single market. More importantly, it was aimed at overcoming the often destructive assertion of separate nationalisms that had plunged Europe into two debilitating wars within a generation. The members of the Union agreed to surrender some measure of their sovereignty into a collectivity that functioned on the basis of an agreed set of rules and more informal norms. What underpins this process of integration are the shared values of liberal democracy and free market economics. The setting up of the monetary union – and the adoption of a single currency by 17 of the 27 member states – was as much a political initiative as an economic one. As the economic bonds tying the member states together have begun to fray, the reassertion of nationalism is evident everywhere. There is a dramatic increase in the political fortunes of hitherto marginal right-wing parties, hostile to the very idea of the Union. They oppose immigration even from other states of the European Union itself. In states like Greece, there has been a worrying rise in violent attacks against immigrants, but xenophobic attitudes are apparent across the continent.
In several countries, the target of attack these days is usually Germany and, to a lesser extent, the Anglo-Saxon dominance over the global economy. Germany is criticised for what is seen as an obstinate and uncaring insistence on financial rectitude, fiscal discipline and further economic integration as conditions for bailing out vulnerable economies. These conditionalities are seen as a plot to create a “German Europe” instead of a “European Germany”. In Spain, the refrain was that Germany was attempting to achieve through economic means what it failed to do through the two world wars it had unleashed in the last century. One was taken aback by the intensity of hostility directed against Germany. If the economic crisis continues to linger and intensify, the spirit of solidarity and common purpose that underlies the Union will diminish, perhaps beyond repair.
It may be possible to carry the process of integration forward in response to the crisis. Judging by the mood in several European countries, the opposite appears more likely. There is a sense of partners stuck in a bad marriage who carry on somehow because separation may have even more negative consequences. This is a very far cry from the ideals that made the Union possible.
What is happening in Europe is of considerable significance to India, and not merely because the European Union is our largest trade partner. In a rapidly transforming and still uncertain geopolitical landscape, a strong and united Europe is a positive for India, which has an instinctive preference for multiple polarity. The Union also symbolised the success of a multiple-ethnic, multiple-cultural and multiple-lingual plural democracy, based on liberal political values that correspond to India’s own deepest aspirations and a view of its own civilisational heritage. In a world riven by the forces of extremism and intolerance, the success of the European experiment has been a source of reassurance and reinforcement for India’s own struggle to establish the ideal of unity in diversity. Europe is an undervalued partner. Its loss will demonstrate its immense relevance to India.
The writer, a former foreign secretary, is chairman of RIS
and a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research
Sunday, 15 July 2012
China acknowledges Dalai Lama's hold in Tibet
| China acknowledges Dalai Lama's hold in Tibet |
| Ajai Shukla / New Delhi Jul 16, 2012, 00:49 IST |
As resentment against the Communist Party’s iron yoke boils over in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of China, Beijing has begun admitting that the Dalai Lama’s hold runs deep in these areas.
This is a major policy shift. Since 1959, when the Dalai Lama escaped to political asylum in India, the Communist Party has insisted that the Tibetans are a happy lot. The communist apparatchiks have passed off growing public protests, like the 40 self-immolations by Tibetans in the last four years, as the work of a few malcontents, instigated from “foreign countries” by the “Dalai Clique”.
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A fortnight ago, the Communist Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Chen Quanguo, urged officials to “make sure that the Central Party’s voices and images can be heard across 120 thousand square kilometres (of Tibet),” and that “no voices and images of enemy forces and Dalai clique can be heard and seen.” This call was published in an interview in the Communist Party’s official newspaper, Renming Wang on June 27.
Tibetans face tightened controls on internet use, text messages, phone ownership, music publishing, and photocopying. Instead of independent news, Tibetans now get intensified political propaganda in villages, schools, and monasteries, and sharp restrictions on travel into the TAR.
Since March 12, controls have been tightened on travel from other provinces into the TAR. Additional restrictions on travel by foreigners to the TAR were introduced in May 2012 and again in early June.
An authoritative new report from Human Rights Watch traces the Communist Party’s shifting stance that acknowledges the Dalai Lama’s growing influence, especially in rural Tibet, where 85 per cent of the population lives.
Until 2008, Chinese officials in Lhasa declared that Tibetans hardly supported the Dalai Lama. In 2001 an official survey purportedly found that 86 per cent of Lhasa’s residents regarded the “Dalai as a separatist or a politician.” Wu Jilie, TAR’s deputy governor told foreign journalists, “the Dalai Lama has aroused the distrust and resolute opposition of the vast majority of people here (Reuters, August 20, 2004).
According to Human Rights Watch, TAR’s chairman said in 2007 that “the majority of Tibetan people do not want the Dalai Lama to return to the region” and that “his influence is very limited” (Xinhua, June 20, 2007).
The first signs of change date back to 2010, when TAR’s governor, Padma Thrinley (Baima Chiling in Chinese) declared, “to say that the Dalai has no influence at all in Tibet is impossible… The Dalai Lama has some influence for sure” (reported in Ifeng News, November 6, 2010). On March 12, Thrinley said, “Let’s face the reality: the Dalai Lama and his followers do try to attract young Tibetans, but what we need to do is not to compete with them … Instead, the key is to improve people’s livelihood … the popularity of the government will depend on its work” (Xinhua, March 7, 2012). He admitted to a Chinese reporter that, “right now, the Dalai is indeed competing with us for the younger generations.”
Tibetan anger is simmering not just in TAR, but in the adjoining Tibetan-inhabited areas as well. TAR is merely the western half of the Tibetan plateau, home to half of China’s Tibetan population, which is 2.9 million out of 5.7 million officially recognised ethnic Tibetans. The other 2.8 million Tibetans live on the eastern part of the Tibetan plateau, in designated Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAP), and Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TAC) within the four provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan.
Chinese government statements that are directed towards non-Tibetan audiences still pretend there is widespread Tibetan support for China’s policies. However, local articles in Tibetan areas increasingly describe the Dalai Lama as having widespread influence.
Since late 2011, official speeches throughout Tibetan areas have referred repeatedly to campaigns directed at “the masses” or “the foundations,” rather than primarily at monks and nuns, indicating an attempt to change the thinking of rural Tibetans on a scale not seen since the beginning of the reform era in the 1980s.
Focus China: Strike corps plan back on drawing board
Shishir Gupta, Hindustan Times
New Delhi, July 15, 2012
New Delhi, July 15, 2012
First Published: 00:39 IST(15/7/2012)
Last Up
Last Up
The UPA government has sent back the army's 2011 proposal for raising a new mountain strike corps at Pannagarh in West Bengal to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) this month in order to bring the navy and air force on board and broad base its military capability against China.
Top official sources said once the three chiefs decide on their specific individual requirements to strengthen the northern borders and deployment in the Indian Ocean, the new proposal will be sent to the Cabinet Committee on Security after due whetting of the defence ministry.
As first reported by HT last August, the army had moved an ambitious proposal to raise a strike corps with two divisions (total of 60,000 men) against China at Pannagarh, position two armoured regiments at Nathu La in Sikkim and Fukche in Ladakh respectively, and deploy an additional infantry brigade to Barahoti plains in Uttarakhand. After being cleared by the defence ministry last year, the proposal was sent to the finance ministry, followed by the CCS, for approval.
The decision to send back the COSC plan came after the country's security managers felt all three services needed to muscle up against the rising military capability of the northern neighbour, and not just the army. The move also came after the navy and air force raised concerns over preferential treatment to army modernisation by the government.
"We have asked the three chiefs to discuss among themselves their hardware requirements within the designated modernisation budget, and come up with a wholesome proposal," said a senior official.
Apart from the army, the air force and navy will also be sending proposals to the COSC before the final view is taken on what new air and naval assets, including helicopters for advance landing grounds and warships for longer reach into Indian Ocean, will be required.
However, given the speed at which China is building its military capacities, defence minister AK Antony has said if the tri-service proposal is not brought to the table soon, the ministry will intervene to allocate military resources within the budget.
| A Chinese encounter |
| Inside story of how India?s political establishment and army fumbled and fought even as China made incursions |
Kuldip Nayar / Jul 14, 2012, 00:56 IST |
| Source:Business Standard |
Kuldip Nayar gives an inside account of how India’s political establishment and army fumbled and fought even as China made incursions into its territory
It was in the home ministry that I first heard about the Chinese incursion into our territory. I was sitting with Fateh Singh, deputy secretary in charge of foreigners, when his aide came with a sheaf of papers relating to China and wanted to know what he should do with them. They related to the illegal construction of a road in Ladakh. Without even looking at him, Fateh Singh said: “Put them in the ‘border file’.”
Fateh Singh told me how China was nibbling away our territory in Ladakh and the guilt he felt that the nation had not been informed. China had built a road in the Indian territory of Aksai Chin. Police official Lakshman Singh was the first person in 1954 to inform New Delhi about the road. As our trade representative, he used to visit Tibet every year. His contacts were wide and he had learnt about the road from some labourers who had built it. (An Indian air force plane accidentally flying over the area at that time confirmed the road on the basis of a photograph.)
New Delhi doubted Lakshman Singh’s version. There was a division of opinion between (Home Minister Govind Ballabh) Pant and Nehru. Pant wanted air reconnaissance to be undertaken to verify the report. Nehru claimed that this would serve no purpose. He did not want to even lodge a protest about the alignment of the road without being certain about its existence. After many discussions, Nehru agreed to send Indian maps to China which depicted Aksai Chin as part of the Indian territory, and even this he asked the foreign secretary to do informally. He was reluctant to annoy China.
However, when there was no response from the other side, Pant persuaded Nehru to send a patrol which found that the road had indeed been constructed in Aksai Chin and was being patrolled by Chinese soldiers. Sighting the Indian patrol, they captured it and tied its members to the tails of horses and dragged them along the road. New Delhi lodged a protest which was rejected with contempt.
* * *
China’s aggressive posture became clear when it denounced the old border maps
and refused to accept the traditional alignments depicted on them. To India’s
dismay our maps showed some of our territory as part of China. The home ministry
wrote to the states asking them to burn the maps or at least smudge the border
with China on the Assam side because they did not accurately delineate the
Indian border.The Chinese exploited our confusion and used our maps to question our claim. Nehru was still in favour of accommodating China on the question of the Aksai Chin road. Pant proposed a long-term lease, but China responded by occupying Khurnak Fort in Ladakh. China Pictorial, Beijing’s official publication, once again published a small-scale map showing a large part of north-eastern Ladakh within the borders of China. Nehru wrote to Chou Enlai to express his surprise at the Chinese attitude “which was contrary to what he had been led to believe since 1949”.
It was a bitter personal blow to Nehru. Despite the warnings from Congress leaders that China was deceitful, he relied on his judgement that China would not betray his confidence and would agree to the traditional border with a few minor adjustments. He had recommended a Security Council seat for China even when the West wanted India to occupy it. A communist country, he imagined, would never be hostile to a third world one, and particularly one wedded to socialist ideals.
* * *
I recall that before hostilities broke out, a ‘solution’ of the border issue
was suggested by (Defence Minister V K) Krishna Menon, but he was overruled by
Pant. Menon had met Chen Yi, China’s foreign minister, at Geneva, and told him
that India might accept Peking’s suzerainty over the area in Aksai Chin as well
as a buffer of 10 miles to the road. In exchange, China must officially accept
the McMahon Line in the East and India’s rights to the rest of Ladakh.China had reportedly accepted the idea but Pant stood in the way. He got the government to formally withdraw the offer through a resolution in the cabinet. Even leasing out the Aksai Chin area was not acceptable. The fact was that Pant, like Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, did not trust Menon and considered him an inveterate communist.
* * *
At that very meeting, it was agreed that some scrutiny of the different
claims would be necessary. Eventually, an official team was appointed with S.
Gopal and Jagat Mehta as members from the Indian side. Gopal travelled to London
to obtain material to support India’s case. He was happy to have found relevant
documents but there was additional material the British government would not
part with but made photostat copies available. The Chinese tried their best to
sabotage this project but the Mountbattens were a great help. The story that the
Chinese attempted to snatch some material from Gopal on his return flight was
incorrect, and he contradicted this when I subsequently asked him for
confirmation.Gopal and Mehta carried a load of material to Peking. A set of copies of the entire data was prepared and left in Delhi lest ‘theft’ or some other ‘untoward occurrence’ might destroy the valuable evidence. They had prepared a convincing report but the Chinese rejected it.
I got a hint of how little was expected from the meeting from the Polish ambassador, whom I had met at diplomatic parties, even before the official team left India. I was only the home ministry’s information officer and had no official locus standi, but it was obvious that the Polish ambassador was on a mission. He invited me for a chat at his chancery and expected me to convey what he had said to Pant. At the beginning of the conversation he said that the proposal he would make had the support of all Communist countries, and specifically mentioning the Soviet Union.
His proposal was that India should accept a package political deal, getting recognition for the McMahon Line in exchange for handing over control of some areas in Ladakh to China. He said that the areas demanded had never been charted, and nobody could say to whom they belonged. What was being claimed to be India’s was what had been forcibly occupied by the UK. No power could honour ‘the imperialist line’, nor should India insist upon it. Whatever the odds, China would never part with control of the road it had built. That was the lifeline between Sinkiang and other parts of China, he argued. I conveyed the proposal to Pant who gave me no reaction, his or that of the government.
* * *
The war was, however, preceded by a string of events. I am reconstructing the
story after having spoken to General P N Thapar, the then chief of army staff,
and Defence Minister Krishna Menon. Somewhat peeved by the criticism, Nehru
ordered Thapar to evict the Chinese from the posts they had built within Indian
territory. The army chief was reluctant to do so because he thought it would be
like ‘disturbing a hornet’s nest’.A meeting was held under the chairmanship of Krishna Menon, who was all for action. Thapar argued that the Indian army did not have the necessary strength, the ratio being six Chinese to one Indian. Menon responded confidently that he had met Chen Yi, the Chinese deputy premier, at Geneva and had been assured that China would never fight India over the border issue. When I asked Menon specifically whether this information given to me by General Thapar was true, his reply was: “That toothless old woman; he did not know how to fight a war.”
Thapar had submitted a note to the government when he took over as chief in 1960. In it, he had pointed out that the equipment with the army was in such poor condition and in such short supply that China or Pakistan could easily defeat India. This was in sharp contrast to Nehru’s statement, which I heard from the press gallery: “I can tell the House that at no time since Independence has our defence been in better condition and finer fettle.”
It appeared as if the government was determined to fight the Chinese without reorganising or re-equipping the army. At Menon’s meeting, Thapar was supported by only one person,
V Vishwanathan, then the additional secretary in the home ministry. He said that if Gen. Thapar felt that India was unprepared there was no point in being foolhardy, but Menon was obdurate about attacking China.
Faced with no option other than an immediate military operation, Thapar sought an interview with the prime minister to seek his intervention. A few minutes before his departure for Nehru’s house, S S Khera, then cabinet secretary, met him and said: “General, if I were you, I would not express my fears before Panditji for he might think that you are afraid to fight.” Thapar’s curt reply was that he must tell the prime minister the truth; the rest was for him to decide.
Before Thapar got into his car, Khera once again said that he must realise that if India did not fight, the government would fall. Thapar did not argue further but was more convinced than ever that the decision to resist China was motivated by political considerations.
Thapar repeated to Nehru how the Indian army was unprepared, untrained, and ill-equipped for the operation it was being asked to undertake. (Menon told me before he became defence minister that there was no army worth the name and no equipment worth the mention.)
Nehru said Menon had informed him that India was itself producing a substantial part of the army equipment it required. Thapar emphasised that India was nowhere near the stage of even assembling the weapons required for war. He then mentioned the note he had submitted, complaining about the poor shape of the army and its equipment. Nehru said he had never seen it.
To reassure Thapar, Nehru told him that he had received reliable information that the Chinese would not offer resistance if there was a show of force to make them vacate the check-posts. Thapar knew from where the information had come. Obviously, the government had not taken any note of the Chinese warnings that “the Indian aggressor must bear full responsibility for the consequences of their crimes”.
The General was still not prepared to take the risk. He asked Nehru to speak to some of the army commanders. Lt Gen Prodip Sen, commanding-in-chief Eastern Army Command, who was in Thapar’s room in the defence ministry at that time, was summoned. He supported Thapar and said that the army was far from prepared. Nehru repeated that his information was that the Chinese would not retaliate.
Thapar took heart from this. If that was true then even his unprepared forces might wear the crown of glory. No general can resist the temptation of marching at the head of a winning army, and Thapar was no exception. He began preparing for action. Thapar told me on 29 July 1970: “Looking back, I think I should have submitted my resignation at that time. I might have saved my country from the humiliation of defeat.”
* * *
By the time Thapar went to meet Menon towards the end of October 1962, the
Indian post at Dhola (3 kilometres north of the McMahon Line) had fallen and the
Chinese forces were rushing downhill further into North East Frontier Agency
(NEFA). Menon had already known about it because one copy of every signal to the
chief of the army staff was going directly to the defence minister.Thapar did not indulge in ‘I-told-you-so’. He simply reported what had happened and said, “Now we must plan what to do next.” Menon, brooding over a cup of black tea, only remarked: “How could I have known that they would come like an avalanche?”
Thapar told the defence minister that Indian forces should now fall back and hold out at Se-la Pass, about 40 miles from Dhola. Menon sarcastically remarked: “General, why not Bangalore?” They talked very little after that and awaited the defence committee meeting over which Nehru was to preside.
Before the meeting, B N Mullick, the intelligence chief, came to Thapar to apologise for being so wrong in his intelligence reports in which he had said that the Chinese were too tied up with the Khampas in Tibet to spare men for the border. The General’s reply was that it was the future which was more important.
* * *
When Bomdi-la fell (19 November 1962), Thapar was at Tezpur. He flew to Delhi
and went straight to Nehru to say that in the best traditions of the Indian army
he, as a defeated general, would like to submit his resignation. For the first
time in many days Thapar saw a smile on Nehru’s face. Holding his hand tightly,
he said: “Thank you, but this is not your fault.”However, when Thapar met him the following morning Nehru said: “General, you remember what you said to me last night. I would like to get it in writing.” Thapar came home and got the letter of resignation typed by his daughter and sent it within two hours. I saw Nehru in the Lok Sabha waving the letter of resignation. This did lessen the anger of members who were targeting Nehru. He thought that Thapar’s exit would assuage parliament’s anger against Krishna Menon. It did to a degree when Nehru changed Menon’s portfolio from defence to defence production.
(Excerpted with permission from Roli Books)
BEYOND THE LINESAn Autobiography
Author: Kuldip Nayar
Publisher: Roli
Pages: 420
Price: Rs 595
Thursday, 12 July 2012
Batting for the Mcmahon Line
(Photo: courtesy
Ajai Shukla): Sunrise over Tawang, the important border town in
Arunachal Pradesh, on which China has cunningly focused the border
discussions
by Ajai
Shukla
Business Standard, 10th July 12
As this
newspaper reported last week (7th July 12, “British question mark
lingers over Arunachal”) a scholarly article in a
Beijing newspaper has focused China’s spotlight on a troubling British policy
retreat that undermines the Indian claim that the McMahon Line forms the
Sino-India border in Arunachal Pradesh. This took the form of an inexplicable
statement from former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in 2008, that
back-tracked from Britain’s long-held position that Tibet was autonomous before
1950, with China having a “special position” but not sovereignty over that
country. Miliband abandoned that position as an “anachronism” based on “the
outdated concept of suzerainty.” Instead, he announced that, “Like every other
EU member state, and the United States, we regard Tibet as part of the People’s
Republic of China.”
Why is this
vital for New Delhi? The McMahon Line was formalized between India and Tibet at
the Simla Convention in 1914, and its legitimacy rests on Tibet’s independence.
Beijing argues that Lhasa was subordinate to Beijing and, therefore, not
empowered to negotiate its borders. Miliband’s statement could add weight to
Beijing’s argument. Chinese negotiators will say: the colonial power that
negotiated the Simla Convention has wisely repudiated
it.
What makes
Miliband’s retreat especially baffling is that London got absolutely nothing out
of it, except for a mouthful from Beijing for interfering in its internal
matters. Having already given away Hong Kong and forsaken Taiwan with a
one-China policy, Tibet was the lone card in the British hand that mattered
desperately to Beijing. But London gifted it away without any apparent strategic
intent.
London was not
alone in kowtowing to China in 2008, when the economic recession made the East
wind appear to indeed be prevailing over the West wind. Nicolas Sarkozy,
France’s blustering former president, responded to China’s brutal crackdown on
Tibetan protestors in Mar 08 by threatening to boycott the opening of the
Beijing Olympics that August. This led to a coordinated picketing of Carrefour
supermarkets across China and an internet campaign that charged the French chain
with funding the Dalai Lama. It was the first anti-European deployment of
people’s power, a weapon that had been perfected earlier against Japan. Beijing
intervened only after a few days of carefully calibrated silence, and Sarkozy
got the message. After meeting Chinese president Hu Jintao in July, Sarkozy
announced his attendance at the Olympics in the spirit of “peace, friendship and
brotherhood.”
Miliband’s
wobble and Beijing’s skilful hardball raise two big issues for India. Firstly,
is China’s economic muscle reformatting foreign policy hard drives in Western
Europe? This is especially relevant regarding the UK, where India’s border claim
has been impacted by the inconsistency of British policymaking in the face of a
resurgent China. Given the haste and secrecy that attended this policy shift, it
appears that London’s eagerness to please Beijing overrode the traditional
policy review process, including consultations with historical and legal
experts.
New Delhi must
immediately seek a public clarification from London, which would allow the
British government to clarify that the pre-1950 position on Tibet remains
unchanged. The big question is: “What is the UK’s current view of its pre-1950
relations with Tibet, and in particular of the Annexures to the Simla Convention
of 1914.” Meanwhile, New Delhi must urge London to recalibrate how it deals with
a rising China, basing policy decisions on long-term considerations and not just
immediate needs.
Secondly,
India must re-evaluate its own Tibet policy. Having provided asylum to the Dalai
Lama, the Central Tibetan Administration, a vibrant Tibetan clergy and a hundred
thousand Tibetans, India is probably the world’s only country with serious
leverage in Tibet. Sadly, New Delhi bends over backwards to convince Beijing
that India has no designs on Tibet. This submissiveness has yielded only
disadvantages: the Tibetan presence in India cannot but make China deeply
suspicious of India; while New Delhi’s periodic clamp-down on Tibetan refugee
activity --- portrayed as a neighbourly concern for Chinese sensitivities ---
leads Beijing to conclude that sustained pressure on India will make the Tibet
card unplayable.
India must
abandon this practice of dealing with China through concessions. Over thousands
of years of history, successive Chinese rulers have seen concessions as a sign
of weakness. The Chinese Communist Party wholeheartedly embraces this belief.
Another
Chinese diplomatic tradition involves centring the public debate on relatively
minor issues, while consigning the crucial central issues --- such as Tibet ---
to the shadows. Robert Barnett of Columbia University, a noted Tibet and China
expert says, “My hypothesis is that we can understand Chinese diplomatic
strategy better by regarding the things they make a big noise about as less
important because they want to protect from public debate the really important
things.”
China will
cheerfully discuss human rights, labour protection legislation, environmental
degradation and a raft of issues that could well be fobbed off as “internal
affairs”. But say the word “Tibet” and the shutters come down. China’s expansive
claim over Arunachal Pradesh is hardly backed by history. But it is designed to
keep the discussion off Tibet, an increasingly sensitive issue for Beijing as
its thuggish militias fail in stamping out a deep-rooted identity
struggle.
Rather than
continuing to play by Chinese rules, where Arunachal is discussed but not Tibet,
and while concessions like Miliband’s reshape the ballgame to India’s
disadvantage, New Delhi must begin raising the issue of Tibet in the Special
Representatives’ dialogue. As long as talks are about only the border, no
settlement is likely. But by strategically repositioning the Sino-Indian
dialogue, and shifting at least some of the spotlight onto Tibet, New Delhi can
create incentives for Beijing to loosen its untenable positions. India has
legitimate and non-provocative interests in Tibet: including the reopening of
India’s consulate in Lhasa that was shut down in the 1950s; border trade;
religious linkages and tourism and people-to-people contacts.
Friday, 6 July 2012
India frets as Bhutan falls in China Teacup
Jabin T Jacob | Agency: DNA | Friday, July 6, 2012
News of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meeting his Bhutanese counterpart Jigme Yoser Thinley, on the sidelines of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development at Rio de Janeiro last month, grabbed considerable attention in India. The Chinese state-owned Global Times announced that the Bhutanese leader had expressed willingness to establish diplomatic ties with China.
While the news was later denied by the Bhutanese, there are a number of issues that the incident raises about India’s relations with its smaller neighbours and specifically with Bhutan and China. It would appear that neither New Delhi nor ordinary Indians pay much attention to their smaller neighbours unless the Chinese get involved.
Why are Bhutan’s relations with China of such importance to India? The tiny Himalayan constitutional monarchy happens to be the only other country besides India that has a land boundary dispute with China. While Bhutan and China began direct negotiations on the boundary dispute in 1984, they are yet to establish full diplomatic relations, thwarted so far by Indian pressure on the Himalayan nation.
Despite Thimphu’s recent denial that it was seeking diplomatic relations with Beijing, it has been evident for some time now that Bhutanese authorities including both the monarchy and elected representatives are interested in precisely this — Bhutan for example, has had a one-China policy and Chinese representatives were invited to the coronations of both the former and current kings.
While the economic reasons are self-evident, the desire to maintain a little more distance from New Delhi is also attractive politically for Bhutan. Despite being a small nation, Bhutan is not short of ambitions for a more active role internationally. And such a role demands greater freedom of action in the foreign policy domain including the assertion of its sovereignty vis-à-vis India and the mending of fences with the Chinese.
India and Bhutan have long shared a ‘special’ relationship signified by their treaty of friendship first signed in 1949 and later revised in 2007. The revised treaty, it might be noted, was occasioned by the impending turn to parliamentary democracy in Bhutan and places the two countries on a substantially more equal footing with both sides agreeing to “cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests” instead of Bhutan being “guided” by India “in regard to its external relations.”
Indeed, as parliamentary democracy takes roots in Bhutan, questions will be increasingly asked about Thimphu maintaining such ‘special’ ties with India, and about Indian military presence in the country.
The trend will be towards greater balance and neutrality. Thus, the Bhutanese opening up to China is to be expected, even if Thimphu will probably be careful not to play the card as disastrously as Kathmandu has.
Meanwhile, the boundary dispute with China is a major national concern for Bhutan. It has apparently already lost a substantial chunk of the area under dispute including the Kula Kangri peak, to slow encroachment by the Chinese. However, the Chinese record on boundary settlements so far, shows a substantial willingness to make territorial concessions to smaller neighbours and Bhutan’s association with India in the dispute has probably disadvantaged the smaller nation.
Thimphu for its part seems willing to accept the Chinese offer of conceding Bhutanese claims in its north in return for letting China have disputed areas in the Chumbi Valley in the west.
However, such a concession in the Chumbi has huge security implications for India. Any widening of the Chumbi salient in China’s favour threatens the narrow Siliguri corridor, not very far away, that connects India to its northeast.
There are limits however, to how much pressure India can bring to bear on Bhutan especially in the era of parliamentary democracy in Bhutan. And given its rather poor record of relations with democratic governments in the neighbourhood, India can ill-afford to alienate another neighbour. New Delhi will therefore, need to tread very carefully here.
Meanwhile, owing to Bhutan’s close historical ties to Tibet and its identity as a Buddhist nation, it will continue to be concerned and wary about Chinese actions in general and in Tibet and on the religious front, in particular.
To these must be added, its desire to preserve its unique model of development. It would appear therefore, that even as Bhutan seeks greater freedom of manoeuver in its ties with India, there remain plenty of reasons that should allow the two countries to continue coordinating their foreign policies.
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